

## **Chapter 5: Foreign Terrorist Organizations**

Designations of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) expose and isolate the designated terrorist organizations, deny them access to the U.S. financial system, and create significant criminal and immigration consequences for their members and supporters.

Moreover, designations can assist or complement the law enforcement actions of other U.S. agencies and governments.

In 2019, the Department of State designated Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), including its Qods Force (IRGC-QF), as an FTO. The State Department also amended the designation of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) to include the aliases Amaq News Agency and Al Hayat Media Center. The State Department amended the designation of Jundallah to add Jaysh al-Adl (and variants thereof) as the group's primary name. In the course of reviewing and maintaining the designation of the al-Mulathamun Battalion, the State Department concluded that the pre-existing alias al-Murabitoun should be used as the group's primary name.

### **Legal Criteria for Designation under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) as Amended:**

1. It must be a *foreign organization*.
2. The organization must *engage in terrorist activity*, as defined in section 212 (a)(3)(B) of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)), or *terrorism*, as defined in section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2)), or *retain the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism*.
3. The organization's terrorist activity or terrorism must threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security (national defense, foreign relations, or the economic interests) of the United States.

### **U.S. Government Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations**

Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB)  
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)  
Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AAMB)  
Al-Ashtar Brigades (AAB)  
Ansar al-Dine (AAD)  
Ansar al-Islam (AAI)  
Ansar al-Shari'a in Benghazi (AAS-B)  
Ansar al-Shari'a in Darnah (AAS-D)  
Ansar al-Shari'a in Tunisia (AAS-T)  
Army of Islam (AOI)  
Asbat al-Ansar (AAA)  
Aum Shinrikyo (AUM)

Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)  
 Boko Haram (BH)  
 Communist Party of Philippines/New People's Army (CPP/NPA)  
 Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)  
 Gama'a al-Islamiyya (IG)  
 Hamas  
 Haqqani Network (HQN)  
 Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HUJI)  
 Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B)  
 Harakat ul-Mujahideen (HUM)  
 Hizballah  
 Hizbul Mujahedeen (HM)  
 Indian Mujahedeen (IM)  
 Islamic Jihad Union (IJU)  
 Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)  
 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)  
 Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)  
 ISIS-Bangladesh  
 ISIS-Greater Sahara  
 Islamic State's Khorasan Province (ISIS-K)  
 ISIL-Libya  
 ISIS-Philippines  
 ISIS Sinai Province (ISIS-SP)  
 ISIS-West Africa  
 Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)  
 Jama'atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis-Sudan (Ansaru)  
 Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM)  
 Jaysh Rijal Al-Tariq Al-Naqshabandi (JRTN)  
 Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT)  
 Jemaah Islamiya (JI)  
 Jaysh al-Adl  
 Kahane Chai  
 Kata'ib Hizballah (KH)  
 Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)  
 Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LeT)  
 Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ)  
 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)  
 Mujahidin Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem (MSC)  
 Al-Murabitoun National Liberation Army (ELN)  
 Al-Nusrah Front (ANF)  
 Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ)  
 Palestine Liberation Front–Abu Abbas Faction (PLF)  
 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)  
 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC)  
 Al-Qa'ida (AQ)  
 Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)

Al-Qa'ida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)  
Al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)  
Real IRA (RIRA)  
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)  
Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C)  
Revolutionary Struggle (RS)  
Al-Shabaab (AS)  
Shining Path (SL)  
Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

### **ABDALLAH AZZAM BRIGADES**

**Also known as (aka)** Abdullah Azzam Brigades; Ziyad al-Jarrah Battalions of the Abdallah Azzam Brigades; Yusuf al-'Uyayri Battalions of the Abdallah Azzam Brigades; Marwan Hadid Brigades; Marwan Hadid Brigade

**Description:** Designated as an FTO on May 30, 2012, the Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB) formally announced its establishment in a July 2009 video statement claiming responsibility for a February 2009 rocket attack against Israel. The Lebanon-based group's full name is Ziyad al-Jarrah Battalions of the Abdallah Azzam Brigades, named after Lebanese citizen Ziad al Jarrah, one of the planners of and participants in the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States.

**Activities:** After its initial formation, AAB relied primarily on rocket attacks against Israeli civilians. It is responsible for numerous rockets fired into Israeli territory from Lebanon, often targeting population centers.

In 2013, AAB began targeting Hizballah for the organization's involvement in the Syrian conflict and support for Syrian regime forces. In November 2013, AAB claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing outside the Iranian Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, which killed 23 people and wounded more than 140. In February 2014, AAB claimed twin suicide bomb attacks against the Iranian cultural center in Beirut that killed four people. In June 2014, AAB was blamed for a suicide bombing in the Beirut neighborhood of Tayyouneh, which killed a security officer and wounded 25 people.

In June 2015, the group released photos of a training camp for its "Marwan Hadid Brigade" camp in Syria, likely located in Homs province. From 2016 - 2018, AAB continued its involvement in the Syrian conflict and was active in Lebanon's Ain al-Hilwah refugee camp.

In December 2017, AAB called for violent jihad by Muslims against the United States and Israel after the U.S. announcement recognizing Jerusalem as Israel's capital. AAB did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2018 or 2019, but announced its full dissolution in Syria in November 2019.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Lebanon

**Funding and External Aid:** Sources of funding are unknown.

### **ABU SAYYAF GROUP**

**Aka** al Harakat al Islamiyya (the Islamic Movement)

**Description:** The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997. ASG split from the Moro National Liberation Front in the early 1990s and is one of the most violent terrorist groups in the Philippines. The group claims to promote an independent Islamic state in western Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, and elements of the group have ties to ISIS's regional affiliate ISIS-Philippines.

**Activities:** ASG has committed kidnappings-for-ransom, bombings, ambushes of security personnel, public beheadings, assassinations, and extortion.

Throughout 2015, ASG was responsible for multiple attacks, kidnappings, and the killing of hostages. In 2016 and 2017, the group conducted kidnapping-for-ransom operations targeting Canadian, Norwegian, German, and Filipino citizens. In August 2017, ASG members killed nine people and injured others in an attack on Basilan Island. In July 2018, ASG detonated a car bomb at a military checkpoint on Basilan Island, killing 10 people, including a Philippine soldier and pro-government militiamen.

ASG continued conducting terrorist attacks and kidnappings in 2019. In May, ASG militants attacked Philippine soldiers on Jolo, resulting in the deaths of two children. In October, ASG kidnapped two British nationals from a beach resort in the Zamboanga region, but they were recovered on Jolo in November.

**Strength:** ASG is estimated to have hundreds of members.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Philippines and Malaysia

**Funding and External Aid:** ASG is primarily funded through its kidnapping-for-ransom operations and extortion. The group may also receive funding from external sources, including remittances from overseas Philippine workers and Middle East-based sympathizers. In the past, ASG has also received training and other assistance from regional terrorist groups such as Jemaah Islamiya.

### **AL-AQSA MARTYRS BRIGADE**

**Aka** al-Aqsa Martyrs Battalion

**Description:** Designated as an FTO on March 27, 2002, the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AAMB) is composed of small cells of Fatah-affiliated activists that emerged at the outset of the al-Aqsa

Intifada in September 2000. AAMB strives to expel the Israeli military and settlers from the West Bank in order to establish a Palestinian state loyal to Fatah.

**Activities:** During the 2000 Intifada, AAMB primarily carried out small-arms attacks against Israeli military personnel and settlers. By 2002, the group was striking at Israeli civilians inside Israel, and claimed responsibility for the first female suicide bombing in Israel. In 2010 and 2011, the group launched numerous rocket attacks on Israeli communities. In November 2012, AAMB claimed that it had fired more than 500 rockets and missiles into Israel during an Israel Defense Forces operation in Gaza.

In 2015, AAMB declared open war against Israel and asked Iran to help fund its efforts in a televised broadcast. Throughout 2015, AAMB continued attacking Israeli soldiers and civilians.

In March 2016, armed confrontation broke out in Nablus between Palestinian youths and Palestinian security officials following the arrest of an AAMB associate on murder charges; seven youths and six Palestinian security officials were injured in the unrest. AAMB claimed responsibility for two rockets fired at Israel from the Gaza Strip in March 2017 and six rockets in June 2018, although these did not cause any casualties. AAMB did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2019.

**Strength:** AAMB is estimated to have a few hundred members.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank

**Funding and External Aid:** Iran has provided AAMB with funds and guidance, primarily through Hizballah facilitators.

## **AL-ASHTAR BRIGADES**

**Aka** Saraya al-Ashtar; AAB

**Description:** Al-Ashtar Brigades (AAB) was designated as an FTO on July 11, 2018. AAB is an Iran-backed terrorist organization established in 2013 with the goal of violently overthrowing the ruling family in Bahrain. In January 2018, AAB formally adopted Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps branding and reaffirmed its loyalty to Tehran to reflect its role in an Iranian network of state and nonstate actors that operates against the United States and its allies in the region.

**Activities:** Since 2013, AAB has claimed responsibility for more than 20 terrorist attacks against police and security targets in Bahrain. In March 2014, AAB conducted a bomb attack that killed two police officers and an officer from the United Arab Emirates. In January 2017, AAB shot and killed another local Bahrain officer. AAB has also promoted violent activity against the British, Saudi Arabian, and U.S. governments over social media. In February 2019, AAB released a video statement promising more attacks in Bahrain to mark the anniversary of Bahrain's Arab Spring-inspired political uprising; however, the group did not claim responsibility for any terrorist attacks in 2019.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Bahrain, Iran, and Iraq

**Funding and External Aid:** AAB receives funding and support from the Government of Iran.

### **ANSAR AL-DINE**

**Aka** Ansar Dine; Ansar al-Din; Ancar Dine; Ansar ul-Din; Ansar Eddine; Defenders of the Faith

**Description:** The Mali-based group Ansar al-Dine (AAD) was designated as an FTO on March 22, 2013. AAD was created in late 2011 after its leader Iyad ag Ghali failed in his attempt to take over another secular Tuareg organization. Following the March 2012 coup that toppled the Malian government, AAD was among the organizations (which also included al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb [AQIM] and Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa) to take over northern Mali, destroy UNESCO World Heritage sites, and enforce a severe interpretation of Sharia law upon the civilian population living in the areas under its control.

Beginning in January 2013, French and allied African forces conducted operations in northern Mali to counter AAD and other terrorist groups, eventually forcing AAD and its allies out of the population centers they had seized. Ghali, however, remained free and appeared in AAD videos in 2015 and 2016 threatening France and the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).

In 2017, the Sahara Branch of AQIM, AAD, al-Murabitoun, and the Macina Liberation Front came together to form Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM).

**Activities:** In early 2012, AAD received backing from AQIM in its fight against the Government of Mali, including for its capture of the Malian towns of Agulhok, Gao, Kidal, Tessalit, and Timbuktu. In March 2013, AAD members were reportedly among the Tuareg rebels responsible for killing 82 Malian soldiers and kidnapping 30 others in an attack against Agulhok. Before the French intervention in January 2013, Malian citizens in towns under AAD's control allegedly faced harassment, torture, and death if they refused to comply with the group's laws.

AAD was severely weakened by the 2013 French intervention, but increased its activities in 2015 and 2016. In 2016, AAD claimed responsibility for attacks targeting the Malian army and MINUSMA. In July 2016, AAD attacked an army base, leaving 17 soldiers dead and six missing. The following month, the group claimed three attacks: two IED attacks on French forces and a rocket or mortar attack on a joint UN-French base near Tessalit. In October and November 2016, AAD claimed responsibility for a series of attacks on UN and French forces. In February 2017, AAD claimed responsibility for an attack on the Malian Gendarmerie in Tenenkou, Mali. AAD did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2018 and 2019.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Mali

**Funding and External Aid:** AAD cooperates closely with and has received support from AQIM since its inception. AAD is also said to receive funds from foreign donors and through smuggling operations.

### **ANSAR AL-ISLAM**

**Aka** Ansar al-Sunna; Ansar al-Sunna Army; Devotees of Islam; Followers of Islam in Kurdistan; Helpers of Islam; Jaish Ansar al-Sunna; Jund al-Islam; Kurdish Taliban; Kurdistan Supporters of Islam; Partisans of Islam; Soldiers of God; Soldiers of Islam; Supporters of Islam in Kurdistan

**Description:** Ansar al-Islam (AAI) was designated as an FTO on March 22, 2004. AAI was established in 2001 in the Iraqi Kurdistan region through the merger of two Kurdish terrorist factions that traced their roots to the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan. AAI seeks to expel western interests from Iraq and establish an independent Iraqi state based on its interpretation of Sharia law.

**Activities:** From 2003 to 2011, AAI conducted attacks against a wide range of targets including Iraqi government and security forces, and U.S. and Coalition forces. The group also carried out numerous kidnappings, murders, and assassinations of Iraqi citizens and politicians. In 2012, AAI claimed responsibility for the bombing of the Sons of Martyrs School in Damascus, which was occupied by Syrian security forces and progovernment militias; seven people were wounded in the attack.

During summer 2014, part of AAI issued a statement pledging allegiance to ISIS, although later reports suggest that a faction of AAI opposed joining ISIS. In October 2019, AAI claimed its first attack in Iraq in five years, placing two IEDs in Iraq's Diyala province.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Iraq and Syria

**Funding and External Aid:** AAI receives assistance from a loose network of associates in Europe and the Middle East.

### **ANSAR AL-SHARI'A IN BENGHAZI**

**Aka** Ansar al-Sharia in Libya; Ansar al-Shariah Brigade; Ansar al-Shari'a Brigade; Katibat Ansar al-Sharia in Benghazi; Ansar al-Shariah-Benghazi; Al-Raya Establishment for Media Production; Ansar al-Sharia; Soldiers of the Sharia; Ansar al-Shariah; Supporters of Islamic Law

**Description:** Designated as an FTO on January 13, 2014, Ansar al-Shari'a in Benghazi (AAS-B) was created after the 2011 fall of the Qadhafi regime in Libya. The group has been

involved in terrorist attacks against civilian targets as well as the assassination and attempted assassination of security officials and political actors in eastern Libya.

**Activities:** Members of AAS-B were involved in the September 11, 2012, attacks against the U.S. Special Mission and Annex in Benghazi, Libya. Four U.S. citizens were killed in the attack: Glen Doherty, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and U.S. Ambassador to Libya J. Christopher Stevens.

Throughout 2016, AAS-B continued its fight against the “Libyan National Army” in Benghazi, resulting in the deaths of numerous Libyan security personnel and civilians. Additionally, AASB controlled several terrorist training camps in Libya and trained members of other terrorist organizations operating in Syria, Iraq, and Mali.

In May 2017, AAS-B announced its formal dissolution due to suffering heavy losses, including the group’s senior leadership, as well as defections to ISIS in Libya. AAS-B has not claimed responsibility for any attacks since 2016.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Benghazi, Libya

**Funding and External Aid:** AAS-B obtained funds from al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb as well as through charities, donations, and criminal activities.

### **ANSAR AL-SHARI’A IN DARNAH**

**Aka** Supporters of Islamic Law; Ansar al-Sharia in Derna; Ansar al-Sharia in Libya; Ansar alSharia; Ansar al-Sharia Brigade in Darnah

**Description:** Designated as an FTO on January 13, 2014, Ansar al-Shari’a in Darnah (AAS-D) was created after the 2011 fall of the Qadhafi regime in Libya. The group has been involved in terrorist attacks against civilian targets as well as the assassination and attempted assassination of security officials and political actors in eastern Libya.

**Activities:** Members of AAS-D were involved in the September 11, 2012, attacks against the U.S. Special Mission and Annex in Benghazi, Libya. Four U.S. citizens were killed in the attack: Glen Doherty, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and U.S. Ambassador to Libya J. Christopher Stevens.

Throughout 2013 and 2014, AAS-D is believed to have cooperated with Ansar al-Shari’a in Benghazi in multiple attacks and suicide bombings targeting Libyan security forces in Benghazi. In 2016, AAS-D continued fighting in and around Darnah. Additionally, AAS-D maintained several terrorist training camps in Darnah and Jebel Akhdar, Libya, and trained members of other terrorist organizations operating in Syria and Iraq.



In 2018, there were unconfirmed reports that AAS-D was involved in clashes with the “Libyan National Army.” AAS-D did not claim any attacks in 2019.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Darnah, Libya

**Funding and External Aid:** Sources of funding are unknown.

### **ANSAR AL-SHARI’A IN TUNISIA**

**Aka** Al-Qayrawan Media Foundation; Supporters of Islamic Law; Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia; Ansar al-Shari’ah; Ansar al-Shari’ah in Tunisia; Ansar al-Sharia

**Description:** Designated as an FTO on January 13, 2014, Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia (AAS-T) was founded in 2011 by Seif Allah Ben Hassine. AAS-T has been implicated in attacks against Tunisian security forces, assassinations of Tunisian political figures, and attempted suicide bombings of popular tourist locations. AAS-T has also recruited Tunisians to fight in Syria.

**Activities:** AAS-T was involved in the September 14, 2012, attack against the U.S. embassy and American school in Tunis, which threatened the safety of more than 100 U.S. embassy employees. In February and July 2013, AAS-T members were implicated in the assassination of Tunisian politicians Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi.

Since 2016, Tunisian authorities have continued to confront and arrest AAS-T members. AAS-T did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2019.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Tunisia and Libya

**Funding and External Aid:** Sources of funding are unknown.

### **ARMY OF ISLAM**

**Aka** Jaysh al-Islam; Jaish al-Islam

**Description:** Designated as an FTO on May 19, 2011, the Army of Islam (AOI), founded in late 2005, is a Gaza-based terrorist organization responsible for numerous terrorist acts against the Israeli and Egyptian governments and British, New Zealand, and U.S. citizens. The group, led by Mumtaz Dughmush, subscribes to a violent Salafist ideology.

Note: AOI is a separate and distinct group from the Syria-based Jaysh al-Islam, which is not a designated FTO.

**Activities:** AOI is responsible for the 2006 and 2007 kidnappings of civilians, including a U.S. journalist. AOI also carried out the early 2009 attacks on Egyptian civilians in Cairo and Heliopolis, Egypt, and planned the January 1, 2011, attack on a Coptic Christian church in Alexandria that killed 25 and wounded 100. In November 2012, AOI announced that it had launched rocket attacks on Israel in a joint operation with the Mujahidin Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem. In August 2013, an Israeli official reported that AOI leader Dughmush was running training camps in Gaza.

In September 2015, AOI reportedly released a statement pledging allegiance to ISIS. In a short post attributed to the group, AOI declared itself an inseparable part of ISIS-Sinai Province. Since then, AOI has continued to express support for ISIS. In October 2017, the group released a video in an effort to encourage ISIS fighters defending Mosul. In August 2019, AOI shared another video praising ISIS that included training information for individuals to conduct suicide attacks.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Egypt, Gaza, and Israel

**Funding and External Aid:** AOI receives much of its funding from a variety of criminal activities in Gaza.

### **ASBAT AL-ANSAR**

**Aka** AAA; Band of Helpers; Band of Partisans; League of Partisans; League of the Followers; God's Partisans; Gathering of Supporters; Partisan's League; Esbat al-Ansar; Isbat al-Ansar; Osbat al-Ansar; Usbat al-Ansar; Usbat ul-Ansar

**Description:** Designated as an FTO on March 27, 2002, Asbat al-Ansar (AAA) is a Lebanon-based Sunni terrorist group composed primarily of Palestinians that first emerged in the early 1990s. Linked to al-Qa'ida and other Sunni terrorist groups, AAA aims to thwart perceived anti-Islamic and pro-Western influences in the country. AAA's base is largely confined to Lebanon's refugee camps.

