More than a year later, the conditions that precipitated the roughly seven-week-long war in Gaza known in Israel as Operation Protective Edge1 have grown considerably worse. The Palestinian government of national consensus, formed in June 2014, never exercised authority in Gaza. On 31 July 2015, that government was reshuffled, dropping all pretence of “consensus”, without Hamas’s inclusion or input. It persists nominally in Gaza, because Hamas still sees it as its best bet for disowning responsibility. While it makes certain expenditures there, it has not taken over managing the territory – not payment of salaries of employees who continue to administer Gaza; not functions or operating costs of major ministries; and not control of the border crossings that remain closed or highly restricted.2 The result for Gaza’s population is unprecedented misery, a sense of abandonment by Palestinian political leaders and economic regression. Per capita income is now 31 per cent lower than in 1994.3

This report examines the causes of Gaza’s immiseration and instability, analyses the prospects of various proposals to resolve Gaza’s problems and offers suggestions for prolonging the current calm. It follows on several recent reports on Gaza,4 including one that anticipated the 2014 war by several months.