**Activities:** Throughout the mid-1990s, AAA assassinated Lebanese religious leaders and bombed nightclubs, theaters, and liquor stores. The group also plotted against foreign diplomatic targets. Between 2005 and 2011, AAA members traveled to Iraq to fight Coalition Forces. AAA has been reluctant to involve itself in operations in Lebanon, in part because of concerns of losing its safe haven in the Ain al-Hilwah Palestinian refugee camp. AAA remained active in Lebanon but has not claimed responsibility for any attacks since 2018.

**Strength:** AAA membership is estimated in the low hundreds.

**Location/Area of Operation:** AAA's primary base of operations is the Ain al-Hilwah Palestinian refugee camp in southern Lebanon.

**Funding and External Aid:** AAA likely receives money through international Sunni extremist networks.

## **AUM SHINRIKYO**

**Aka** A.I.C. Comprehensive Research Institute; A.I.C. Sogo Kenkyusho; Aleph; Aum Supreme Truth

**Description:** Aum Shinrikyo (AUM) was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997. It was established in 1987 by leader Shoko Asahara and gained legal status in Japan as a religious entity in 1989. The Japanese government revoked its recognition of AUM as a religious organization following the group's deadly 1995 sarin attack in Tokyo. Despite claims that the group has renounced violence and Asahara's teachings, members of AUM continue to adhere to the violent and apocalyptic teachings of its founder.

**Activities:** In March 1995, AUM members simultaneously released the chemical nerve agent sarin on several Tokyo subway trains, killing 13 and causing up to 6,000 people to seek medical treatment. Subsequent investigations by the Japanese government revealed that AUM was responsible for other chemical incidents in Japan in 1994, including a sarin attack on a residential neighborhood in Matsumoto that killed seven and injured approximately 500. Japanese police arrested Asahara in May 1995; in February 2004, authorities sentenced him to death for his role in the 1995 attacks.

Although AUM has not conducted a terrorist attack since 1995, concerns remain regarding its continued adherence to the violent teachings of Asahara. The group now consists of two factions, both of which have recruited new members, engaged in commercial enterprises, and acquired property. In July 2000, Russian authorities arrested a group of Russian AUM followers who planned to detonate bombs in Japan as part of an operation to free Asahara from prison. In August 2012, a Japan Airlines flight to the United States turned back after receiving a bomb threat demanding the release of Asahara.

In March 2016, Montenegro expelled 58 people associated with AUM found holding a conference at a hotel in Danilovgrad. One month later, Russian authorities carried out raids on 25 AUM properties and opened a criminal investigation into an AUM cell. In November 2017, Japanese police raided the offices of a "successor" group to AUM.

On July 6, 2018, AUM leader Shoko Asahara was executed. AUM did not claim any attacks in 2019.

**Strength:** AUM is estimated to have around 1,500 followers.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Japan and Russia

**Funding and External Aid:** AUM's funding comes primarily from member contributions and group-run businesses.

### **BASQUE FATHERLAND AND LIBERTY**

**Aka** ETA; Askatasuna; Batasuna; Ekin; Euskal Herritarrok; Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna; Herri Batasuna; Jarrai-Haika-Segi; K.A.S.; XAKI; Epanastatiki Pirines; Popular Revolutionary Struggle

**Description:** Designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997, Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) was founded in 1959 with the aim of establishing an independent homeland based on Marxist principles in the Spanish Basque provinces of Alava, Guipuzcoa, and Viscaya; the autonomous region of Navarre; and the southwestern French territories of Labourd, Lower-Navarre, and Soule.

**Activities:** ETA has primarily conducted bombings and assassinations against Spanish government officials, businessmen, politicians, judicial figures, and security and military forces; however, the group has also targeted journalists and major tourist areas. ETA is responsible for killing more than 800 civilians and members of the armed forces and police as well as injuring thousands since it formally began its campaign of violence in 1968.

In December 2006, ETA exploded a massive car bomb, destroying much of the covered parking garage at Madrid's Barajas International Airport. ETA marked its fiftieth anniversary in 2009 with a series of high profile and deadly bombings, including the July 2009 attack on a Civil Guard barracks that injured more than 60 people, including children.

ETA has not conducted any attacks since it announced a "definitive cessation of armed activity" in October 2011.

In 2016, authorities seized ETA weapons, including a cache found in a forest north of Paris, and captured the top ETA leader. In April 2017, ETA reported that it had relinquished its last caches of weapons. In May 2018, ETA released a letter announcing the dissolution of its organizational structures. In a September 2019 mass trial, a Spanish court accepted a plea deal for 47 ETA members to avoid prison sentences for membership in the group.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Spain and France

**Funding and External Aid:** Sources of funding are unknown.

### **BOKO HARAM**

**aka** Nigerian Taliban; Jama'atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda'Awati Wal Jihad; Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad; People Committed to the Prophet's Teachings for Propagation and Jihad; Sunni Group for Preaching and Jihad

**Description:** Boko Haram (BH) was designated as an FTO on November 14, 2013. The Nigeria-based group is responsible for numerous attacks in northern and northeastern regions of the country as well as in the Lake Chad Basin in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger that have killed thousands of people since 2009.

In March 2015, BH pledged allegiance to ISIS in an audiotape message. ISIS accepted the pledge, and BH began calling itself ISIS-West Africa. In August 2016, ISIS announced that Abu Musab al-Barnawi was to replace Abubakar Shekau as the new leader of the group. Infighting then led BH to split. Shekau maintains a group of followers and affiliates concentrated primarily in the Sambisa Forest; this faction is known as Boko Haram, while al-Barnawi's group is now separated and designated as ISIS-West Africa.

**Activities:** BH crosses porous Lake Chad region borders to target civilians and military personnel in northeast Nigeria, the Far North Region of Cameroon, and parts of Chad and Niger. The group continued to evade pressure from Lake Chad country forces, including through the regional Multinational Joint Task Force.

Throughout 2014, BH killed about 5,000 Nigerian civilians in various attacks. In April 2014, the group kidnapped 276 female students from a secondary school in Chibok, Borno State. BH has continued to abduct women and girls in the northern region of Nigeria and the Lake Chad region, some of whom are subjected to domestic servitude, other forms of forced labor, and sexual servitude, including through forced marriages to its members. For further information, refer to the [\*2019 Trafficking in Persons Report\*](#).

In January 2015, BH carried out a massacre in Baga, Borno State; reported casualties ranged from 150 to more than 2,000 killed, injured, or disappeared. The January 2015 attacks and other BH operations in surrounding smaller villages in 2015 displaced an estimated 35,000 people and allowed BH to gain control of Borno State.

Between 2017 and 2018, BH increased its forced abduction of women and girls and ordered them to carry out suicide attacks on civilians, including the January 2017 attack against the University of Maiduguri in Borno State, and twin attacks against a mosque and market in Adamawa State, Nigeria, in May 2018, killing 86.

BH continued its terrorist attacks in 2018 and 2019. Between January and November 2019, BH reportedly killed at least 275 people, mostly civilians, and displaced thousands in the Far North Region of Cameroon. In February, the group killed at least 60 people in a renewed assault on the northeast Nigerian town of Rann. In July, at least 65 people were killed and 10 others injured in an attack by suspected BH fighters on a funeral in Borno State.

**Strength:** BH is estimated to have several thousand fighters.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, and Chad

**Funding and External Aid:** BH largely self-finances through criminal activities such as looting, extortion, kidnapping-for-ransom, and bank robberies.

## COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES/NEW PEOPLE'S ARMY

**Aka** CPP/NPA; Communist Party of the Philippines; CPP; New People's Army; NPA; NPP/PP

**Description:** The Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army (CPP/NPA) was designated as an FTO on August 9, 2002. The military wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) – the New People's Army (NPA) – is a Maoist group formed in March 1969 with the aim of overthrowing the government through protracted guerrilla warfare. NPA's founder, Jose Maria Sison, reportedly directs CPP/NPA activity from the Netherlands, where he lives in self-imposed exile. Luis Jalandoni, a fellow Central Committee member and director of the CPP's overt political wing, the National Democratic Front, also lives in the Netherlands. Although primarily a rural-based guerrilla group, the CPP/NPA has an active urban infrastructure to support its terrorist activities and, at times, has used city-based assassination squads.

**Activities:** The CPP/NPA primarily targets Philippine security forces, government officials, local infrastructure, and businesses that refuse to pay extortion, or "revolutionary taxes." The CPP/NPA also has a history of attacking U.S. interests in the Philippines. In 1987, for example, the group killed three U.S. soldiers in four separate attacks in Angeles City. In 1989, the CPP/NPA issued a press statement claiming responsibility for the ambush and murder of Colonel James Nicholas Rowe, chief of the Ground Forces Division of the Joint U.S.-Military Advisory Group.

Over the past several years, the CPP/NPA has continued to carry out killings, raids, kidnappings, acts of extortion, and other forms of violence primarily directed against Philippine security forces.

Throughout 2016 and 2017, several attempts were made to establish a cease-fire and peace deal between the CPP/NPA and the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Reported violations from both sides, however – including reports of the CPP/NPA's continued recruitment in the Philippines and attacks against government forces and civilians – stalled peace efforts through 2019. In August 2018, seven suspected members of the CPP/NPA were killed in a shootout with Philippine police in the town of Antique; authorities found a cache of cellphones, laptops, firearms, and explosives at the site. In December 2018, CPP/NPA members attacked a military patrol in the city of Catarman using an anti-personnel mine. The attack killed four soldiers and two civilians.

In 2019, the CPP/NPA continued attacks on security forces and civilians. Their most deadly was in April, when they detonated bombs by an improvised land mine in a surprise early morning attack clash in Samar, killing six Philippine troops.

**Strength:** The Philippine government estimates that the CPP/NPA has about 4,000 members. The group also retains a significant amount of support from communities in rural areas of the Philippines.

**Location/Area of Operation:** The Philippines

**Funding and External Aid:** The CPP/NPA raises funds through extortion and theft.

### **CONTINUITY IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY**

**Aka** CIRA; Continuity Army Council; Continuity IRA; Republican Sinn Fein

**Description:** Designated as an FTO on July 13, 2004, the Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) is a terrorist splinter group that became operational in 1986 as the clandestine armed wing of Republican Sinn Fein, following its split from Sinn Fein. “Continuity” refers to the group’s belief that it is carrying on the original goal of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), to force the British out of Northern Ireland. CIRA cooperates with the larger Real IRA (RIRA).

**Activities:** CIRA has been active in Belfast and the border areas of Northern Ireland, where it has carried out bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, hijackings, extortion operations, and robberies. On occasion, it has provided advance warning to police of its attacks. Targets have included the British military, Northern Ireland security forces, and Loyalist paramilitary groups.

In February 2016, CIRA claimed responsibility for a shooting at a boxing event in Dublin that left one dead. In June 2017, CIRA released a statement claiming it would disband and decommission some of its arms over the following three months, describing the conflict as a “futile war.”

In August 2019, CIRA members conducted an attack on the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), setting off a bomb near the border of North Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. In December 2019, CIRA claimed responsibility for a grenade attack in west Belfast on a PSNI vehicle.

**Strength:** CIRA’s membership is small, with possibly fewer than 50 members.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland

**Funding and External Aid:** CIRA supports its activities through criminal activities, including smuggling.

### **GAMA’A AL-ISLAMIYYA**

**Aka** al-Gama’at; Egyptian al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya; GI; Islamic Gama’at; IG; Islamic Group

**Description:** Gama’a al-Islamiyya (IG) was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997. Formed in the 1970s, IG was once Egypt’s largest terrorist group. The group’s external wing, composed mainly of exiled members residing in several countries, maintained that its primary goal was to replace the Egyptian government with an Islamist state. IG’s “spiritual” leader Omar Abd al-Rahman, or the “blind Sheikh,” served a life sentence in a U.S. prison for his involvement in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and died in prison in February 2017.

**Activities:** During the 1990s, IG conducted armed attacks against Egyptian security, other government officials, and Coptic Christians. IG claimed responsibility for the June 1995

attempted assassination of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The group also launched attacks on tourists in Egypt, most notably the 1997 Luxor attack. In 1999, part of the group publicly renounced violence. IG is not known to have committed a terrorist attack in recent years; the group remained dormant in 2019.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Egypt

**Funding and External Aid:** Sources of funding are unknown.

## HAMAS

**Aka** the Islamic Resistance Movement; Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya; Izz al-Din al Qassam Battalions; Izz al-Din al Qassam Brigades; Izz al-Din al Qassam Forces; Students of Ayyash; Student of the Engineer; Yahya Ayyash Units; Izz al-Din al-Qassim Brigades; Izz al-Din alQassim Forces; Izz al-Din al-Qassim Battalions; Izz al-Din al Qassam Battalions; Izz al-Din al Qassam Brigades; Izz al-Din al Qassam Forces

**Description:** Designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997, Hamas was established in 1987 at the onset of the first Palestinian uprising, or First Intifada, as an outgrowth of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. The armed element, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, has conducted anti-Israeli attacks, including suicide bombings against civilian targets inside Israel. Hamas also manages a broad, mostly Gaza-based, network of *Dawa* or ministry activities that include charities, schools, clinics, youth camps, fundraising, and political activities. After winning Palestinian Legislative Council elections in January 2006, Hamas gained control of significant Palestinian Authority (PA) ministries in Gaza, including the Ministry of Interior. In 2007, Hamas expelled the PA and Fatah from Gaza in a violent takeover. In 2017, the group selected a new leader, Ismail Haniyeh, who is based in Gaza. Hamas remained the de facto ruler in Gaza in 2019.

**Activities:** Before 2005, Hamas conducted numerous anti-Israeli attacks, including suicide bombings, rocket launches, IED attacks, and shootings. U.S. citizens have died and been injured in the group's attacks. In June 2007, after Hamas took control of Gaza from the PA and Fatah, the Gaza borders were closed, and Hamas increased its use of tunnels to smuggle weapons into Gaza through the Sinai and maritime routes.

Hamas fought a 23-day war with Israel from late December 2008 to January 2009. From November 14-21, 2012, Hamas fought another war with Israel during which it claims to have launched more than 1,400 rockets into Israel. Despite the Egypt-mediated cease-fire between Israel and Hamas in 2012, operatives from Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) coordinated and carried out a November bus bombing in Tel Aviv that wounded 29 people. On July 8, 2014, Israel launched Operation Protective Edge in Gaza with the intent of preventing rocket fire into Israel; the rocket fire from Gaza had increased following earlier Israeli military operations that targeted Hamas for the kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teenagers in June 2014, including 16-year-old U.S.-Israeli citizen Naftali Fraenkel.

In April 2016, a Hamas member carried out a suicide attack on a bus in Jerusalem, killing 20. The group was also held responsible for several Gaza-based rocket attacks, including a July strike in Sderot that hit a kindergarten and damaged several buildings.



Hamas-organized protests at the border between Gaza and Israel continued throughout much of 2019, resulting in clashes that killed Hamas members, Palestinian protestors, and Israeli soldiers. Hamas claimed responsibility for numerous rocket attacks from Gaza into Israeli territory throughout 2018, and the Israeli military reported that some rocket attacks in 2019 came from Hamas launchers.

**Strength:** Hamas comprises several thousand Gaza-based operatives.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Gaza, the West Bank, and Lebanon

**Funding and External Aid:** Hamas has received funding, weapons, and training from Iran and raises funds in Gulf countries. The group receives donations from some Palestinian and other expatriates as well as from its own charity organizations.

## **HAQQANI NETWORK**

### **Aka HQN**

**Description:** Designated as an FTO on September 19, 2012, the Haqqani Network (HQN) was formed in the late 1980s, around the time of the then-Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan. HQN's founder Jalaluddin Haqqani established a relationship with Usama bin Laden in the mid-1980s, and joined the Taliban in 1995. After the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001, Jalaluddin retreated to Pakistan where, under the leadership of his son Sirajuddin Haqqani, HQN continued to direct and conduct terrorist activity in Afghanistan. In July 2015, Sirajuddin Haqqani was appointed Deputy Leader of the Taliban.

**Activities:** HQN has planned and carried out numerous significant kidnappings and attacks against U.S. and Coalition Forces in Afghanistan, the Afghan government, and civilian targets. In September 2011, HQN wounded 77 U.S. soldiers in a truck bombing in Wardak province and conducted a 19-hour attack on the U.S. Embassy and International Security Assistance Force headquarters in Kabul, killing 16 Afghans. In June 2012, an HQN suicide bomb attack against Forward Operating Base Salerno killed two U.S. soldiers and wounded more than 100 others.

In April 2016, HQN was blamed for an attack in Kabul against a government security agency tasked with providing protection to senior government officials. This attack was the deadliest in Kabul in 15 years, killing 64 people and injuring more than 300. Afghan officials also blamed HQN for a June 2016 double suicide attack outside of Kabul against Afghan police cadets and first responders; 30 people were killed.

On May 31, 2017, a truck bomb exploded in Kabul, killing more than 150 people. Afghan officials blamed HQN for the attack. In October, an American woman and her family were recovered after five years of HQN captivity.

HQN was believed to be responsible for a January 2018 ambulance bombing in Kabul that killed more than 100 people. Afghan officials blamed HQN for a January 2018 attack on the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul that killed 22 people, including Americans. HQN was also blamed for a May 2018 attack on the Afghan interior ministry that resulted in the death of a police officer.

In November 2019, the HQN released two hostages, including a U.S. citizen, who were kidnapped at gunpoint in August 2016. Afghan authorities also released Anas Haqqani, a leading figure and fund-raiser for HQN.

**Strength:** HQN is estimated to have between 3,000 and 5,000 fighters.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Afghanistan and Pakistan

**Funding and External Aid:** HQN is primarily funded from taxing local commerce, extortion, smuggling, and other licit and illicit business ventures. In addition to the funding it receives as part of the broader Afghan Taliban, the group receives some funds from donors in Pakistan and the Gulf.

### **HARAKAT-UL JIHAD ISLAMI**

**Aka** HUJI; Movement of Islamic Holy War; Harkat-ul-Jihad-al Islami; Harkat-al-Jihad-ul Islami; Harkat-ul-Jehad-al-Islami; Harakat ul Jihad-e-Islami

**Description:** Designated as an FTO on August 6, 2010, Harakat-ul Jihad Islami (HUJI) was formed in 1980 in Afghanistan to fight against the former Soviet Union. Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, the group redirected its efforts towards India. HUJI seeks the annexation of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir into Pakistan and the expulsion of Coalition Forces from Afghanistan, and has supplied fighters to the Taliban in Afghanistan.

HUJI historically focused its activities on the Afghanistan-Pakistan front, and was composed of Pakistani terrorists and veterans of the Soviet-Afghan war. HUJI experienced internal splits, and a portion of the group has aligned with al-Qa'ida.

**Activities:** HUJI claimed responsibility for the September 7, 2011, bombing of the New Delhi High Court, which left at least 11 dead and an estimated 76 wounded. The group sent an email to the press stating that the bomb was intended to force India to repeal a death sentence of a HUJI member. HUJI did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2019.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan

**Funding and External Aid:** Sources of funding are unknown.

### **HARAKAT UL-JIHAD-I-ISLAMI/BANGLADESH**

**Aka** HUJI-B; Harakat ul Jihad e Islami Bangladesh; Harkatul Jihad al Islam; Harkatul Jihad; Harakat ul Jihad al Islami; Harkat ul Jihad al Islami; Harkat-ul-Jehad-al-Islami; Harakat ul Jihad Islami Bangladesh; Islami Dawat-e-Kafela; IDEK

**Description:** Designated as an FTO on March 5, 2008, Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B) was formed in April 1992 by a group of former Bangladeshi Afghan veterans seeking to establish Islamist rule in Bangladesh. In October 2005, Bangladeshi authorities banned the group. The leaders of HUJI-B signed the February 1998 *fatwa* sponsored by Usama bin Laden that declared U.S. civilians legitimate targets. HUJI-B has connections to al-Qa'ida and Pakistani terrorist groups advocating similar objectives, including HUJI and Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LeT).

**Activities:** In December 2008, three HUJI-B members, including HUJI-B leader Mufti Abdul Hannan, were convicted for the May 2004 grenade attack that wounded the British High Commissioner in Sylhet, Bangladesh. In 2011, Bangladeshi authorities formally charged multiple suspects, including Hannan, with the killing of former Finance Minister Shah AMS Kibria in a grenade attack on January 27, 2005. In 2013, Bangladeshi police arrested a group of terrorists, including HUJI-B members, who were preparing attacks on public gatherings and prominent individuals. In 2014, HUJI-B continued its operations; reports at the time suggested that some HUJI-B members may have traveled to Pakistan to receive military training from LeT.

On April 12, 2017, Bangladeshi authorities executed HUJI-B leader Hannan and two associates for the May 2004 grenade attack. In October 2019, Dhaka police arrested three HUJI-B operatives reportedly attempting to revive the group's operations.

**Strength:** HUJI-B leaders claim that up to 400 of its members are Afghan war veterans; its total membership is unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Bangladesh and India

**Funding and External Aid:** HUJI-B funding comes from a variety of sources. Several international NGOs may have funneled money to HUJI-B.

### **HARAKAT UL-MUJAHIDEEN**

**Aka** HUM; Harakat ul-Ansar; HUA; Jamiat ul-Ansar; JUA; al-Faran; al-Hadid; al-Hadith; Harakat ul-Mujahidin; Ansar ul Ummah

**Description:** Designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997, Harakat ul-Mujahideen (HUM) seeks the annexation of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir into Pakistan and the expulsion of Coalition Forces from Afghanistan. In January 2005, HUM's long-time leader Fazlur Rehman Khalil stepped down and was replaced by Dr. Badr Munir. HUM operated terrorist training camps in eastern Afghanistan until Coalition air strikes destroyed them in 2001. In 2003, HUM began using the name Jamiat ul-Ansar; Pakistan banned the group in November 2003.

**Activities:** HUM has conducted numerous operations against Indian troops and civilian targets in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, as well as in India's northeastern states. In December 1999, HUM hijacked an Indian airliner, which led to the release of Masood Azhar, an important leader who later founded Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM). India also released Ahmed Omar Sheikh as a result of the hijacking. Sheikh was later convicted of the 2002 abduction and murder of U.S. journalist Daniel Pearl.

HUM has conducted attacks targeting Indian interests including the late December 2015 strikes in Handwor and Poonch, which resulted in the deaths of five Indian army personnel. HUM did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2019.

**Strength:** After 2000, a significant portion of HUM's membership defected to JeM, and only a small number of cadres are reported to still be active.

**Location/Area of Operation:** HUM conducts operations primarily in Afghanistan and in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. It operates from Muzaffarabad in Azad Kashmir, and in other cities in Pakistan.

**Funding and External Aid:** HUM collects donations from wealthy donors in Pakistan.

## HIZBALLAH

**Aka** the Party of God; Islamic Jihad; Islamic Jihad Organization; Revolutionary Justice Organization; Organization of the Oppressed on Earth; Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine; Organization of Right Against Wrong; Ansar Allah; Followers of the Prophet Muhammed; Lebanese Hizballah; Lebanese Hezbollah; LH; Foreign Relations Department; FRD; External Security Organization; ESO; Foreign Action Unit; Hizballah ESO; Hizballah International; Special Operations Branch; External Services Organization; External Security Organization of Hizballah

**Description:** Hizballah was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997. Formed in 1982 following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the Lebanon-based radical Shia group takes its ideological inspiration from the Iranian revolution and the teachings of the late Ayatollah Khomeini. The group generally follows the religious guidance of the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei. Hizballah is closely allied with Iran and the two often work together on shared initiatives, although Hizballah also occasionally acts independently. Hizballah shares a close relationship with the Syrian regime of Bashar Assad, and like Iran, provides assistance – including fighters – to Syrian regime forces in the Syrian conflict.

**Activities:** Hizballah is responsible for multiple large-scale terrorist attacks, including the 1983 suicide truck bombings of U.S. Embassy Beirut and the U.S. Marine barracks; the 1984 attack on the U.S. Embassy Beirut annex; and the 1985 hijacking of TWA flight 847, during which U.S. Navy diver Robert Stethem was murdered. Hizballah was also implicated, along with Iran, in the 1992 attacks on the Israeli embassy in Argentina and the 1994 bombing of the Argentine-Israelite Mutual Association in Buenos Aires.

Hizballah assisted Iraq Shia militant and terrorist groups in Iraq, and in January 2007, attacked the Karbala Provincial Joint Coordination Center, killing five American soldiers.

In July 2012, a suspected Hizballah operative was detained by Cypriot authorities for allegedly helping plan an attack against Israeli tourists on the island. On March 21, 2013, a Cyprus court found the operative guilty of charges based on his surveillance activities of Israeli tourists. The group was also responsible for the July 2012 attack on a passenger bus carrying 42 Israeli tourists at the Sarafovo Airport in Bulgaria, near the city of Burgas. The explosion killed five Israelis and one Bulgarian, and injured 32 others.

In May 2013, Hizballah publicly admitted to playing a significant role in the ongoing conflict in Syria, rallying support for the Syrian regime of Bashar Assad. Hizballah's support for Syria's Assad regime continued into 2019.

In May 2013, Nigerian authorities arrested three Hizballah operatives who had stored weapons and a large quantity of ammunition and explosives. In October 2014, Peruvian authorities arrested a Hizballah operative who had been planning to carry out attacks against Israeli and Jewish targets. In May 2015, Cypriot authorities arrested and convicted a Hizballah member after finding 8.2 tons of liquid ammonium nitrate in the basement of a residence in Larnaca. In August 2015, Kuwaiti authorities arrested three Hizballah operatives who had stored weapons and explosives under a residential house.

In June 2017, two Hizballah operatives were arrested in the United States. One operative arrested in Michigan had identified the availability of explosives precursors in Panama in 2011

and surveilled U.S. and Israeli targets in Panama as well as the Panama Canal from 2011 -2012. Another operative arrested in New York had surveilled U.S. military and law enforcement facilities from 2003-2017.

In September 2018, Brazil arrested a Hizballah financier, and in December 2018, tunnels reportedly built by the group were discovered on Israeli territory along the boundary with Lebanon. In September 2019, Hizballah launched attacks directly on the Israeli military, firing anti-tank missiles targeting an army base and vehicles near the border.

**Strength:** Hizballah has tens of thousands of supporters and members world wide.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Lebanon and Syria

**Funding and External Aid:** Iran continues to provide Hizballah with most of its funding, training, weapons, and explosives, as well as political, diplomatic, monetary, and organizational aid. Iran's annual financial backing to Hizballah – which in recent years has been estimated at \$700 million – accounts for the overwhelming majority of the group's annual budget. The Assad regime has provided training, weapons, and diplomatic and political support. Hizballah also receives funding in the form of private donations from some Lebanese Shia diaspora communities worldwide, including profits from legal and illegal businesses. These include smuggling contraband goods, passport falsification, narcotics trafficking, money laundering, and credit card, immigration, and bank fraud.

### **HIZBUL MUJAHIDEEN**

**Aka** HM, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen

**Description:** Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) was designated as an FTO on August 17, 2017.

The group was formed in 1989 and is one of the largest and oldest militant groups operating in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. HM is led by Mohammad Yusuf Shah, also known as Syed Salahuddin, and officially supports the liberation of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir from Indian control and its accession to Pakistan, although some cadres are pro-independence. The group focuses its attacks on Indian security forces and politicians in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, and has conducted operations jointly with other Kashmiri militants. The group is made up primarily of ethnic Kashmiris.

**Activities:** HM has claimed responsibility for several attacks in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. In May 2015, HM claimed an attack on Indian security forces in Kupwara that killed three Indian troops, according to the targeted forces. HM launched additional attacks against Indian security forces in 2015 and 2016. On May 1, 2017, HM killed seven people – including five policemen – when it attacked a bank van carrying cash in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. On August 29, 2018, HM reportedly killed four policemen in Shopian district in the Indian state Jammu and Kashmir. On September 21, 2018, HM claimed responsibility for abducting and killing three police officials in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir.

In March 2019, Indian officials accused HM of being behind a grenade attack on a Jammu bus stand that killed a teenager and injured 32 others. In June, two Indian soldiers were killed and six others injured when an alleged HM militant attacked their patrol with a VBIED. HM has also reportedly been specifically targeting non-locals in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir and is suspected by police of having killed five Bengali laborers and a truck driver in October 2019.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Jammu and Kashmir

**Funding and External Aid:** Sources of support are unknown, but HM is suspected to receive some funding from sources in Pakistan as well as from local fundraising.

### **INDIAN MUJAHEDDEEN**

**Aka** Indian Mujahedeen; Indian Mujahidin; Islamic Security Force-Indian Mujahideen (ISF-IM)

**Description:** The Indian Mujahedeen (IM) was designated as an FTO on September 19, 2011. The India-based terrorist group is responsible for dozens of bomb attacks throughout India since 2005 and has caused the deaths of hundreds of civilians. IM maintains ties to other terrorist entities including ISIS and Pakistan-based Lashkar e-Tayyiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, and Harakat ul-Jihad Islami. IM's stated goal is to carry out terrorist actions against Indians for their oppression of Muslims.

**Activities:** IM is known for carrying out multiple coordinated bombings in crowded areas against economic and civilian targets to maximize terror and casualties. In 2008, IM was responsible for 16 synchronized bomb blasts in crowded urban centers, including an attack in Delhi that killed 30 people and an attack at a local hospital in Ahmedabad that killed 38. In 2010, IM bombed a popular German bakery frequented by tourists in Pune, India; 17 people were killed, and more than 60 people were injured in the attack.

In January 2015, the arrest of three IM militants linked the group to the December 2014 low-intensity blast near a restaurant in Bangalore that killed one woman and injured three others. The arrest also uncovered that the group planned to carry out attacks on India's Republic Day and had provided explosives for attacks in other parts of the country.

In 2016, IM was increasingly linked to ISIS. In May, six IM operatives were identified in an ISIS propaganda video threatening attacks on India. A month later, it was reported that an IM cell linked to ISIS was plotting attacks on multiple targets in Hyderabad and had purchased chemicals to make high-grade explosives for the planned operations. In September 2017, Indian law enforcement uncovered the plans of an IM militant in custody to conduct attacks in India, including targeted killings and bombing a temple in Gaya. IM did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2019.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** India

**Funding and External Aid:** IM is suspected to obtain funding and support from other terrorist organizations, as well as from sources in Pakistan and the Middle East.

## ISLAMIC JIHAD UNION

**Aka** Islamic Jihad Group; Islomiy Jihod Ittihodi; al-Djihad al-Islami; Dzhamaat Modzhakhedov; Islamic Jihad Group of Uzbekistan; Jamiat al-Jihad al-Islami; Jamiyat; The Jamaat Mojahedin; The Kazakh Jama'at; The Libyan Society

**Description:** The Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) was designated as an FTO on June 17, 2005.

The group splintered from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in the early 2000s.

Najmiddin Jalolov founded the organization as the Islamic Jihad Group in March 2002, but the group was renamed Islamic Jihad Union in May 2005. Although IJU remains committed to overthrowing the Government of Uzbekistan, today it is active primarily in Afghanistan and, more recently, in Syria, where a number of its members relocated from Afghanistan.

**Activities:** IJU primarily operates against international forces in Afghanistan and remains a threat to Central Asia. IJU claimed responsibility for attacks in 2004 in Uzbekistan, which targeted police at several roadway checkpoints and at a popular bazaar, killing approximately 47 people, including 33 IJU members, some of whom were suicide bombers. In July 2004, the group carried out near-simultaneous suicide bombings of the Uzbek Prosecutor General's office and the U.S. and Israeli Embassies in Tashkent.

In September 2007, German authorities detained three IJU operatives, including two German converts, disrupting the group's plans to attack targets in Germany – including Ramstein Airbase where the primary targets would be U.S. diplomats, soldiers, and civilians.

In 2013, two IJU videos showed attacks against an American military base in Afghanistan and an IJU sniper shooting an Afghan soldier.

According to statements and photos released by the group, IJU participated in the five-month long 2015 Taliban siege of Kunduz city. At least 13 police officers were killed in the attacks, and hundreds of civilians were killed. In August 2015, IJU pledged allegiance to the then newly appointed Taliban leader Mullah Mansour.

In 2017, IJU released a video showing its militants using assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades to fight Afghan troops in late 2016. IJU released a second video in April 2018 showing a joint raid with the Taliban in northern Afghanistan. The video, dated October 2017, shows a night clash with Afghan forces. In 2019, the United Nations confirmed that IJU was operating inside Syria under control of al-Nusra Front.

**Strength:** IJU consists of 100 to 200 members.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Afghanistan, Syria, Uzbekistan, Turkey, and Europe

**Funding and External Aid:** Sources of funding are unknown.

## ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OF UZBEKISTAN

**Aka** IMU

**Description:** Designated as an FTO on September 25, 2000, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) seeks to overthrow the Uzbek government and establish an Islamic state.

For most of the past decade, however, the group has recruited members from other Central Asian states and Europe. Despite its stated objective to set up an Islamic state in Uzbekistan, the group

primarily operates along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and in northern Afghanistan, where it fights against international forces. Several IMU members are also suspected of having traveled to Syria to fight with terrorist groups.

The IMU has had a decade-long relationship with al-Qa'ida (AQ), the Taliban, and Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan. Top IMU leaders have integrated themselves into the Taliban's shadow government in Afghanistan's northern provinces.

In August 2015, IMU leader Usman Ghazi publicly announced the group's shift of allegiance to ISIS. Numerous IMU members, including possibly Ghazi himself, were subsequently reported to have been killed as a result of hostilities between ISIS and the IMU's former Taliban allies.

**Activities:** Since the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom, the IMU has been predominantly focused on attacking international forces in Afghanistan. In late 2009, NATO forces reported an increase in IMU-affiliated FTFs in Afghanistan. In 2010, the IMU claimed responsibility for the September 19 ambush that killed 25 Tajik troops in Tajikistan. On June 8, 2014, IMU claimed responsibility for an attack on Karachi's international airport that resulted in the deaths of at least 39 people.

Throughout 2015, the IMU actively threatened the Afghan government, primarily in the northern part of the country. In April 2015, the group released a video showing IMU members beheading an individual they claimed to be an Afghan soldier and threatened to behead Hazara (a historically persecuted ethnic group in Afghanistan) hostages, in supposed retaliation for the Afghan security forces capture of several female IMU members. In 2016, Uzbek refugee Fazliddin Kurbanov was sentenced by a U.S. federal court to 25 years in prison for planning a bomb attack in Idaho. Kurbanov had been in online contact with members of IMU, seeking advice on how to make explosives and discussing attacking U.S. military bases.

In June 2016, a faction of the IMU announced its continued commitment to the Taliban and AQ, marking a split with its leader Ghazi and the rest of the group, which announced its loyalty to ISIS in 2015 and has since cooperated with Islamic State's Khorasan Province. IMU did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2019.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria, Central Asia, and Turkey

**Funding and External Aid:** The IMU receives support from a large Uzbek diaspora, terrorist organizations, and donors from Europe, Central and South Asia, and the Middle East.

### **ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS**

**Aka** IRGC; The Iranian Revolutionary Guards; IRG; The Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution; AGIR; Pasdarn-e Enghelab-e Islami; Sepah-e Pasdaran Enghelab Islami; Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Eslami; Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami; Pasdaran-e Inqilab; Revolutionary Guards; Revolutionary Guard; Sepah; Pasdaran; Sepah Pasdaran; Islamic Revolutionary Corps; Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps; Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps; Islamic Revolutionary Guards; Iran's Revolutionary Guards; Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution.



**Description:** Designated as an FTO on April 15, 2019, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), part of Iran's official military, has played a central role in Iran's use of terrorism as a key tool of Iranian statecraft since its inception 40 years ago. The IRGC has been directly involved in terrorist plotting; its support for terrorism is foundational and institutional, and it has killed U.S. citizens.

The IRGC was founded in 1979 and since then has gained a substantial role in executing Iran's foreign policy and wields control over vast segments of the economy. The IRGC's ties to nonstate armed groups in the region, such as Hizballah in Lebanon, help Iran compensate for its relatively weak conventional military forces. Answering directly to the supreme leader, the corps is also influential in domestic politics, and many senior officials have passed through its ranks.

The IRGC is composed of five primary branches: the IRGC Ground Forces, IRGC Air Force, IRGC Navy, the Basij, and the IRGC-Qods Force (IRGC-QF).

**Activities:** The IRGC - most prominently through its Qods Force (QF) - directs and carries out a global terrorist campaign. The IRGC-QF in 2011 plotted a brazen terrorist attack against the Saudi Ambassador to the U.S. on American soil. In 2012, IRGC-QF operatives were arrested in Turkey and Kenya for plotting attacks. An IRGC operative was convicted in March 2017 of espionage for a foreign intelligence service; he had been surveilling a German-Israeli group. In January 2018, Germany uncovered ten IRGC operatives involved in a terrorist plot in Germany. In September 2018, a U.S. federal court found Iran and the IRGC liable for the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing which killed 19 Americans. The QF is active in Syria in support of the Assad regime.

The IRGC-QF is Iran's primary mechanism for cultivating and supporting terrorist groups abroad. The IRGC continues to provide financial and other material support, training, technology transfer, advanced conventional weapons, guidance, or direction to a broad range of terrorist organizations, including Hizballah, Kata'ib Hizballah in Iraq, al-Ashtar Brigades in Bahrain, and other terrorist groups in Syria and around the Gulf. Iran also provides up to \$100 million annually in combined support to Palestinian terrorist groups, including Hamas, PIJ, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command.

**Strength:** The IRGC has upwards of 125,000 troops under its command.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Iran, Iraq, Syria, Europe, and the Gulf

**Funding and External Aid:** The IRGC-QF continues to engage in large-scale illicit financing schemes and money laundering to fund its malign activities. In 2017, the IRGC-QF engineered a plot to produce counterfeit currency by deceiving European suppliers to procure advanced printing machinery and other necessary materials. It then printed counterfeit Yemeni bank notes, which were used to support its destabilizing activities in Yemen.

## ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA

**Aka** al-Qa'ida in Iraq; al-Qa'ida Group of Jihad in Iraq; al-Qa'ida Group of Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Qa'ida in Mesopotamia; al-Qa'ida in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Qa'ida of Jihad in Iraq; al-Qa'ida of Jihad Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Qa'ida of the Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Tawhid; Jam'at al-Tawhid Wa'al-Jihad; Tanzeem

Qa'idat al Jihad/Bilad al Raafidaini; Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn; The Monotheism and Jihad Group; The Organization Base of Jihad/Country of the Two Rivers; The Organization Base of Jihad/Mesopotamia; The Organization of al-Jihad's Base in Iraq; The Organization of al-Jihad's Base in the Land of the Two Rivers; The Organization of al-Jihad's Base of Operations in Iraq; The Organization of al-Jihad's Base of Operations in the Land of the Two Rivers; The Organization of Jihad's Base in the Country of the Two Rivers; al-Zarqawi Network; Islamic State of Iraq; Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham; Islamic State of Iraq and Syria; ad-Dawla al-Islamiyya fi al-'Iraq wa-sh-Sham; Daesh; Dawla al Islamiya; Al-Furqan Establishment for Media Production; Islamic State; ISIL; ISIS; Amaq News Agency; Al Hayat Media Center; Al-Hayat Media Center; Al Hayat

**Description:** Al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI) was designated as an FTO on December 17, 2004. In the 1990s, Jordanian militant Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi organized a terrorist group called al-Tawhid wal-Jihad to oppose the presence of U.S. and western military forces in the Middle East as well as the West's support for, and the existence of, Israel. In late 2004, Zarqawi joined al-Qa'ida (AQ) and pledged allegiance to Usama bin Laden. At that time, his group became known as al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI). Zarqawi led the group in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom to fight against U.S. and Coalition Forces until his death in June 2006.

In October 2006, AQI publicly renamed itself the Islamic State in Iraq. In 2013, it adopted the moniker ISIS to express its regional ambitions as it expanded operations to include the Syrian conflict. ISIS was led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who declared an Islamic caliphate in June 2014, until he was killed on October 27, 2019. In October 2017, the U.S. military fighting with local Syrian allies announced the liberation of Raqqa, the self-declared capital of ISIS's so-called "caliphate." In December 2017, then Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi announced the territorial defeat of ISIS in Iraq. In September 2018, the Syrian Democratic Forces, with support from the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS began a final push to oust ISIS fighters from the lower Middle Euphrates River Valley in Syria. March 2019 marked the full territorial defeat of ISIS's so-called caliphate.

**Activities:** ISIS has conducted numerous high-profile attacks, including IED attacks against U.S. military personnel and Iraqi infrastructure, videotaped beheadings of U.S. citizens, suicide bombings against both military and civilian targets, and rocket attacks. ISIS perpetrated these attacks using foreign, Iraqi, and Syrian operatives. In 2014, ISIS was responsible for most of the 12,000 Iraqi civilian deaths that year. ISIS is heavily involved in the fighting in Syria, and has participated in numerous kidnappings of civilians, including aid workers and journalists. In 2015 and 2016, ISIS claimed responsibility for several large-scale attacks in Iraq and Syria. In July 2016, ISIS claimed responsibility for a car bombing at a popular shopping center in Baghdad that killed nearly 300 people, making it the single deadliest bombing in Iraq's capital city since 2003.

ISIS continued its attacks throughout 2017. In February 2017, ISIS killed 56 people in a series of attacks in Baghdad. In early April, the group killed 33 Syrians in eastern Syria, and on the same day, killed another 22 people in Tikrit, Iraq. In June, ISIS gunmen and suicide bombers killed more than a dozen people in two separate attacks in Tehran, including an attack inside the Parliament building. In September, ISIS killed over 80 people in Nasiriyah, Iraq, an area frequented by Shia Muslims on pilgrimage.

Since at least 2015, the group has integrated local children and children of FTFs into its forces and used them as executioners and suicide attackers. ISIS has systematically prepared child soldiers in Iraq and Syria using its education and religious infrastructure as part of its training and recruitment of members. Further, since 2015, ISIS abducted, raped, and abused thousands of women and children, some as young as eight years old. Women and children were sold and enslaved, distributed to ISIS fighters as spoils of war, forced into marriage and domestic servitude, or subjected to physical and sexual abuse. For further information, refer to the [2019 Trafficking in Persons Report](#).

ISIS also directs, enables, and inspires individuals to conduct attacks on behalf of the group around the world, including in the United States and Europe. In November 2015, ISIS carried out a series of coordinated attacks in Paris, France, including at a rock concert at the Bataclan concert hall, killing about 130 people and injuring more than 350 others; 23 year-old U.S. citizen Nohemi Gonzalez was among the dead. In March 2016, ISIS directed two simultaneous attacks in Brussels, Belgium – one at the Zaventem Airport and the other at a metro station. The attacks killed 32 people, including four U.S. citizens, and injured more than 250 people. In June 2016, a gunman who pledged allegiance to ISIS killed 49 individuals and injured 53 others at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida. In July 2016, ISIS claimed an attack in which a terrorist driving a cargo truck attacked a crowd in Nice, France, during Bastille Day celebrations, resulting in 86 deaths, including three U.S. citizens. In December 2016, ISIS claimed responsibility for a truck attack on a crowded Christmas market in Berlin, Germany, that killed 12 people and injured 48 others.

In March 2017, ISIS claimed responsibility for a terrorist attack on London's Westminster Bridge when a man drove his car into pedestrians and stabbed others, killing five people. In early April 2017, a man who claimed to be a member of ISIS drove a truck into a crowded shopping center in Stockholm, Sweden, killing five and injuring many more. In May 2017, ISIS claimed a suicide bombing in Manchester, England, that killed 22 people outside of a live concert.

In July 2018, ISIS attacked the city of Suweida and nearby towns and villages in southwestern Syria, conducting multiple suicide bombings and simultaneous raids in a brutal offensive, killing more than 200 people.

In January 2019, ISIS claimed responsibility for the suicide bombing of a restaurant in Manbij, Syria that killed 19 people, including four Americans. That same month, ISIS reportedly launched a missile attack that seriously wounded two British commandos in eastern Syria. On Easter Sunday 2019, over 250 people were killed in Sri Lanka when ISIS inspired terrorists carried out coordinated suicide bombings at multiple churches and hotels. In August, ISIS claimed responsibility for killing a U.S. service member while he was participating in a combat operation in Ninawa Province, Iraq. In November, ISIS claimed responsibility for a stabbing attack near the London Bridge in which a man killed two people and injured three others. Also in November, ISIS claimed responsibility for a November 6 attack on a border post in Tajikistan that killed four Tajik service members and 15 militants.

**Strength:** Estimates suggest ISIS fighters in Iraq and Syria number between 11,000 and 18,000, including several thousand FTFs.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Iraq and Syria, with branches and networks around the world.

**Funding and External Aid:** ISIS received most of its funding from a variety of criminal activities in Iraq and Syria. Criminal activities included extortion of civilian economies, smuggling oil, and robberies. ISIS also maintains stockpiles of as much as hundreds of millions of dollars scattered across Iraq and Syria it looted during its occupation of those countries in 2013 to 2019. ISIS continues to rely on trusted courier networks and money services businesses to move its financial resources within and outside of Iraq and Syria. Before ISIS's territorial defeat, targeted counterterrorism operations and airstrikes served to sever critical financial networks, reduce the group's cash reserves in Iraq and Syria, and degrade ISIS's ability to exploit local resources such as oil. The territorial defeat of ISIS which eliminated its control of territory in Syria in 2019 reduced ISIS's ability to generate, hold, and transfer its financial assets. Despite this, ISIS continues to generate revenue from criminal activities through its many clandestine networks in Iraq and Syria, and provides significant financial support and guidance to its network of global branches and affiliates.

ISIS has increased its presence outside the conflict zone in Iraq and Syria. In particular, ISIS core creates financial and logistical hubs in Central and East Africa, North Africa, and West Africa. ISIS also announced that the group had established two new branches in Pakistan and India.

### **ISIS–BANGLADESH**

**Aka** Caliphate in Bangladesh, Caliphate's Soldiers in Bangladesh, Soldiers of the Caliphate in Bangladesh, Khalifa's Soldiers in Bengal, Islamic State Bangladesh, Islamic State in Bangladesh, ISB, ISISB, Abu Jandal al-Bangali, Neo-JMB, New JMB, Neo-Jammat-ul Mujahadeen-Bangladesh

**Description:** ISIS-Bangladesh was designated as an FTO on February 28, 2018. Created in 2014, ISIS-Bangladesh has described itself as ISIS's official branch in Bangladesh and was born out of ISIS's desire to expand its campaign to the Indian Subcontinent. Coinciding with the announcement of the caliphate in Iraq and Syria, a group of Bangladeshi nationals pledged allegiance to ISIS and vowed to organize Bengali Muslims under the leadership of then-ISIS leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

**Activities:** In September 2015, gunmen belonging to ISIS-Bangladesh shot and killed an Italian aid worker in Dhaka. In December 2015, ISIS-Bangladesh claimed responsibility for injuring 10 people during a Christmas Day suicide attack at a mosque packed with Ahmadi Muslims. In July 2016, the group claimed responsibility for an assault on the Holey Artisan Bakery in Dhaka that killed 22 people, including one American. In March 2017, ISIS-Bangladesh claimed responsibility for twin explosions that targeted a crowd in Sylhet, Bangladesh, killing six people.

In April and May 2019, ISIS-Bangladesh claimed responsibility for two explosions in Dhaka that injured four police officers and two civilians. In August, ISIS-Bangladesh claimed responsibility for a small bomb thrown at a Bangladeshi minister in Dhaka, which injured two police officers. In September, the group claimed responsibility for an explosion outside Awami League office in Khulna.

**Strength:** ISIS-Bangladesh has several hundred armed supporters.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Bangladesh

**Funding and External Aid:** Although ISIS-Bangladesh's sources of funding are largely unknown, the group does receive some support from ISIS.

### **ISIS-GREATER SAHARA**

**Aka** ISIS in the Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS); Islamic State in the Greater Sahel (ISGS); Islamic State in the Greater Sahara; Islamic State of the Greater Sahel; ISIS in the Greater Sahel; ISIS in the Islamic Sahel

**Description:** ISIS in the Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS) was designated as an FTO on May 23, 2018. ISIS-GS emerged when leader Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi and his followers split from al-Murabitoun. Al-Sahrawi first pledged allegiance to ISIS in May 2015, which was acknowledged by ISIS in October 2016.

**Activities:** In September 2016, ISIS-GS claimed responsibility for an attack on a gendarmerie post in Markoye, Burkina Faso, that killed two people. In October 2016, ISIS-GS claimed responsibility for an attack on a military post in Intangom, Burkina Faso, that killed three Burkinabe soldiers.

In October 2017, ISIS-GS claimed responsibility for an attack on a joint U.S.-Nigerien patrol in the region of Tongo, Niger, which killed four U.S. soldiers and five Nigerien soldiers. In 2018, ISIS-GS was reportedly involved in numerous skirmishes and attacks in Mali and Niger, including those in May that targeted French troops and civilians. In 2019, ISIS-GS continued to intensify their rate of attacks, including an attack in November on a Malian military base that killed 54 soldiers.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso

**Funding and External Aid:** Sources of funding are unknown.

### **ISLAMIC STATE'S KHORASAN PROVINCE**

**Aka** Islamic State's Khorasan Province; ISIS Wilayat Khorasan; ISIL's South Asia Branch; South Asian Chapter of ISIL

**Description:** Islamic State's Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) was designated as an FTO on January 14, 2016. The group is based in Afghanistan, conducts operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and is composed primarily of former members of Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan, the Afghan Taliban, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. ISIS-K's senior leadership has pledged allegiance to then-ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, which was accepted in late January 2015. The group has carried out suicide bombings, small arms attacks, and kidnappings in Afghanistan against civilians and Afghan National Security and Defense Forces. ISIS-K has also claimed responsibility for attacks on civilians and government officials in Pakistan.

**Activities:** In January 2016, ISIS-K claimed a strike on a Pakistani consulate in Afghanistan, resulting in the deaths of seven Afghan security personnel. In July 2016, the group conducted a bomb attack at a peaceful protest in Kabul, Afghanistan, that killed an estimated 80 people and wounded another 230. In August 2016, ISIS-K claimed a shooting and suicide bombing at a hospital in Quetta, Pakistan, targeting lawyers, which killed 94. The group also claimed

responsibility for a November 2016 suicide bombing at the Shah Noorani Shrine in Balochistan province, Pakistan, killing more than 50 people.

In July 2017, ISIS-K attacked the Iraqi Embassy in Kabul, killing two people, and bombed a mosque in western Afghanistan, killing 29 people and injuring 60 others. Between October and December of 2017, ISIS-K claimed responsibility for several deadly attacks in Kabul, including those targeting a television station, a Shia cultural center, and an Afghan intelligence office near the U.S. embassy.

ISIS-K also claimed multiple attacks in Pakistan in 2017, including an attack on a Sufi shrine in Sindh province in February that killed at least 88 people, an attack on a church in Quetta that killed at least nine people, and a July attack on an election rally in Balochistan province that killed 149 people. In September 2018, ISIS-K claimed responsibility for a double suicide bombing in a Shiite majority neighborhood in Kabul, leaving more than 20 dead and 70 injured.

In April 2019, ISIS-K claimed responsibility for an attack at the Ministry of Communications in Kabul, killing seven people. In August 2019, ISIS-K claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing at a wedding hall in a Shiite minority neighborhood in Kabul, killing 80 people and injuring 154 others. In October 2019, an ISIS-K bombing of a mosque in Nangarhar province killed at least 70 people. In November 2019, ISIS-K suffered a series of major defeats and lost much of its territory in Nangarhar in the face of attacks by both the coalition and Taliban forces.

**Strength:** ISIS-K is estimated to have approximately 1,000 fighters.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia

**Funding and External Aid:** ISIS-K receives some funding from ISIS. Additional funds come from illicit criminal commerce, taxes, and extortion on the local population and businesses.

### **ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND THE LEVANT-LIBYA**

**Aka** Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-Libya; Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant in Libya; Wilayat Barqa; Wilayat Fezzan; Wilayat Tripolitania; Wilayat Tarabulus; Wilayat al-Tarabulus

**Description:** The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-Libya (ISIL-Libya) was designated as an FTO on May 20, 2016. In 2014, then-ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi dispatched a group of ISIS operatives from Syria to Libya to establish a branch of the terrorist group. In October 2014, several hundred operatives set up a base in Darnah, and the following month, Baghdadi formally established the branch after announcing he had accepted oaths of allegiance from fighters in Libya.

**Activities:** Since becoming established, ISIS-Libya has carried out multiple attacks throughout Libya and has threatened to expand ISIS's presence into other countries in Africa.

In January 2015, ISIL-Libya claimed responsibility for a suicide attack on a luxury hotel in Tripoli, Libya, that killed eight people, including a U.S. contractor.

In February 2015, ISIL-Libya released a propaganda video showing the murder of 21 Egyptian Coptic Christians who had been kidnapped from Sirte, Libya, in two separate incidents in December 2014 and January 2015. That same month, ISIL-Libya claimed responsibility for bomb attacks against a petrol station, a police station, and the home of parliamentary speaker

Agila Salah in the town of al-Qubbah. These attacks killed more than 40 people and wounded dozens of others.

In 2016, ISIL-Libya expanded operations into Libya's oil crescent, launching attacks on some of the country's largest oil installations: burning oil tanks, killing dozens, and forcing facilities to shut down operations. In December, Libyan forces drove ISIL-Libya from its main stronghold in Sirte and into the desert areas and neighboring cities.

In May 2018, ISIL-Libya claimed responsibility for an attack on Libya's electoral commission headquarters in Tripoli that killed 14 people. In September, ISIL-Libya claimed responsibility for a suicide attack on Libya's National Oil Company headquarters that left two dead and 10 others wounded. In October, ISIL-Libya was implicated in an attack on a town in central Libya that resulted in five people killed and 10 others kidnapped. In December, ISIL-Libya claimed responsibility for an attack on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that killed three people.

In May 2019, ISIL-Libya claimed responsibility for a number of attacks on the Libyan National Army (LNA). These included a dawn assault on a military training camp in the southern city of Sebha which killed at least nine soldiers and an attack on the town of Zillah in which three soldiers were killed and four captured.

**Strength:** ISIL-Libya is estimated to have fewer than 500 fighters.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Libya

**Funding and External Aid:** ISIL-Libya's funding comes from a variety of sources, including criminal activity, such as smuggling and extortion, and external funding. The group also receives support from ISIS.

## ISIS-PHILIPPINES

**Aka** ISIS in the Philippines; ISIL Philippines; ISIL in the Philippines; IS Philippines; ISP; Islamic State in the Philippines; Islamic State of Iraq and Syria in South-east Asia; Dawlatul Islamiyah Waliyatul Masrik (DIWM); Dawlatul Islamiyah Waliyatul Mashriq; IS East Asia Division; ISIS Branch in the Philippines; ISIS' Philippines province

**Description:** ISIS-Philippines (ISIS-P) was designated as an FTO on February 28, 2018. In July 2014, militants in the Philippines pledged allegiance to ISIS in support of ISIS's efforts in the region under the command of now-deceased leader Isnilon Hapilon. Hatib Hajan Sawadjaan is the current leader of ISIS-P, and the organization has ties to elements of the Abu Sayyaf Group.

**Activities:** In May 2016, ISIS-P claimed responsibility for an attack on Basilan Island, which killed one soldier and injured another. In 2017, ISIS-P participated in five months of fighting in Marawi that claimed more than 1,000 lives and forced more than 300,000 residents to flee the area. In July 2018, ISIS-P claimed responsibility for a suicide bomb attack on a military checkpoint in Basilan that killed 10 people. In January 2019, ISIS-P claimed responsibility for the Jolo cathedral bombing in Sulu, a complex suicide attack carried out by an Indonesian couple during mass, killing 23 people and wounding more than 100 others.

**Strength:** ISIS-P is estimated to have a small cadre of fighters in the southern Philippines, but exact numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** The Philippines

**Funding and External Aid:** ISIS-P receives financial assistance from ISIS in Syria and receives funds from local extortion and kidnapping-for-ransom groups.

### **ISLAMIC STATE-SINAI PROVINCE**

**Aka** Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis; Ansar Jerusalem; Supporters of Jerusalem; Ansar Bayt al-Maqdes; Ansar Beit al-Maqdis; Islamic State-Sinai Province; Islamic State in the Sinai; Jamaat Ansar Beit al-Maqdis fi Sinaa; Sinai Province; Supporters of the Holy Place; The State of Sinai; Wilayat Sinai

**Description:** Originally designated as an FTO on April 9, 2014, Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM, as it was known then) rose to prominence in 2011 following the uprisings in Egypt. In November 2014, ABM officially declared allegiance to ISIS. In September 2015, the Department of State amended ABM's designation to add the aliases ISIL Sinai Province and Islamic State-Sinai Province (ISIS-SP), among others.

**Activities:** Prior to pledging allegiance to ISIS, ABM claimed responsibility for numerous attacks against Israeli and Egyptian interests from 2012 through 2014, including attacks on Israeli economic and military assets, as well as attacks on the Egyptian military and tourist sectors. On November 4, 2015, ISIS-SP released an audio recording in which it claimed responsibility for the October 31 bombing of a Russian passenger plane carrying 231 people from the Egyptian resort town of Sharm el-Sheikh to St. Petersburg, Russia. All 224 passengers and seven crew members were killed.

On August 5, 2015, ISIS-SP claimed responsibility for the July 22 abduction and killing of Croatian citizen Tomislav Salopek.

Throughout 2016, ISIS-SP carried out numerous attacks in the Sinai, including a January double bombing that killed two Egyptian policemen and two military officers. The group was responsible for a July 2016 wide-scale coordinated attack on several military checkpoints that reportedly killed more than 50 people. On December 11, 2016, an attack on St. Mark's Cathedral, a Coptic Christian church in Cairo, killed 29 people.

In 2017, ISIS-SP attacked two Coptic Christian churches on Palm Sunday (April 9), killing 30 people at St. George's Church in Tanta and killing 17 people at St. Mark's Church in Alexandria. In May 2017, the group's attack on a bus of pilgrims en route to St. Samuel the Confessor, a Coptic monastery near Minya, killed 29 people. In September 2017, ISIS-SP attacked an Egyptian police convoy in an ambush that killed 18 soldiers. In November 2017, an attack on the al-Rawda mosque in North Sinai – Egypt's deadliest in modern history – killed more than 300 individuals at prayer. While the attack was unclaimed, press reported the Egyptian Prosecutor General's office as attributing the attack to ISIS-SP and alleging that attackers carried an ISIS flag. The group's December 2017 attack on St. Mina, a Coptic Christian church near Cairo, killed 11 people.

ISIS-SP attacked an Egyptian army base in April 2018 and attacked an Egyptian police checkpoint in December 2018, killing 15 soldiers in each attack. On November 2, 2018, the group's attack on a bus of pilgrims traveling from St. Samuel the Confessor killed seven and wounded 14 others.



In 2019, ISIS-SP claimed responsibility for multiple attacks on Egyptian police and army checkpoints in the Sinai. In February, ISIS-SP killed 15 Egyptian soldiers and killed eight Egyptian policemen in June. In July, ISIS-SP claimed responsibility for beheading four civilians and for a suicide bombing in North Sinai that killed a civilian and a member of the security forces.

**Strength:** ISIS-SP is estimated to have between 800 and 1,200 fighters in the Sinai Peninsula and affiliated cells in the Nile Valley.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Egypt

**Funding and External Aid:** Although the sources of ISIS-SP's funding are largely unknown, there are indications that it may receive funding from ISIS in Syria.

### **ISIS-WEST AFRICA**

**Aka** Islamic State West Africa Province; ISISWAP; Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-West Africa; ISIL-WA; Islamic State of Iraq and Syria West Africa Province; ISIS West Africa Province; ISIS West Africa; ISIS-WA

**Description:** ISIS-West Africa (ISIS-WA) was designated as an FTO on February 28, 2018. In March 2015, a faction of Boko Haram pledged allegiance to ISIS in an audiotape message. ISIS accepted the group's pledge and the group began calling itself ISIS-West Africa. In August 2016, ISIS announced that Abu Musab al-Barnawi was to become the new leader of ISIS-WA.

**Activities:** ISIS-WA has been responsible for numerous attacks in Nigeria and the Lake Chad region since 2016. In January 2017, ISIS-WA conducted a midnight attack against Nigerian troops in the village of Kamuya, killing three Nigerian soldiers.

In February 2018, ISIS-WA abducted a Christian student in Nigeria and in March 2018, the group kidnapped three aid workers during an attack that killed dozens of other people. ISIS-WA killed one of the three aid workers in September 2018 and another in October. In November 2018, ISIS-WA claimed responsibility for five attacks in Chad and Nigeria that resulted in 118 deaths.

In February 2019, ISIS-WA attacked the convoy of the then-Governor of Borno State as it drove from the capital of Maiduguri to a town near Nigeria's border with Cameroon, killing as many as 10. In May 2019, ISIS-WA claimed responsibility for two attacks in western Niger, ambushing Niger Army soldiers in Tongo resulting in 28 deaths, while also attacking Niger security forces near the Koutoukale prison that killed one soldier.

In July 2019, ISIS-WA fighters launched an attack against a military base near Baga in the Lake Chad area, killing 20 Nigerian and five Chadian soldiers. Also in July, ISIS-WA attacked a convoy of Action Against Hunger (AAH) and Nigerian health ministry employees in Borno. One AAH driver was killed, while one AAH staff member, two drivers, and three health ministry workers remained missing, reportedly taken as hostages. On September 25, media reported ISIS-WA said it executed one of the missing aid workers. On December 13, ISIS-WA said it killed four of the five remaining hostages. On December 26, ISIS-WA released a video showing the execution of 11 reported Christians and claimed the killings were revenge for the killing of ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

**Strength:** ISIS-WA has an estimated 3,500 members.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Nigeria and the greater Lake Chad region

**Funding and External Aid:** ISIS-WA receives funding from local sources, the capture of military supplies, taxes, and kidnapping-for-ransom payments.

### **JAMA'AT NUSRAT AL-ISLAM WAL-MUSLIMIN**

**Aka** Jamaat Nosrat al-Islam wal-Mouslimin; Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims; Group to Support Islam and Muslims; GSIM; GNIM; Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen

**Description:** Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) was designated as an FTO on September 6, 2018. JNIM has described itself as al-Qa'ida's official branch in Mali and has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks and kidnappings since its formation in March 2017. In 2017, the Sahara Branch of al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Murabitoun, Ansar al-Dine, and the Macina Liberation Front came together to form JNIM. JNIM is led by Iyad ag Ghali. JNIM's second in command, Ali Maychou, was killed in October 2019.

**Activities:** In June 2017, JNIM carried out an attack at a resort frequented by Westerners outside of Bamako, Mali, and was responsible for the large-scale coordinated attacks in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, on March 2, 2018.

In June 2018, JNIM claimed responsibility for a suicide attack against an African Coalition base in Mali that killed at least six people. In July 2018, JNIM claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing in Gao, Mali, which targeted a French military patrol and killed several civilians. In November 2018, JNIM claimed responsibility for the detonation of a truck bomb in a residential complex in Gao, killing three and injuring 30.

In January 2019, JNIM claimed responsibility for an attack against a UN base in Northern Mali, killing 10 Chadian peacekeepers and wounding 25 others. In April, JNIM claimed responsibility for an assault on a Malian military base, killing 11 soldiers. In September, JNIM detonated a landmine under a passenger bus in central Mali, killing 14 civilians and injuring another 24.

**Strength:** JNIM is estimated to have between 1,000 and 2,000 fighters.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger

**Funding and External Aid:** JNIM receives funding through kidnapping-for-ransom and extortion and from smugglers and traffickers who pay a tax in exchange for permission and safe transit through JNIM-controlled trafficking routes in Mali.

### **JAMA'ATU ANSARUL MUSLIMINA FI BILADIS-SUDAN**

**Aka** Ansaru; Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan; Vanguard for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa; JAMBS; Jama'atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan

**Description:** Designated as an FTO on November 14, 2013, Jama'atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis-Sudan (Ansaru) publicly splintered from Boko Haram in January 2012. Since its inception, Ansaru has targeted civilians, including Westerners, and Nigerian government and security officials. Ansaru purportedly aims to defend Muslims throughout Africa by fighting

against the Nigerian government and international interests. Ansaru claims to identify with Boko Haram's objectives and struggle, but has criticized the group for killing fellow Muslims.

**Activities:** In November 2012, Ansaru raided a police station in Abuja, killing Nigerian police officers and freeing detained terrorists from prison. Ansaru has also carried out multiple kidnapping operations targeting civilians. In late 2012, Ansaru kidnapped a French engineer allegedly in response to French involvement in Mali. In early 2013, Ansaru kidnapped and subsequently killed seven international construction workers.

On April 4, 2016, the Nigerian army announced the capture of Ansaru leader Khalid al-Barnawi. Ansaru did not publicly claim responsibility any attacks in 2019, but in October 2019, Ansaru announced the creation of a new media outlet for the group.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown; however, given its narrower scope of operations, Ansaru's membership is estimated to be much smaller than that of Boko Haram.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Nigeria

**Funding and External Aid:** Sources of funding are unknown.

### **JAISH-E-MOHAMMED**

**Aka** Army of Mohammed; Mohammed's Army; Tehrik ul-Furqaan; Khuddam-ul-Islam; Khudamul Islam; Kuddam e Islami; Jaish-i-Mohammed

**Description:** Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) was designated as an FTO on December 26, 2001. JeM was founded in early 2000 by former senior Harakat ul-Mujahideen leader Masood Azhar. The group aims to annex the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan and expel international forces from Afghanistan. JeM has openly declared war against the United States.

**Activities:** JeM continues to operate openly in parts of Pakistan, conducting fatal attacks in the region, despite the country's 2002 ban on its activities. JeM has claimed responsibility for several suicide car bombings in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, including an October 2001 suicide attack on the Jammu and Kashmir legislative assembly building in Srinagar that killed more than 30 people. The Indian government publicly implicated JeM, along with Lashkar e-Tayyiba, in the December 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament that killed nine people and injured 18 others.

In 2002, Pakistani authorities arrested and convicted a JeM member for the abduction and murder of U.S. journalist Daniel Pearl. In December 2003, Pakistan implicated JeM members in two assassination attempts against then-President Pervez Musharraf.

In 2016, Indian officials blamed JeM for a January attack on an Indian Air Force base in Pathankot that killed one civilian and seven Indian security force personnel. In June 2017, Indian police stated that JeM had conducted multiple attacks against security forces across the state of Jammu and Kashmir, injuring more than a dozen people.

In February 2018, JeM claimed responsibility for killing nine Indian officers at the Sunjuwan military station. In December 2018, several JeM militants stormed a police outpost in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir killing four police officers and injuring one other. In February

2019, JeM claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing that killed 40 personnel from India's Central Reserve Police Force in the city of Pulwama in the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

**Strength:** JeM has several hundred armed supporters.

**Location/Area of Operation:** India, Afghanistan, and Pakistan

**Funding and External Aid:** To avoid asset seizures by the Pakistani government, since 2007 JeM has withdrawn funds from bank accounts and invested in legal businesses, such as commodity trading, real estate, and the production of consumer goods. JeM also collects funds through donation requests, sometimes using charitable causes to solicit donations.

### **JAYSH RIJAL AL-TARIQ AL-NAQSHABANDI**

**Aka** Army of the Men of the Naqshbandi Order; Armed Men of the Naqshbandi Order; Naqshbandi Army; Naqshabandi Army; Men of the Army of al-Naqshbandia Way; Jaysh Rajal al-Tariqah al-Naqshbandia; JRTN; JRN; AMNO

**Description:** Jaysh Rijal al-Tariq al-Naqshabandi (JRTN) was designated as an FTO in September 30, 2015. The group first announced insurgency operations against international forces in Iraq in December 2006 in response to the execution of Saddam Hussein. Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, former vice president of Saddam Hussein's Revolutionary Council, leads the group, which consists of former Baath Party officials, military personnel, and Sunni nationalists. JRTN aims to overthrow the Government of Iraq, install a new Ba'athist regime, and end external influence in Baghdad.

**Activities:** Between its founding in 2006 and the 2011 withdrawal of Coalition Forces from Iraq, JRTN claimed responsibility for numerous attacks on U.S. bases and forces. JRTN also is known to have used VBIEDs against Iraqi government security forces.

In 2014, elements of JRTN joined military forces with ISIS in opposition to the Iraqi government. JRTN played a major role in the capture of Mosul from Iraqi security forces in 2014. However, fissures between ISIS and JRTN quickly emerged after ISIS's advance in Baiji and Tikrit. Although some elements of JRTN splintered off, the majority of the organization was subsumed by ISIS. JRTN did not claim responsibility for any attacks between 2016 and 2019.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Iraq

**Funding and External Aid:** JRTN has received funding from former regime members, major tribal figures in Iraq, and from Gulf-based financiers of terrorism.

### **JEMAAH ANSHORUT TAUHID**

**Aka** JAT; Jemmah Ansharut Tauhid; Jem'mah Ansharut Tauhid; Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid; Jama'ah Ansharut Tauhid; Laskar 99; JAT

**Description:** Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT) was designated as an FTO on March 13, 2012. Formed in 2008, the Indonesia-based group seeks to establish an Islamic caliphate in Indonesia and has carried out numerous attacks on Indonesian government personnel, police, military, and civilians. In 2011, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, the founder and leader of JAT, was sentenced to 15

years in prison for his role in organizing a militant training camp in Aceh. Ba'asyir is also the co-founder and former leader of Jemaah Islamiya (JI). JAT maintains ties to JI and other terrorist groups in Southeast Asia.

**Activities:** JAT has conducted multiple attacks targeting civilians and Indonesian officials, resulting in the deaths of numerous Indonesian police and innocent civilians. In December 2012, four police officers were killed and two wounded in an attack by suspected local JAT members in central Sulawesi. Since Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's pledge of allegiance to ISIS in 2014, many JAT members have joined Indonesia's ISIS-affiliated groups, while others have joined al-Qa'ida-affiliated groups. Although JAT did not claim responsibility for any attacks between 2016 and 2019, JAT members are believed to have been involved in ISIS operations in Southeast Asia.

**Strength:** JAT is estimated to have several thousand supporters and members. Internal disagreements over aligning with ISIS have likely reduced its membership.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Indonesia

**Funding and External Aid:** JAT raises funds through membership donations and legitimate business activities. JAT also has conducted cyber hacking, robbed banks, and carried out other illicit activities to fund the purchase of assault weapons, ammunition, explosives, and bomb-making materials.

### **JEMAAH ISLAMIYA**

**Aka** Jemaa Islamiyah; Jema'a Islamiyah; Jemaa Islamiyya; Jema'a Islamiyya; Jemaa Islamiyyah; Jema'a Islamiyyah; Jemaah Islamiah; Jemaah Islamiyah; Jema'ah Islamiyah; Jemaah Islamiyyah; Jema'ah Islamiyyah; JI

**Description:** Designated as an FTO on October 23, 2002, Jemaah Islamiya (JI) is a Southeast Asia-based terrorist group co-founded by Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. The group seeks to establish an Islamic caliphate in the region. More than 400 JI operatives have been captured or killed since 2002, including operations chief and al-Qa'ida associate Hambali and, in January 2015, bomb-maker Zulfiki bin Hir (aka Marwan).

**Activities:** Significant JI attacks include the 2002 Bali bombings, which killed more than 200 people, among them seven U.S. citizens; the August 2003 bombing of the J.W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta; the September 2004 bombing outside the Australian Embassy in Jakarta; and the October 2005 suicide bombing in Bali, which killed 26 people.

In July 2009, a JI faction claimed responsibility for suicide attacks on the J.W. Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels in Jakarta that killed seven people and injured more than 50, including seven U.S. citizens.

In January 2015, 44 policemen and three civilians were killed during a raid targeting two JI members in Mamasapano on the island of Mindanao in the southern Philippines.

In June 2019, Indonesian authorities arrested several JI members, including its emir Para Wijayanto. Indonesian police said that between 2013 and 2018, under Wijayanto's leadership, JI sent at least six groups to Syria for military training or to participate in the fighting.

JI did not claim responsibility for any terrorist attacks between 2016 and 2019.

**Strength:** Estimates of JI membership vary from 500 to several thousand members.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines

**Funding and External Aid:** JI fundraises through membership donations, criminal actions, and business activities. The group has received financial, ideological, and logistical support from Middle Eastern contacts and illegitimate charities and organizations.

### **JAYSH AL-ADL**

**Aka** People's Resistance Movement of Iran (PMRI); Jonbesh-i Moqavemat-i-Mardom-i Iran; Popular Resistance Movement of Iran; Soldiers of God; Fedayeen-e-Islam; Former Jundallah of Iran; Jundallah; Jundullah; Jondullah; Jundollah; Jondollah; Jondallah; Army of God (God's Army); Baloch Peoples Resistance Movement (BPRM); Jeysh al-Adl; Army of Justice; Jaish ul-Adl; Jaish al-Adl; Jaish Aladl; Jeish al-Adl

**Description:** Jaysh al-Adl was designated as an FTO on November 4, 2010, under the name Jundallah. Since its inception in 2003, Jaysh al-Adl, has engaged in numerous attacks, killing and maiming scores of Iranian civilians and government officials. The group's stated goals are to secure recognition of Balochi cultural, economic, and political rights from the Government of Iran, and to spread awareness of the plight of the Baloch people. The group adopted the name Jaysh al-Adl in 2012 and has since claimed responsibility for attacks under that name.

**Activities:** Jaysh al-Adl claimed responsibility for an October 2009 suicide bomb attack in the Sistan va Balochistan province that killed more than 40 people and was reportedly the deadliest terrorist attack in Iran since the 1980s. In a statement on its website, Jaysh al-Adl claimed responsibility for the December 15, 2010, suicide bomb attack inside the Iman Hussein Mosque in Chabahar, which killed an estimated 35 to 40 civilians and wounded 60 to 100. In July 2010, Jaysh al-Adl attacked the Grand Mosque in Zahedan, killing about 30 people and injuring an estimated 300. In June 2018, Jaysh al-Adl, reportedly killed three Iranian security personnel while trying to enter Iran from Pakistan. In October 2018, Jaysh al-Adl claimed responsibility for abducting 12 Iranian security personnel on the border with Pakistan. In February 2019, Jaysh al-Adl claimed responsibility for a suicide car bombing in southeastern Iran that killed 27 Iranian government officials.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan

**Funding and External Aid:** Sources of support are unknown.

### **KAHANE CHAI**

**Aka** American Friends of the United Yeshiva; American Friends of Yeshivat Rav Meir; Committee for the Safety of the Roads; Dikuy Bogdim; DOV; Forefront of the Idea; Friends of the Jewish Idea Yeshiva; Jewish Legion; Judea Police; Judean Congress; Kach; Kahane; Kahane Lives; Kahane Tzadak; Kahane.org; Kahanetzadak.com; Kfar Tapuah Fund; Koach; Meir's Youth; New Kach Movement; Newkach.org; No'ar Meir; Repression of Traitors; State of Judea; Sword of David; The Committee Against Racism and Discrimination (CARD); The Hatikva Jewish Identity Center; The International Kahane Movement; The Jewish Idea Yeshiva; The Judean Legion; The Judean Voice; The Qomemiyut Movement; The Rabbi Meir David Kahane

Memorial Fund; The Voice of Judea; The Way of the Torah; The Yeshiva of the Jewish Idea; Yeshivat Harav Meir

**Description:** Kahane Chai (KC) was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997. Radical Israeli-American Rabbi Meir Kahane founded Kach – the precursor to KC – with the aim of restoring Greater Israel (Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza). Its offshoot, Kahane Chai (translation: “Kahane Lives”), was founded by Meir Kahane’s son Binyamin, following his father’s 1990 assassination. In 1994, the group was banned from running in Israeli elections.

**Activities:** KC has harassed and threatened Arabs, Palestinians, and Israeli government officials and vowed revenge for the December 2000 death of Binyamin Kahane and his wife. The group is suspected of involvement in a number of low-level attacks dating back to the start of the Second Palestinian Intifada in 2000. KC was last linked to an attack in 2005, when one of its members killed four people on a bus in Shfaram, Israel.

**Strength:** KC’s core membership has been estimated to be fewer than 100.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Israel and the West Bank

**Funding and External Aid:** KC has received support from sympathizers in the United States and Europe.

### KATA’IB HIZBALLAH

**Aka** Hizballah Brigades; Hizballah Brigades in Iraq; Hizballah Brigades-Iraq; Kata’ib Hezbollah; Khata’ib Hezbollah; Khata’ib Hizballah; Khattab Hezbollah; Hizballah Brigades-Iraq of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq; Islamic Resistance in Iraq; Kata’ib Hizballah Fi al-Iraq; Katibat Abu Fathel al-A’abas; Katibat Zayd Ebin Ali; Katibut Karbalah

**Description:** Formed in 2006 as an anti-Western Shia group, Kata’ib Hizballah (KH) was designated as an FTO on July 2, 2009. Prior to the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq in 2011, the group conducted attacks against U.S., Iraqi, and Coalition targets in Iraq and threatened the lives of Iraqi politicians and civilians supporting the legitimate political process in Iraq. KH is notable for its extensive use of media operations and propaganda, such as filming and releasing videos of attacks. KH has ideological ties to and receives support from Iran.

**Activities:** KH has claimed responsibility for numerous terrorist attacks since 2007, including IED attacks, rocket-propelled grenade attacks, and sniper operations. In 2007, KH gained notoriety for its attacks against U.S. and Coalition Forces in Iraq. In June 2011, five U.S. soldiers were killed in Baghdad when KH assailants fired multiple rockets at U.S. military base, Camp Victory. The group remained active in 2015, fighting in Syria in support of the Assad regime and in Iraq against ISIS.

In 2016, KH continued to fight ISIS alongside the Iraqi army, but operated outside the Iraqi government’s command-and-control structure. In 2017, the group threatened to fight “American occupiers” in Iraq in an article published on the group’s official website. In 2018, the group issued a warning statement threatening the U.S. presence in Iraq in retaliation for a non-Coalition airstrike that hit KH members in Syria.

In June 2019, KH members stormed the Bahraini embassy in Baghdad in protest of Bahrain hosting America’s Israel-Palestine conference. In October 2019, KH was reportedly involved in

sniper operations against Iraqi protestors. On December 27, KH was blamed for a rocket attack on K-1 Air Base in Kirkuk that killed one U.S. citizen. On December 31, members of KH broke into the U.S. Embassy compound and participated in a violent attack against the facility, setting fires inside which destroyed security checkpoints and reception rooms.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Iraq and Syria

**Funding and External Aid:** KH depends heavily on support from Iran.

### **KURDISTAN WORKERS' PARTY**

**Aka** the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress; the Freedom and Democracy Congress of Kurdistan; KADEK; Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan; the People's Defense Force; Halu Mesru Savunma Kuvveti; Kurdistan People's Congress; People's Congress of Kurdistan; KONGRA-GEL

**Description:** Founded by Abdullah Ocalan in 1978 as a Marxist-Leninist separatist organization, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997. The group, composed primarily of Turkish Kurds, launched a campaign of violence in 1984. The PKK's original goal was to establish an independent Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey.

**Activities:** In the early 1990s, the PKK moved beyond rural-based insurgent activities to engage in urban terrorism. Anatolia became the scene of significant violence, with some estimates suggesting at least 40,000 casualties. The PKK foreswore violence from 1999 until June 2004, when its hardline militant wing took control and renounced the self-imposed cease-fire. In 2009, the Turkish government and the PKK resumed peace negotiations, but talks broke down after the PKK carried out an attack in July 2011 that killed 13 Turkish soldiers. In 2012, the PKK claimed responsibility for multiple car bombings that killed more than 10 people. Between December 2012 and July 2015, the Turkish government and the PKK resumed peace negotiations, but the negotiations ultimately broke down – owing partly to domestic political pressures and the war in Syria.

Between January and mid-July 2015, the PKK carried out small-scale armed attacks against Turkey's security forces and military bases. In August 2016, the group claimed a VBIED strike against Sirnak police headquarters, which killed 11 people and wounded more than 70 others. In 2017, Turkish officials blamed the PKK for a car bomb and shooting outside of a courthouse that killed two people and a June attack on a military convoy that killed more than 20 soldiers.

In 2018, numerous attacks by the PKK were reported against Turkey's security forces, including an attack claimed by the PKK in November against a Turkish army base, which resulted in dozens of casualties. On September 12, 2018, a roadside bomb struck a bus carrying workers from the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, killing seven and wounding 13 in Diyarbakir province's Kulp district. The government blamed the PKK for the attack.

In 2019, the PKK engaged in terrorist attacks in eastern and western Turkey, when the PKK struck over the border from its bases within Iraq. In September, the PKK attacked a Turkish military vehicle in Hakkari province, killing two soldiers and wounding another. In July, the PKK was accused of assassinating a senior Turkish diplomat in Erbil, Iraq.



**Strength:** The PKK is estimated to consist of 4,000 to 5,000 members

**Location/Area of Operation:** Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria

**Funding and External Aid:** The PKK receives financial support from the large Kurdish diaspora in Europe.

### **LASHKAR E-TAYYIBA**

**Aka** al Mansoorien; Al Mansoorian; Army of the Pure; Army of the Pure and Righteous; Army of the Righteous; Lashkar e-Toiba; Lashkar-i-Taiba; Paasban-e-Ahle-Hadis; Paasban-e-Kashmir; Paasban-i-Ahle-Hadith; Pasban-e-Ahle-Hadith; Pasban-e-Kashmir; Jamaat-ud-Dawa; JUD; Jama'at al-Dawa; Jamaat ud-Daawa; Jamaat ul-Dawah; Jamaat-ul-Dawa; Jama'at-i-Dawat; Jamaat-ud-Dawa; Jama'at-ud-Da'awah; Jama'at-ud-Da'awa; Jamaati-ud-Dawa; Idara Khidmate-Khalq; Falah-i-Insaniat Foundation; FiF; Falah-e-Insaniat Foundation; FalaheInsaniyat; Falah-i-Insaniyat; Falah Insania; Welfare of Humanity; Humanitarian Welfare Foundation; Human Welfare Foundation; Al-Anfal Trust; Tehrik-e-Hurmat-e-Rasool; TehrikeTahafuz Qibla Awwal; Al-Muhammadia Students; Al-Muhammadia Students Pakistan; AMS; Tehreek-e-Azadi-e-Kashmir; Kashmir Freedom Movement; Tehreek Azadi Jammu and Kashmir; Tehreek-e-Azadi Jammu and Kashmir; TAJK; Movement for Freedom of Kashmir; Tehrik-i-Azadi-i Kashmir; Tehreek-e-Azadi-e-Jammu and Kashmir; Milli Muslim League; Milli Muslim League Pakistan; MML

**Description:** Designated as an FTO on December 26, 2001, Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LeT) is an anti-India-focused terrorist group. LeT was formed in the late 1980s as the terrorist wing of Markaz ud Dawa ul-Irshad, a Pakistan-based extremist organization and charity originally formed to oppose the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. LeT is led by Hafiz Muhammad Saeed. Shortly after LeT's FTO designation, Saeed changed the group's name to Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD) and launched humanitarian projects to circumvent sanctions. LeT disseminates its message through JUD's media outlets. Since the creation of JUD, LeT has repeatedly changed its name in an effort to avoid sanctions.

Elements of LeT and Jaish-e-Muhammed (JeM) have combined with other groups like Hizbul Mujahideen to mount anti-India attacks. The Pakistani government banned LeT in January 2002 and temporarily arrested Hafiz Saeed following the 2008 Mumbai attack. On January 30, 2017, Pakistan placed Saeed under house arrest; however, he was released in November 2017 after a Lahore High Court judicial body rejected a government request to renew his detention. In July 2019, Pakistani police again arrested Saeed and charged him with financing terrorism.

**Activities:** LeT has conducted operations, including several high profile attacks, against Indian troops and civilian targets since 1993. The group also has attacked Coalition Forces in Afghanistan. LeT uses assault rifles, machine guns, mortars, explosives, and rocket-propelled grenades.

LeT was responsible for the November 2008 attacks in Mumbai against luxury hotels, a Jewish center, a train station, and a popular café that killed 166 people – including six U.S. citizens – and injured more than 300. India has charged 38 people in the case; most are at large, however, and thought to be in Pakistan.

In March 2010, Pakistani-American businessman David Headley pled guilty in a U.S. court to charges related to his role in the November 2008 LeT attacks in Mumbai and to charges related to a separate plot to bomb the Danish newspaper, *Jyllands-Posten*. Headley testified in the trials of other LeT supporters in 2011 and 2015.

LeT was behind a July 2015 attack in Gurdaspur, Punjab, which killed seven people. In August 2015, operatives affiliated with LeT attacked Indian security forces in Udhampur, in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. In December 2015, LeT carried out an attack on an Indian paramilitary convoy after it left Srinagar, Kashmir, injuring one civilian and seven Indian military personnel.

From February to May 2016, LeT was suspected of engaging in at least three firefights with Indian security forces in Kupwara district, in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, injuring two Indian personnel. In June 2016, LeT was suspected of conducting an ambush on an Indian security force convoy in Pulwama district, in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, killing eight and injuring 20. Some media reports alleged the group's involvement in the September 2016 attack on an Indian army camp in Uri, in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, which killed 20 soldiers.

In June 2017, LeT conducted an attack in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir that left six police officers dead. In July, LeT militants attacked a bus of pilgrims returning from the Amarnath Yatra shrine, killing seven people. In June 2018, LeT claimed responsibility for a suicide attack against an Indian army camp in the state of Jammu and Kashmir's Bandipora district that killed three soldiers. LeT did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2019.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan

**Funding and External Aid:** LeT collects donations in Pakistan and the Gulf as well as from other donors in the Middle East and Europe – particularly the UK, where it is a designated terrorist organization. In 2019, LeT and its front organizations continued to operate and fundraise in Pakistan.

## **LASHKAR I JHANGVI**

**Aka** Army of Jhangvi; Lashkar e Jhangvi; Lashkar-i-Jhangvi

**Description:** Designated as an FTO on January 30, 2003, Lashkar I Jhangvi (LJ) is the terrorist offshoot of the Sunni Deobandi sectarian group Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan. LJ carries out anti-Shia and other sectarian attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Government of Pakistan banned the group in August 2001 as part of an effort to rein in sectarian violence, causing many LJ members to seek refuge in Afghanistan with the Taliban, with whom the group had existing ties. After the collapse of the Taliban government in Afghanistan, LJ members became active in aiding other terrorists and have provided them with safe houses, false identities, and protection in Pakistani cities. LJ works closely with Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan. LJ chief Asif Chotu was killed along with three other LJ militants in a police operation in Pakistan in January 2017.

In May 2018, LJ's Balochistan chief, Salman Badini, and two other LJ militants were killed during a police raid in Quetta, Pakistan.

**Activities:** LJ specializes in armed attacks and bombings and has admitted to numerous killings of Shia religious and community leaders in Pakistan. In January 1999, the group attempted to assassinate then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his brother Shahbaz Sharif, Chief Minister of Punjab province. Media reports linked LJ to attacks on Christian targets in Pakistan, including a March 2002 grenade assault on the Protestant International Church in Islamabad that killed two U.S. citizens.

In January 2014, more than 24 people were killed and 40 others wounded in a bus bombing by an LJ attack targeting Shia pilgrims. LJ claimed responsibility for the December 2015 suicide bombing that targeted a market in the predominantly Shia town of Parachinar, Pakistan, that killed at least 23 people and wounded 50. In November 2016, two individuals suspected of belonging to LJ were arrested by police in Pakistan for their alleged involvement in 25 cases of targeted killings, including the murder of Pakistani singer Amjad Sabri, as well as army and police personnel. In April 2019, LJ claimed responsibility for the bombing of a market in Quetta, Pakistan that killed 20 people. The attack reportedly targeted the local minority Shia Muslim Hazara community.

**Strength:** LJ's membership is assessed to be in the low hundreds.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Pakistan and Afghanistan

**Funding and External Aid:** LJ's funding comes from wealthy donors in Pakistan and the Middle East, particularly Gulf States. The group engages in criminal activity, including extortion, to fund its activities.

### **LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM**

**Aka** Ellalan Force; Tamil Tigers

**Description:** Founded in 1976 and designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) is a Tamil secessionist group in Sri Lanka. Despite its military defeat at the hands of the Sri Lankan government in 2009, the LTTE's international network of sympathizers and financial support has persisted.

**Activities:** Although largely inactive since 2009, the LTTE was responsible for an integrated insurgent strategy that targeted key installations and senior Sri Lankan leaders. In early 2009, Sri Lankan forces recaptured the LTTE's key strongholds, including their capital of Kilinochchi. In May 2009, government forces defeated the last LTTE fighting forces, killed members of its leadership including leader Velupillai Prabhakaran, and declared military victory.

There have been no known attacks in Sri Lanka attributed to the LTTE since 2009, but 13 LTTE supporters, several of whom had allegedly planned attacks against U.S. and Israeli diplomatic facilities in India, were arrested in Malaysia in 2014. Additional members were arrested in Malaysia and India in 2015, one of whom was accused of exhorting other Sri Lankans to fund and revive the LTTE.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Sri Lanka, India, and Malaysia

**Funding and External Aid:** The LTTE's financial network of support continued after the group's military defeat in 2009. The LTTE has employed charities as fronts to collect and divert funds for its activities.

### **MUJAHIDIN SHURA COUNCIL IN THE ENVIRONS OF JERUSALEM**

**Aka** MSC; Mujahideen Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem; Mujahideen Shura Council; Shura al-Mujahedin Fi Aknaf Bayt al-Maqdis; Majlis Shura al-Mujahidin; Majlis Shura alMujahideen; Magles Shoura al-Mujahddin

**Description:** The Mujahidin Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem (MSC) was designated as an FTO on August 19, 2014. The MSC is a consolidation of several Salafi terrorist groups based in Gaza that have claimed responsibility for numerous attacks against Israel since the group's founding in 2012.

**Activities:** In August 2013, MSC claimed responsibility for a rocket attack targeting the Israeli city of Eilat. Previously, MSC claimed responsibility for the March 2013, attack in which Gaza-based militants fired at least five rockets at Sderot, Israel, and the April 2013 attack in which two rockets were fired at Eilat. MSC did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2019.

**Strength:** MSC is estimated to have several hundred fighters.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Gaza

**Funding and External Aid:** Sources of funding are unknown.

### **AL-MURABITOUN**

**Aka** al-Mulathamun Battalion; al-Mulathamun Brigade; al-Muwaqqi'un bil-Dima; Those Signed in Blood Battalion; Signatories in Blood; Those who Sign in Blood; Witnesses in Blood; Signed-in-Blood Battalion; Masked Men Brigade; Khaled Abu al-Abbas Brigade; al-Mulathamun Masked Ones Brigade; The Sentinels

**Description:** Al-Murabitoun was designated as an FTO on December 19, 2013, originally under the name al-Mulathamun Battalion. Al-Murabitoun was originally part of al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), but became a separate organization in late 2012 after its leader, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, split from AQIM. After the split, Belmokhtar threatened to fight against Western interests and announced the creation of the al-Mulathamun Battalion. In 2013, the al-Mulathamun Battalion and the Mali-based Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) announced that the two organizations would merge under the name "al-Murabitoun." In 2015, al-Murabitoun announced a re-merger with AQIM. In 2017, the Sahara Branch of al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Murabitoun, Ansar al-Dine, and the Macina Liberation Front came together to form Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM).

**Activities:** In January 2013, what is now known as al-Murabitoun claimed responsibility for the attack against the Tiguentourine gas facility near In Amenas, in southeastern Algeria. More than 800 people were taken hostage during the four-day siege, resulting in the deaths of 39 civilians, including three U.S. citizens. Seven other U.S. citizens escaped.

In May 2013, al-Murabitoun participated in twin suicide bombings on a northern Nigerien military base and a French uranium mine in Arlit. The coordinated attacks killed more than 20 people, including all of the attackers.

In March 2015, al-Murabitoun claimed responsibility for an attack at La Terrasse restaurant in Bamako, Mali that killed a French national, a Belgian national, and three Malians. Al-Murabitoun also claimed responsibility for the August 2015 hotel siege in central Mali that killed 17 people. In November 2015, al-Murabitoun operatives participated in the strike against the Radisson Blu Hotel in Bamako, Mali, taking more than 170 people hostage – including U.S. citizens. Nearly 27 people were killed in the attack, among them a U.S. international development worker.

Al-Murabitoun was reportedly involved in the AQIM January 2016 attack on a popular tourist hotel in Burkina Faso that killed nearly 30, including a U.S. citizen. In addition, al-Murabitoun claimed responsibility for a January 2017 suicide car bombing at a military camp in Mali that killed more than 47 people and injured more than 115. In July 2018, al-Murabitoun was involved in fighting against French forces in Mali. Al-Murabitoun remained active in 2019.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Algeria, Burkina Faso, Libya, Mali, and Niger

**Funding and External Aid:** In addition to the support it may receive through its connections to other terrorist organizations in the region, al-Murabitoun is likely funded through kidnapping-for-ransom and other criminal activities.

### **NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY**

**Aka** ELN; Ejército de Liberación Nacional.

**Description:** The National Liberation Army (ELN) was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997. The ELN is a Colombian Marxist-Leninist group formed in 1964. The ELN remains focused on attacking the security services and economic infrastructure – in particular oil and gas pipelines and electricity pylons – and on extorting foreign and local companies and commits crimes and acts of terror throughout the country, including violence against civilian populations in Colombia and Venezuela

**Activities:** The ELN continued to target Colombia's infrastructure, particularly oil pipelines. The ELN also launched mortars at police stations and the military; placed explosive devices near roads; and engaged in sniper attacks, roadblocks, and ambushes. Additionally, the ELN continued to kidnap civilians and members of the security services.

Throughout 2017, the Government of Colombia and the ELN conducted peace talks but did not ultimately reach an agreement. Peace talks were intermittent throughout 2018 after being suspended in January following a series of ELN bombings that killed several police officers and injured dozens more. The government ended talks following a January 2019 vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attack by the ELN on the General Santander National Police Academy. The attack was the deadliest Bogotá had experienced in years, killing 22 police cadets and injuring 87 more. Colombian officials also attributed a number of oil pipeline bombings to the ELN in 2019.

**Strength:** ELN consists of about 3,000 armed combatants.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Colombia and Venezuela

**Funding and External Aid:** The ELN draws its funding from the illicit narcotics trade, extortion of oil and gas companies and landowners, and illegal mining in Colombia and Venezuela. Additional funds are derived from kidnapping-for-ransom payments.

### **AL-NUSRAH FRONT**

**Aka** Jabhat al-Nusrah; Jabhet al-Nusrah; The Victory Front; al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant; al-Nusrah Front in Lebanon; Jabhat al-Nusra li-Ahl al-Sham min Mujahedi al-Sham fi Sahat al-Jihad; Support Front for the People of the Levant; Jabhat Fath al-Sham; Jabhat Fath al-Sham; Jabhat Fatah al-Sham; Jabhat Fateh al-Sham; Front for the Conquest of Syria; the Front for liberation of al-Sham; Front for the Conquest of Syria/the Levant; Front for the Liberation of the Levant; Conquest of the Levant Front; Fatah al-Sham Front; Fateh al-Sham Front; Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham; Hay'et Tahrir al-Sham; Hayat Tahrir al-Sham; HTS; Assembly for the Liberation of Syria; Assembly for Liberation of the Levant; Liberation of al-Sham Commission; Liberation of the Levant Organization; Tahrir al-Sham; Tahrir al-Sham Hay'at

**Description:** Al-Nusrah Front (ANF) was designated as an FTO on May 15, 2014, and is al-Qa'ida's affiliate in Syria. It is led by Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani. The group was formed in late 2011 when then-al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI) – now ISIS – leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi sent al-Jawlani to Syria to organize terrorist cells. In 2013, the group split from AQI and became an independent entity. ANF's stated goal is to oust Syria's Assad regime and replace it with a Sunni Islamic state. The group is concentrated in and controls a portion of territory in northwest Syria, where it is active as an opposition force, and exerts varying degrees of influence over local governance and external plotting.

In early 2017, ANF joined with four smaller Syrian factions and created Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) as a vehicle to advance its position in the Syrian insurgency and further its own goals as al-Qa'ida's affiliate in Syria.

**Activities:** ANF has been active in operations against other factions in the Syrian conflict. In 2016, the group carried out attacks in Aleppo and other parts of Syria controlled by the Syrian army, killing both military officials and civilians.

Since 2017, ANF has continued to operate through HTS in pursuit of its objectives. In October 2017, ANF launched an attack near the Turkish border against the Syrian army, killing several soldiers. In March, the group carried out multiple suicide bombings in Damascus, including suicide attacks using VBIEDs. ANF took control of significant portions of Idlib from 2017 to 2019, exerting severe military pressure over other local groups such as Ahrar ash-Sham and Nur ad-Din al-Zinki as it fought against the regime and continued plotting against U.S. and allied interests.

In 2019, the group suffered heavy casualties, estimated in the hundreds, from engagement with Russian-backed Syrian government forces.

**Strength:** ANF has between 5,000 and 10,000 fighters.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Syria

**Funding and External Aid:** ANF receives funding from a variety of sources, including kidnapping-for-ransom payments, taxes and fees on border crossings it controls, and donations

from external Gulf-based donors. The group also generates revenue by collecting fees from commercial traffic entering and exiting Idlib.

### **PALESTINE ISLAMIC JIHAD**

**Aka** PIJ; PIJ-Shaqaqi Faction; PIJ-Shallah Faction; Islamic Jihad of Palestine; Islamic Jihad in Palestine; Abu Ghunaym Squad of the Hizballah Bayt al-Maqdis; Al-Quds Squads; Al-Quds Brigades; Saraya al-Quds; Al-Awdah Brigades

**Description:** Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997. Formed by militant Palestinians in Gaza during the 1970s, PIJ is committed to the destruction of Israel and to the creation of an Islamic state in historic Palestine, including present-day Israel.

**Activities:** PIJ terrorists have conducted numerous attacks, including large-scale suicide bombings, against Israeli civilian and military targets. Between 2008 and 2011, PIJ conducted rocket attacks and used other explosive devices to target southern Israel. Throughout 2014, PIJ operatives carried out attacks on Israeli buses in Tel Aviv. In March 2014, PIJ carried out a wave of rocket attacks into Israeli territory; up to 60 rockets may have reached Israel.

In 2015, PIJ revealed that its militants were smuggling weapons, including Gaza-made rockets and mortars, through tunnels in Gaza, in preparation for future attacks against Israel. In May 2015, Israeli forces blamed PIJ for firing a rocket that landed in Gan Yazne, a region close to the Gaza border. In August 2015, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) claimed PIJ operatives in Syria fired four rockets at the Golan Heights and Upper Galilee.

Throughout 2016, PIJ continued to strike Israel, primarily through light arms fire directed at IDF patrols. In September 2016, Israeli authorities arrested PIJ operative Mahmoud Yusuf Hasin Abu Taha upon his entry into Israel from Gaza, interrupting a PIJ plot to abduct and kill an IDF soldier and carry out a mass-casualty attack on a reception hall in Beersheba. In 2017, PIJ praised numerous shootings, bombings, and other attacks in Israel that resulted in multiple deaths. PIJ claimed responsibility for launching rockets into Israel throughout 2018 and 2019. In a November 2019 video, PIJ's Al-Quds Brigade introduced a new rocket to its arsenal and thanked Iran for its support.

**Strength:** PIJ has close to 1,000 members.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank

**Funding and External Aid:** PIJ receives financial assistance and training primarily from Iran. PIJ has partnered with Iran- and Syria-sponsored Hizballah to carry out joint operations.

### **PALESTINE LIBERATION FRONT – ABU ABBAS FACTION**

**Aka** PLF; PLF-Abu Abbas; Palestine Liberation Front

**Description:** The Palestinian Liberation Front-Abu Abbas Faction (PLF) was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997. In the late 1970s, the PLF splintered from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command. It later split into pro-Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), pro-Syrian, and pro-Libyan factions. The pro-PLO faction was led by Muhammad Zaydan (aka Abu Abbas) and was based in Baghdad before Operation Iraqi Freedom.

**Activities:** The PLF was responsible for the 1985 attack on the Italian cruise ship *Achille Lauro* and the murder of U.S. citizen Leon Klinghoffer. Throughout the 1990s, the PLF was suspected of supporting terrorism against Israel by other Palestinian groups. In April 2004, Abu Abbas died of natural causes while in U.S. custody in Iraq. After not claiming an attack for 16 years, the PLF claimed responsibility for the March 2008 assault against an Israeli military bus in Huwarah, Israel, and the shooting of an Israeli settler. In February 2010, the PLF claimed responsibility for an IED attack against an IDF patrol, which caused minor injuries to a soldier; another IED was discovered during a search of the area. The PLF has not claimed responsibility for any attacks since 2016, but continues to maintain a strong presence in many refugee camps in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Gaza, Lebanon, and the West Bank

**Funding and External Aid:** Sources of funding are unknown.

### **POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE**

**Aka** PFLP; Halhul Gang; Halhul Squad; Palestinian Popular Resistance Forces; PPRF; Red Eagle Gang; Red Eagle Group; Red Eagles; Martyr Abu-Ali Mustafa Battalion

**Description:** Designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) is a Marxist-Leninist group founded in 1967 by George Habash after splitting from the Arab Nationalist Movement. The group earned a reputation for committing large-scale international attacks in the 1960s and 1970s, including airline hijackings that killed more than 20 U.S. citizens.

**Activities:** The PFLP increased its operational activity during the Second Intifada. During that time, the group assassinated Israeli Tourism Minister Rehavam Ze'evi in 2001, carried out at least two suicide operations, and launched multiple joint operations with other Palestinian terrorist groups. Between 2008 and 2011, the PFLP claimed responsibility for numerous attacks on IDF in Gaza as well as mortar and rocket attacks fired from Gaza into Israel. In 2012, the Israeli Security Agency arrested several members of the PFLP for plotting to carry out attacks on IDF checkpoints and planning to conduct kidnappings.

In November 2014, two Palestinians reportedly affiliated with the PFLP entered a Jerusalem synagogue and attacked Israelis with guns, knives, and axes, killing five people – including three U.S. citizens – and injuring 12. In December, the PFLP claimed responsibility for several rocket attacks along the Lebanese-Israel border.

In June 2017, three Palestinian militants launched an attack near Jerusalem's Old City, stabbing and killing an Israeli border security agent. Two of the militants were PFLP members, although ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack.

In September 2019, IDF and Israeli Border Patrol forces arrested four PFLP members allegedly responsible for remotely detonating an IED in the West Bank, killing an Israeli teenager and seriously wounding two others.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Gaza, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, and the West Bank



**Funding and External Aid:** Sources of support are unknown.

## **POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE-GENERAL COMMAND**

**Aka** PFLP-GC

**Description:** The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997. The PFLP-GC split from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine in 1968, claiming it wanted to concentrate more on resistance and less on politics. Ahmad Jibril, a former captain in the Syrian army, has led the PFLP-GC since its founding. The PFLP-GC has close ties to both Syria and Iran.

**Activities:** The PFLP-GC carried out dozens of attacks in Europe and the Middle East during the 1970s and 1980s. The organization was known for conducting cross-border attacks into Israel using unusual means, such as hot-air balloons and motorized hang gliders. Since the early 1990s, the group has primarily focused on supporting Hizballah's attacks against Israel, training members of other Palestinian terrorist groups, and smuggling weapons. More recently, the PFLP-GC has been implicated by Lebanese security officials in several rocket attacks against Israel. In 2009, the group was responsible for wounding two civilians in an armed attack in Nahariyya, Israel.

In November 2012, the PFLP-GC claimed responsibility for a bus bombing in Tel Aviv that injured 29 people, although four Palestine Islamic Jihad and Hamas operatives later were arrested for the attack. In 2015, the PFLP-GC reportedly began fighting alongside the Assad regime in Syria, while also receiving logistical and military aid from Hizballah and Iran.

Separately, in December 2015, the PFLP-GC took responsibility for rocket fire aimed at Israeli territory. The attack, in which at least three rockets were fired from Lebanon into northern Israel, landed near Shlomi, a small town near the Lebanese frontier with Israel. Although the PFLP-GC did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2019, the group remained an active participant in the Syrian conflict.

**Strength:** The PFLP-GC has several hundred members.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza

**Funding and External Aid:** The PFLP-GC receives safe haven and logistical and military support from Syria as well as financial support from Iran.

## **AL-QA'IDA**

**Aka** al-Qa'eda; al Qaida, al Qaeda, Islamic Army; Islamic Salvation Foundation; The Base; The Group for the Preservation of the Holy Sites; The Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places; the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders; Usama Bin Laden Network; Usama Bin Laden Organization; al-Jihad; the Jihad Group; Egyptian al-Jihad; Egyptian Islamic Jihad; New Jihad; International Front for Fighting Jews and Crusades; Islamic Army for the Liberation of Holy Sites

**Description:** Al-Qa'ida (AQ) was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1999. Established in 1988, the group helped finance, recruit, transport, and train fighters for the Afghan resistance against the former Soviet Union. AQ strives to eliminate Western influence from the Muslim world, topple "apostate" governments of Muslim countries, and establish a pan-Islamic caliphate

governed by its own interpretation of Sharia law that would ultimately be at the center of a new international order. These goals remain essentially unchanged since the group's 1996 public declaration of war against the United States. AQ leaders issued a statement in 1998 under the banner of "The World Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders," saying it was the duty of all Muslims to kill U.S. citizens – civilian and military – and their allies everywhere. AQ merged with al-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad) in June 2001. While numerous AQ leaders have been killed in recent years, including Usama bin Laden in 2011, AQ's current leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, remains at large.

**Activities:** AQ conducted three bombings targeting U.S. troops in Aden, Yemen, in 1992 and claimed responsibility for shooting down U.S. helicopters and killing U.S. soldiers in Somalia in 1993. AQ also carried out the 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing up to 300 people and injuring more than 5,000. In 2000, AQ conducted a suicide attack on the USS Cole in the port of Aden with an explosive-laden boat, killing 17 U.S. Navy sailors and injuring 39 others.

On September 11, 2001, 19 AQ members hijacked and crashed four U.S. commercial jets – two into the World Trade Center in New York City, one into the Pentagon, and the last into a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania. Nearly 3,000 civilians, police, and first responders were killed. The dead included U.S. and foreign citizens from at least 77 countries.

In a 2011 video, al-Zawahiri claimed AQ was behind the kidnapping of U.S. aid worker Warren Weinstein in Pakistan. Weinstein was held captive until his death in 2015.

In 2015, five senior AQ leaders were released from Iranian custody in exchange for an Iranian diplomat kidnapped in Yemen. Of the five, Saif al Adel and Abu Mohammed al Masri are wanted for the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.

In 2016, al-Zawahiri publicly released two audio messages and one seven-page statement, condemning the Government of Saudi Arabia and its role in the Syrian conflict, encouraging AQ activity in Southeast Asia – especially Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines – and acknowledging support for its affiliate in Syria, al-Nusrah Front.

In September 2017, a U.S. citizen was convicted in New York of charges related to supporting AQ to attack a U.S. military base in Afghanistan using two truck bombs in 2009. In October 2017, al-Zawahiri released a video calling for jihadists around the world to conduct attacks against the United States. Al-Zawahiri released multiple recordings and videos in 2018 in which he continued to call for jihad against the United States after the U.S. Embassy in Israel moved from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.

In July 2019, a man from Cleveland, Ohio, was arrested for allegedly making plans for an AQ-inspired bomb attack on the city's downtown July 4th parade. In July 2019, Zawahiri called for extremists in Kashmir to attack Indian forces. On September 11, 2019, al-Zawahiri appealed to Muslims to attack U.S., European, Israeli, and Russian military targets in a video recording.

**Strength:** In South Asia, AQ's core has been seriously degraded. The death or arrest of dozens of mid- and senior-level AQ operatives, including Usama bin Laden, has disrupted communication, financial support, facilitation nodes, and several terrorist plots. AQ, however, remains a focal point of "inspiration" for a worldwide network of affiliated groups. Among them, al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-

Nusrah Front, al-Shabaab, al-Qa'ida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), and other terrorist groups, including the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Islamic Jihad Union, Lashkar i Jhangvi, Harakat ul-Mujahideen, and Jemaah Islamiya. The Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan and the Haqqani Network also have ties to AQ. In addition, supporters and associates worldwide who are “inspired” by the group’s ideology may operate without direction from AQ central leadership.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, North Africa, and Somalia

**Funding and External Aid:** AQ primarily depends on donations from likeminded supporters, and from individuals who believe that their money is supporting a humanitarian cause. Some funds are diverted from Islamic charitable organizations.

### AL-QA'IDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA

**Aka** al-Qa'ida in the South Arabian Peninsula; al-Qa'ida in Yemen; al-Qa'ida of Jihad Organization in the Arabian Peninsula; al-Qa'ida Organization in the Arabian Peninsula; Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Jazirat al-Arab; AQAP; AQY; Ansar al-Shari'a; Ansar al-Sharia; Ansar al-Shariah, Ansar al Shariah, Partisans of Islamic Law, Sons of Abyan; Sons of Hadramawt; Sons of Hadramawt Committee; Civil Council of Hadramawt; and National Hadramawt Council

**Description:** Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) was designated as an FTO on January 19, 2010. In January 2009, the now-deceased leader of al-Qa'ida in Yemen, Nasir al-Wahishi, publicly announced that Yemeni and Saudi al-Qa'ida (AQ) operatives were working together under the banner of AQAP. The announcement signaled the rebirth of an AQ franchise that previously carried out attacks in Saudi Arabia. AQAP's stated goals include establishing a caliphate and implementing Sharia law in the Arabian Peninsula and the wider Middle East.

**Activities:** AQAP has claimed responsibility for numerous terrorist acts against both local and foreign targets since its inception in January 2009. These include a March 2009 suicide bombing against South Korean tourists in Yemen and the December 25, 2009, attempted attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253 from Amsterdam to Detroit, Michigan. In October 2010, AQAP claimed responsibility for a foiled plot to send explosive-laden packages to the United States via cargo planes. The parcels were intercepted in the UK and the United Arab Emirates.

AQAP, operating under the alias Ansar al-Shari'a, carried out a May 2012 suicide bombing in Sana'a that killed 96 people. The same month, the media reported that AQAP allegedly planned to detonate a bomb aboard a U.S.-bound airliner using an IED.

In January 2015, brothers Cherif and Said Kouachi attacked the satirical newspaper *Charlie Hebdo* in Paris, France, killing 12 people. One of the brothers, who had traveled to Yemen in 2011 and met with now-deceased Anwar al-Aulaqi, claimed responsibility for the attack on behalf of AQAP.

Also in 2015, AQAP took advantage of Yemen's deteriorating political and economic environment following the Houthi take over – and exile of the Government of Yemen – of the capitol, Sana'a. In April 2015, AQAP stormed the city of Mukalla, seizing control of government buildings, releasing terrorists from prison, and stealing millions from the central bank. Between 2015 and 2016, AQAP consolidated its control over Mukalla and expanded its reach throughout large portions of Yemen's south.

In early 2016, AQAP swept through southern Yemen, gaining control of al-Hawta, Azzan, and Habban in Lahij Governorate as well as Mahfad and Ahwar in Abyan Governorate. By February 2016, AQAP controlled most of Yemen's southeastern coast. The group lost control of Mukalla in April 2016, when forces backed by the Saudi-led Coalition retook the port city; however, these territorial losses did not significantly degrade AQAP's capabilities, although they did deprive the group of an important source of income.

In early 2017, a U.S. Navy SEAL was killed in a raid against AQAP leaders in Yemen. In June 2017, AQAP attacked a Yemeni army camp, killing at least two soldiers. In 2018, AQAP senior leader, Khaled Batarfi, called on the group's supporters to "rise and attack" Americans "everywhere." In August 2019, AQAP gunmen killed 19 soldiers in an attack on an army base in southern Yemen.

**Strength:** AQAP fighters are estimated to be in the low thousands.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Yemen

**Funding and External Aid:** AQAP's funding has historically come from theft, robberies, oil and gas revenue, kidnap-for-ransom operations, and donations from likeminded supporters.

### **AL-QA'IDA IN THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT**

**Aka** al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent; Qaedat al-Jihad in the Indian Subcontinent

**Description:** Al-Qa'ida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) was designated as an FTO on July 1, 2016. Established in 2014, AQIS focuses on terrorist activity in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. Its leader is Asim Umar, a former member of the FTO Harakat ul-Mujahideen. In September 2019, the Afghan government reported that Umar was killed in a military raid on a Taliban compound in Helmand Province, Afghanistan.

**Activities:** In September 2014, AQIS claimed responsibility for an attack on a naval dockyard in Karachi, Pakistan, in which militants attempted to hijack a Pakistani Navy frigate to attack nearby U.S. warships. AQIS also claimed attacks against human rights activists and secular writers in Bangladesh, including U.S. citizen Avijit Roy, U.S. Embassy local employee Xulhaz Mannan, and Bangladeshi nationals Oyasiqur Rahman Babu, Ahmed Rajib Haideer, and A.K.M. Shafiul Islam. In September 2017, AQAP called on AQIS to launch more attacks on Burmese authorities because of Burma's policies towards Rohingya Muslims. AQIS has not claimed responsibility for any attacks since 2017. In 2019, Asim Umar, the head of AQIS, was killed in a joint U.S.-Afghan military operation.

**Strength:** AQIS is estimated to have several hundred members.

**Location/Area of Operations:** Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan

**Funding and External Aid:** AQIS likely receives funding from al-Qa'ida senior leadership and engages in general criminal activity, kidnapping, and extortion.

### **AL-QA'IDA IN THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB**

**Aka** AQIM; GSPC; Le Groupe Salafiste Pour la Predication et le Combat; Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat; Salafist Group for Call and Combat; Tanzim al-Qa'ida fi Bilad al-Maghrib al-Islamiya

**Description:** The Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) was designated as an FTO on March 27, 2002. The Department of State amended the GSPC designation on February 20, 2008, after the GSPC officially joined with al-Qa'ida (AQ) in September 2006 and became al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Although AQIM remains largely a regionally focused terrorist group, it has adopted a more anti-Western rhetoric and ideology. The group aspires to overthrow “apostate” African regimes and create an Islamic state. AQIM is led by Abdelmalek Droukdel, also known as Abu Mus'ab Abd al-Wadoud.

**Activities:** Following AQIM's 2007 bombing of the UN headquarters building and an Algerian government building in Algiers, which killed 60 people, AQIM's northern leadership was contained to northeastern Algeria, while the group's southern battalions focused mostly on kidnapping-for-ransom efforts. In 2011 and 2012, however, AQIM took advantage of the deteriorating security situation across Libya, Mali, and Tunisia to expand its operations. Terrorists with ties to AQIM were involved in the September 11, 2012, attack on U.S. facilities in Benghazi that killed U.S. Ambassador to Libya J. Christopher Stevens and three other embassy staff members. In April 2014, AQIM killed 14 Algerian soldiers in an ambush east of Algiers.

In January 2015, AQIM claimed responsibility for an attack on a UN vehicle in Kidal, Mali, which wounded seven peacekeepers. That same year, AQIM twice attacked UN convoys near Timbuktu, Mali, with small arms and rocket-propelled grenades; three peacekeepers were killed in a May 2015 attack and another six were killed in a July attack. In November 2015, AQIM, in cooperation with other terrorist groups, attacked the Radisson Blu Hotel in Bamako, Mali, taking more than 170 hostages, including U.S. citizens. As many as 27 people were killed in the attack, among them a U.S. international development worker.

In January 2016, AQIM carried out an attack on a hotel in Burkina Faso that killed 28 people and injured 56. In March 2016, AQIM claimed responsibility for a strike on a popular tourist beach resort in Cote d'Ivoire that killed more than 16 people and wounded another 33.

AQIM has continued to conduct kidnapping-for-ransom operations, typically targeting Western citizens from governments or third parties that have an established pattern of paying ransom for the release of individuals. In November 2014, AQIM released a video of two Western hostages (a Dutch national and a French national), who were later released in December 2014.

In January 2017, AQIM conducted a suicide attack that left more than 50 people dead in Gao, Mali. In July 2018, AQIM claimed responsibility for a vehicle suicide attack on an army patrol in Gao that killed four civilians and wounded 31 others, including four French soldiers.

In January 2019, AQIM claimed responsibility for an attack on a UN camp in northern Mali, killing 10 peacekeepers and wounding 25 others.

**Strength:** AQIM has an estimated 1,000 fighters operating in the Sahel, including Algeria, northern Mali, southwest Libya, and Niger.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Libya, Mali, Niger, and Tunisia

**Funding and External Aid:** AQIM members engage in kidnapping-for-ransom and other criminal activities to finance their operations. AQIM also successfully fundraises globally and receives limited financial and logistical assistance from supporters residing in Western Europe.

### **REAL IRA**

**Aka** RIRA; Real Irish Republican Army; 32 County Sovereignty Committee; 32 County Sovereignty Movement; Irish Republican Prisoners Welfare Association; Real Oglagh Na Heireann

**Description:** The Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) was designated as an FTO on May 16, 2001. The group was formed in 1997 as the clandestine armed wing of the 32 County Sovereignty Movement, a “political pressure group” dedicated to removing British forces from Northern Ireland and unifying Ireland. The RIRA has historically sought to disrupt the Northern Ireland peace process and did not participate in the September 2005 weapons decommissioning. Despite internal rifts and calls by some jailed members (including the group’s founder Michael “Mickey” McKevitt) for a cease-fire and disbandment, the RIRA has pledged additional violence and continued to conduct attacks. Many RIRA members are former Provisional Irish Republican Army members who left the organization after the group renewed its cease-fire in 1997. These members brought extensive experience in terrorist tactics and bomb-making to the group.

**Activities:** Targets have included civilians (the most notorious example is the Omagh bombing in August 1998), British security forces, and police officers in Northern Ireland. The Independent Monitoring Commission, which oversees the peace process, assessed that RIRA likely was responsible for the majority of the attacks that occurred after the Irish Republican Army (IRA) was decommissioned in Northern Ireland.

In May 2015, Irish police carried out 20 searches aimed at known dissident republicans across Ireland. Six individuals with links to the RIRA and the Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) were arrested after police discovered explosive devices. In 2016, the RIRA bombed the van of an Irish prison officer in east Belfast; the officer died from complications following the attack. Dublin police also linked the RIRA to a cache of explosives found in Dublin in April 2016. In January 2017, RIRA gunmen fired at police officers in north Belfast, injuring one officer. RIRA did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2018 and 2019.

**Strength:** The Irish government reports that the RIRA has roughly 100 active members. The organization may receive limited support from IRA hardliners and sympathizers who are dissatisfied with the IRA’s cease-fire and with Sinn Féin’s involvement in the peace process.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland

**Funding and External Aid:** RIRA is suspected of receiving funds from sympathizers in the United States and of attempting to buy weapons from U.S. gun dealers. The group reportedly purchased sophisticated weapons from the Balkans and occasionally collaborated with the CIRA.

### **REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF COLOMBIA**

**Aka** FARC; Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia

**Description:** Founded in 1964 and designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) was Latin America’s oldest, largest, and best-equipped

terrorist organization. The FARC was responsible for large numbers of kidnappings-for-ransom in Colombia and held as many as 700 hostages. In November 2016, after four years of negotiation in Havana, Cuba, the Colombian government and FARC reached a peace agreement, later approved by Colombia's Congress, setting into motion a disarmament, demobilization, and reincorporation process. In accordance with the peace agreement, the vast majority of FARC combatants disarmed and demobilized between December 2016 and August 2017 under UN supervision, with roughly 7,000 FARC members turning in more than 8,000 weapons. In 2019, roughly 13,000 FARC ex-combatants and former militia members continued to participate in social and economic reincorporation activities under the 2016 accord. Up to 1,500 FARC guerrillas chose not to participate in the peace process and around 250 have since abandoned the process. FARC dissidents have recruited an estimated 1,000 new members, largely minors, since the signing of the peace accord. Altogether, these individuals are often referred to by the United States as FARC dissidents and as the residual organized armed group by the Colombian government.

**Activities:** Over the years, the FARC has perpetrated many high-profile terrorist acts, including the 1999 murder of three U.S. missionaries working in Colombia as well as multiple kidnappings and assassinations of Colombian government officials and civilians. In July 2008, the Colombian military conducted a dramatic rescue of 15 high-value FARC hostages, including U.S. Department of Defense contractors Marc Gonsalves, Keith Stansell, and Thomas Howe, who were held captive for more than five years, along with former Colombian presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt.

There have been reports of continued extortion and violent criminal activities by FARC dissidents not participating in the peace process. In August, former FARC commanders Iván Márquez and Jesus Santrich appeared in a video calling for a return to arms against the Colombian government.

**Strength:** Before the peace accord, the FARC was estimated to have 7,000 armed members, with several thousand additional supporters.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Colombia and Venezuela

**Funding and External Aid:** Before the peace accord, the FARC was primarily funded by extortion and international drug trade. FARC dissidents continue such activities.

## **REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE'S LIBERATION PARTY/FRONT**

**Aka** DHKP/C; Dev Sol; Dev Sol Armed Revolutionary Units; Dev Sol Silahli Devrimci Birlikleri; Dev Sol SDB; Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Partisi-Cephesi; Devrimci Sol; Revolutionary Left

**Description:** Designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997, the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) was formed in 1978 as Devrimci Sol, or Dev Sol, a splinter faction of Dev Genc (Revolutionary Youth). It was renamed in 1994 after factional infighting. "Party" refers to the group's political activities and "Front" alludes to the group's militant operations. The group advocates a Marxist-Leninist ideology and opposes the United States, NATO, and the Turkish establishment. It strives to establish a socialist state and to abolish Turkish prisons.

**Activities:** Since the late 1980s, the group has primarily targeted current and retired Turkish security and military officials. In 1990, the group began conducting attacks against foreign interests, including U.S. military and diplomatic personnel and facilities. The DHKP/C assassinated two U.S. military contractors, wounded a U.S. Air Force officer, and bombed more than 20 U.S. and NATO military, diplomatic, commercial, and cultural facilities. In 2001, the DHKP/C began conducting its first suicide bombing attacks against Turkish police. Since the end of 2001, DHKP/C has typically used IEDs against official Turkish and U.S. targets.

The DHKP/C was responsible for many high-profile attacks in 2012, including the suicide bombing of a police station in Istanbul. In February 2013, a DHKP/C operative exploded a suicide vest inside the employee entrance to the U.S. Embassy in Ankara. The explosion killed a Turkish guard and seriously wounded a Turkish journalist. In March 2013, three members of the group attacked the Ministry of Justice and the Ankara headquarters of the Turkish Justice and Development political party using grenades and rocket launchers.

In 2015, the DHKP/C claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing that killed one police officer and wounded another. In March 2015, Turkish prosecutor Mehmet Selim Kiraz was taken hostage and died from multiple gunshot wounds inflicted by the DHKP/C after police attempted to rescue him. In August 2015, two women opened fire on the U.S. Consulate in Istanbul; one woman was identified as a member of the DHKP/C.

On January 20, 2017, a DHKP/C militant launched an anti-tank missile into Istanbul police headquarters. The attack did not result in any deaths or injuries.

In November 2018, a court in Istanbul issued an arrest warrant for members of the DHKP/C who were believed to be in Europe and connected with the 2015 death of Turkish prosecutor Mehmet Selim Kiraz.

In May 2019, two individuals linked to the DHKP/C were arrested by Turkish security forces, after entering the Turkish Parliament and taking a staff member hostage.

**Strength:** The DHKP/C is estimated to have several dozen members inside Turkey, with a support network throughout Europe.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Turkey and Europe

**Funding and External Aid:** The DHKP/C finances its activities chiefly through donations and extortion. The group raises funds primarily in Europe.

## **REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE**

**Aka** Epanastatikos Aghonas

**Description:** Designated as an FTO on May 18, 2009, Revolutionary Struggle (RS) is a radical Marxist extremist group that has conducted attacks against both Greek and U.S. targets in Greece. RS emerged in 2003 following the arrests of members of two other Greek Marxist groups, 17 November and Revolutionary People's Struggle.

**Activities:** RS first gained notoriety when it claimed responsibility for the September 5, 2003, bombings at the Athens Courthouse during the trials of 17 November members. From 2004 to 2006, RS carried out IED attacks that included a March 2004 attack outside a Citibank office in Athens. RS claimed responsibility for the January 2007 rocket-propelled grenade attack on the



U.S. Embassy in Athens, which damaged the building, and the March 2009 bombing of a Citibank branch in Athens.

The Greek government has made significant strides in curtailing the group's terrorist activity. On April 10, 2010, Greek police arrested six suspected RS members, including purported leader Nikos Maziotis, who later escaped. On April 3, 2013, five RS members were convicted by an Athens appeals court, three of them receiving maximum prison sentences. Maziotis and another accused RS conspirator, Paula Roupa, were convicted in absentia. Before Maziotis's recapture, RS conducted a bomb attack outside a Bank of Greece office in Athens in April 2014; the blast caused extensive damage to surrounding structures but no casualties.

In March 2016, a Greek court sentenced Maziotis to life in prison plus 129 years. In January 2017, Roupa was arrested by Greek police in Athens, later sentenced to life and 25 years' imprisonment. RS did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2019.

**Strength:** Precise numbers are unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Greece

**Funding and External Aid:** RS's sources of funding are unknown, but the group most likely supports itself by means of criminal activities, including bank robbery.

### **AL-SHABAAB**

**Aka** Harakat Shabaab al-Mujahidin; al-Shabab; Shabaab; Youth Wing; Mujahidin al-Shabaab Movement; Mujahideen Youth Movement; Mujahidin Youth Movement; al-Hijra, al Hijra, Muslim Youth Center, MYC, Pumwani Muslim Youth, Pumwani Islamist Muslim Youth Center; Hizbul Shabaab; Hisb'ul Shabaab; al-Shabaab al-Islamiya; al-Shabaab al-Islaam; al-Shabaab al-Jihad; The Unity of Islamic Youth; Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin; Harakatul-Shabaab al Mujaahidiin; Mujaahidiin Youth Movement

**Description:** Al-Shabaab was designated as an FTO on March 18, 2008. Al-Shabaab was the militant wing of the former Somali Islamic Courts Council that took over parts of southern Somalia during the second half of 2006. Since the end of 2006, al-Shabaab and associated militias have engaged in violent insurgency using guerrilla warfare and terrorist tactics against the transitional governments of Somalia.

Al-Shabaab is an official al-Qa'ida (AQ) affiliate and has ties to other AQ affiliates, including al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula and al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb. The group's leader is Ahmed Diriye aka Ahmed Umar aka Abu Ubaidah.

Al-Shabaab is composed of Somali recruits and foreign terrorist fighters. Since 2011, al-Shabaab has seen its military capacity reduced owing to the efforts of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali forces, and clashes within the group itself. Despite al-Shabaab's loss of urban centers since 2012, the group has maintained its hold on large sections of rural areas throughout Somalia and has conducted attacks in Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, and Djibouti.

**Activities:** Al-Shabaab has used intimidation and violence to exploit divisions in Somalia and undermine the Somali government, recruit new fighters, extort funding from local populations, and kill activists working to bring about peace through political dialogue. The group has claimed

responsibility for several high-profile bombings and shootings throughout Somalia targeting AMISOM troops and Somali officials. Al-Shabaab has assassinated numerous civil society figures, government officials, journalists, international aid workers, and members of non-governmental organizations.

Al-Shabaab was responsible for the July 11, 2010, suicide bombings in Kampala, Uganda – its first attack outside of Somalia. The attack, which took place during the World Cup, killed 76 people, including a U.S. citizen. In September 2013, al-Shabaab staged a significant attack against the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya. The multi-day siege resulted in the deaths of at least 65 civilians, including foreign nationals from 13 countries as well as six soldiers and police officers; hundreds of others were injured. In April 2015, al-Shabaab carried out a raid with small arms and grenades on Kenya's Garissa University College that killed 148 people.

Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for one of the deadliest attacks against AMISOM troops in Somalia in January 2016. Using a VBIED and small arms fire, al-Shabaab massed against a Kenyan AMISOM base and killed more than 100 soldiers. In February, al-Shabaab attempted to down Daallo Airlines Flight 321 with 74 passengers on board, but only the suicide bomber was killed in the explosion.

Al-Shabaab continued a steady pace of attacks in 2017, including in car bomb attacks in Mogadishu in January, March, and June that killed more than 70 people. In October 2017, it is believed that al-Shabaab conducted a double truck bombing in a Mogadishu intersection with heavy vehicle and pedestrian traffic that killed more than 500 people and injured 300 others.

In July 2018, al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for an attack on Somalia's interior ministry compound, killing at least nine people. In November 2018, al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for an attack in which suicide attackers set off two car bombs at a hotel near the headquarters of Somalia's Criminal Investigations Department in Mogadishu, killing at least 17 people.

In 2019, al-Shabaab was involved in more than 1,000 violent events in Somalia and eastern Kenya. In January, al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for a hotel attack in Kenya that killed 21 people and injured 28 others. In March, al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for an attack on the government ministries in Mogadishu, killing 15 people including a deputy minister and injuring 11 others. In July, al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing at the office of Mogadishu mayor Abdirahman Omar Osman, killing eight people including Osman and injuring several others. In October, al-Shabaab conducted an attack on the UN and AMISOM compound in Mogadishu, killing seven people and wounding others. In December, al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for an attack on a passenger bus in northeastern Kenya that killed eight people, including Kenyan police officers, and injured others. Later that month, al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for a bomb blast in Mogadishu that killed more than 90 people.

**Strength:** Al-Shabaab is estimated to have between 7,000 and 9,000 members.

**Location/Area of Operation** Somalia, Kenya, and Uganda

**Funding and External Aid:** Al-Shabaab receives enough income to launch attacks throughout Somalia, including against AMISOM bases and other civilian targets. Al-Shabaab obtains funds through illegal charcoal production and exports, taxation of local populations and businesses, and by means of remittances and other money transfers from the Somali diaspora (although these funds are not always intended to support al-Shabaab members).

## SHINING PATH

**Aka** SL; Sendero Luminoso; Ejército Guerrillero Popular; EGP; Ejército Popular de Liberación; EPL; Partido Comunista del Peru (Communist Party of Peru); PCP; Partido Comunista del Peru en el Sendero Luminoso de Jose Carlos Mariategui (Communist Party of Peru on the Shining Path of Jose Carlos Mariategui); Socorro Popular del Peru; SPP, Communist Party of Peru on the Shining Path of Jose Carlos Mariategui, Communist Party of Peru, People's Aid of Peru, People's Guerrilla Army; People's Liberation Army

**Description:** The Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso or SL) was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997. The Peru-based terrorist organization was formed in the late 1960s by former university professor Abimael Guzman, whose teachings created the foundation of SL's militant Maoist doctrine. In the 1980s, SL was one of the most ruthless terrorist groups in the Western Hemisphere. In 1992, the Peruvian government captured Guzman who, along with key accomplices, is serving a life sentence in prison. SL is now led by brothers Victor and Jorge Quispe Palomino and Tarcela Loya Vilchez. Under their direction, the group aims to overthrow the Peruvian government and names the United States as a principal enemy.

**Activities:** SL attacks have declined in recent years. On April 9, 2016, the group attacked a six-vehicle military caravan transporting election materials ahead of the country's election; eight soldiers and two civilian contractors were killed by SL members armed with long-range rifles and grenades. In separate incidents in 2017, SL killed several policemen in an area where the group controls territory and facilitates drug trafficking.

In June 2018, six soldiers were wounded by SL sharpshooters at the Nueva Libertad military base. In the same month, a group of SL members killed five soldiers and wounded another in an attack on the Nueva Libertad military base in the region of Junín, and attacked a police vehicle using a roadside bomb, killing four policemen.

In June 2019, suspected SL members conducted an attack on the Peruvian Army, killing three soldiers.

**Strength:** Estimates of SL's strength vary, but experts assess SL to number between 250 and 300 combatants.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Peru

**Funding and External Aid:** SL is primarily funded by the illicit narcotics trade.

## TEHRIK-E TALIBAN PAKISTAN

**Aka** Pakistani Taliban; Tehreek-e-Taliban; Tehrik-e-Taliban; Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan; TTP

**Description:** Designated as an FTO on September 1, 2010, Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is a Pakistan and Afghanistan-based terrorist organization formed in 2007 to oppose Pakistani military efforts in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (formerly known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas). Previously disparate tribal militants agreed to cooperate and eventually coalesced into TTP under the leadership of now-deceased leader Baitullah Mehsud. Mullah Fazlullah headed the group until his death in June 2018. TTP then named Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud as the group's new leader.

TTP aims to push the Government of Pakistan out of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and establish Sharia law by waging a terrorist campaign against the Pakistani military and state. TTP uses the tribal belt along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border to train and deploy its operatives, and the group has ties to al-Qa'ida (AQ). TTP draws ideological guidance from AQ, while elements of AQ rely in part on TTP for safe haven in the Pashtun areas along the Afghanistan-Pakistani border. This arrangement has given TTP access to both AQ's global terrorist network and its members' operational expertise.

**Activities:** TTP has carried out and claimed responsibility for numerous terrorist acts against Pakistani and U.S. interests, including a December 2009 suicide attack on a U.S. military base in Khost, Afghanistan, which killed seven U.S. citizens; and an April 2010 suicide bombing against the U.S. Consulate in Peshawar, Pakistan, which killed six Pakistani citizens. TTP is suspected of involvement in the 2007 assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. TTP directed and facilitated Faisal Shahzad's failed attempt to detonate an explosive device in New York City's Times Square on May 1, 2010.

Between 2011 and 2018, TTP continued to carry out attacks against the Government of Pakistan and Pakistani civilian targets, as well as against U.S. targets in Pakistan. In 2012, TTP carried out attacks against a mosque, a police checkpoint, a Pakistani Air Force base, and a bus carrying Shia Muslims. In 2013, TTP attacked churches, the home of a government minister in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province, and a Shia neighborhood in Karachi, Pakistan. These attacks killed and wounded hundreds of civilians and Pakistani government and law enforcement officials. In 2014, TTP carried out two consecutive attacks against Karachi's international airport and a siege on a primary school in Peshawar, Pakistan that killed 145 people, 132 of whom were children. In 2015, TTP bombed a Shia mosque near Peshawar and conducted suicide bombings at two churches in Lahore. In 2016, the group claimed responsibility for a December attack that left the Deputy Superintendent of the police counterterrorism department dead and his son injured in an attack on their vehicle in Peshawar.

TTP attacks in 2017 included several suicide bombings, among them a February attack that targeted a protest in Lahore, a March attack on a mosque in northwestern Pakistan, and a July attack in Lahore that killed 26 people. In December 2017, TTP militants disguised as women stormed an agricultural training school in Peshawar, leaving nine dead including the attackers.

In February 2018, TTP claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing that killed more than 11 Pakistani security personnel in Swat, Pakistan. TTP also claimed responsibility for a March 2018 suicide bombing that targeted a checkpoint on the outskirts of Lahore, resulting in the deaths of four police officers and two civilians.

TTP claimed multiple attacks in Pakistan in 2019. In July, TTP claimed responsibility for killing six soldiers on patrol in North Waziristan. TTP also claimed responsibility in August for killing four members of a 'peace committee' who were working with the Pakistani government in its efforts against the Afghan Taliban.

**Strength:** TTP is estimated to have between 3,000 and 5,000 fighters.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Pakistan and Afghanistan

**Funding and External Aid:** TTP likely raises most of its funds through kidnapping-for-ransom payments, extortion, and other criminal activity.