

2017-02-20

Fråga-svar

Uzbekistan. Andizjan och specialförband

Fråga

1. Vilka militära eller polisiära styrkor/enheter/förband skickades till eller var på plats i Andizhan 13 maj 2005? Vilka enheter gjorde vad? Särskilt intressant är inrikesministeriets militära specialförband SOBR (specialenhet för snabbreagering). SOBR ska ha sorterat under BARS, båda inom inrikesministeriet.
2. Vilka MR-brott har begåtts av inrikesministeriets specialförband sedan 2004?
3. Hur har Uzbekistans militära enheter och förmågor generellt sett ut sedan 2004, och framför allt inrikesministeriets specialtruppers organisation och uppdrag/uppgifter?

Svar

1. Vilka militära eller polisiära styrkor/enheter/förband skickades till eller var på plats i Andizhan 13 maj 2005? Vilka enheter gjorde vad?

Information kring vad som egentligen hände den 13 maj 2005 i Andizjan och vilka enheter som var inblandade är svårt att få klarhet i. Enligt en rapport av Human Rights Watch (HRW, 2008-05-12):

In the immediate aftermath of the massacre, the Uzbek government also made unprecedented efforts to suppress and manipulate the truth about the May 13 events. Foreign journalists were forcibly ejected from Andijan, and had their notes and equipment confiscated. Local law enforcement and mahalla (neighborhood) committee members went door to door warning residents not to speak with journalists or foreigners or to discuss the events of May 13.

The authorities detained and tortured or otherwise ill-treated hundreds of participants in and witnesses to the demonstration. (s. 11-12)

Ferghana Information Agency (2005-07-14):

It is almost impossible to find people who are willing to speak about what happened here on May 13. I first visited the city a few days after the uprising and subsequent crackdown, and at that time, it was easy to find witnesses eager to give their account of what they had seen. Family members were not afraid to talk about how their husbands, wives, and children had been killed.

Today, the situation is completely different.

Viss information om vilka enheter som fanns på plats har publicerats av olika källor, även om detaljnivån inte är stor. Inrikesministeriets specialtrupper generellt och enheten BARS närvaro specifikt omnämns dock av några källor.

Associated Press/The San Diego Union-Tribune (2005-05-29):

Uzbek officials won't name the units involved in the Andijan events for security reasons. But one police official said all the country's elite forces had been mobilized here.

"There were regular army and special forces of all sorts, both Interior Ministry and National Security Service," the official said on condition of anonymity. "Everyone was there."

Institute for War & Peace Reporting (IWPR, 2005-11-20):

"These combat vehicles simply mowed everyone on the square down like hay," said the [police] officer. "A densely packed crowd of demonstrators occupying the entire area of the square made an ideal target for the APCs and the Spetsnaz troops sitting on them." /---/

The bulk of the operation was carried out by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, including the Spetsnaz or special troops. These units were sent in from Tashkent, while the locally-based police force which also falls under the ministry's control played a lesser role, according to the interviewee.

The investigation and arrests that followed the violence are also being handled by officers from Tashkent, many of whom IWPR's police source does not know.

Burnashev, Rustam och Chernykh, Irina (2007):

According to unofficial data, about 12,500 military servicemen were deployed during the Andijan events. Among them were the 17th air-

assault brigade and a battalion of specialized operations from the Eastern military district; a brigade of rapid reaction forces and a separate battalion of Special Forces "Bars" of the Ministry of Interior's internal troops; and four separate units of Special Forces of the National Security Service. (s. 68)

The New York Times (2005-06-18):

Witnesses and American officials say the Uzbek Army, law enforcement and intelligence service were all present at the crackdown. Among them was a special Internal Affairs counterterrorism unit known as Bars, which has two or three members who trained in a course sponsored by the State Department for crisis-response commanders in Louisiana in 2004, according to the State Department.

It is not clear whether these specific officers were present in Andijon, although their unit was.

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Among forces under General Almatov's command were two special counterterrorism units, Bars and Skorpion, according to survivors, a relative of one of Bars members, a Bars driver and several Uzbeks familiar with the crackdown, all of whom spoke on condition of anonymity out of fear for their safety. American military officials say they have information that those units were present.

Bars, which survivors said was particularly active, is thought to have at least 300 members. It has previously worked in the Fergana Valley, a region that guerrillas from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, a group with links to Al Qaeda, have raided in the past.

Much else about the crackdown remains unknown. The full list of units present and names of their commanders have not been made public. Nor have the nature of orders and roles of specific units in the worst hours of violence and roundups. It is not publicly known whether the most lethal shooting was deliberate or the result of poor discipline, or both.

Rotar, Igor (2005-06-16):

All those questioned by Forum 18 stated that soldiers from a unit called Bars, trained by American military instructors, fired on people indiscriminately. Eye-witnesses told Forum 18 that the Bars unit opened fire on the windows of nearby residential blocks to get rid of unwanted witnesses.

Majoriteten av övrig rapportering omnämner bara regeringsstyrkor eller säkerhetsstyrkor utan att ge närmare detaljer. Att National Security Service (SNB/NSS) var inblandade nämns av flera, då SNB:s byggnad attackerades.

IWPR (2005-05-14):

As the night went on, they went to the SNB building for Andijan region, where the newly-arrested people were being held. There was gunfire as SNB officers held off the crowds, and protest leaders said at least 30 people were killed, although in the continuing confusion, there have been no verified casualty figures.

Human Rights Watch (2005-06-06):

A heavy gun battle broke out around the SNB building, although it is unclear whether the fighting was initiated by the attackers aiming to overrun the SNB building, or by SNB officers trying to stop the attackers' progress.

Daly, John C. K. (maj 2016):

More shooting occurred as the gunmen passed the National Security Service (NSS) building, where a heavy gun battle erupted around 1 a.m., lasting about two hours. (s. 14)

Hartman, Jeffry W. (maj 2016):

The outnumbered NSS night shift defended their compound against the assault, but not before requesting reinforcements from the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Years later, NSS personnel remained proud of their colleagues' defense of its Andijan headquarters and the fact that no weapons were lost and no buildings were infiltrated. By contrast, NSS members looked down on their colleagues in the Ministry of Internal Affairs since the requested police reinforcements which never arrived.¹ (s. 30)

I övrigt omnämns olika militära fordon som funnits på plats, dock utan att enskilda enheter nämns. Vissa militära uniformer beskrivs också av några källor.

IWPR (2005-05-14):

The eight-wheeled armoured personnel carriers, APCs, appeared out of nowhere, moving through the streets at speed, past the people on the outer fringes of the rally. The first column of vehicles thundered past without taking any aggressive action.

¹ In Uzbekistan, police from the Ministry of Internal Affairs are often looked down upon for their regular demands for bribes, other forms of corruption, and their overall lack of professionalism. Their failure to help the NSS at Andijan is well known. When asked by the author, several government and non-government Uzbek respondents characterized the Ministry of Internal Affairs police response at Andijan as "cowardly."

But a second column arriving five minutes later suddenly opened up on the crowds, firing off round after round without even slowing down to take aim.

Human Rights Watch (2005-06-06):

The first thing I saw was a column of military vehicles, four trucks. These were heavy military trucks, ZIL-131 and URALs. They were followed by a column of ten jeeps, seven or eight were open jeeps, American or British, and the rest were Russian jeeps. Inside were men armed with automatic guns pointed at people. They were going up Navoi Prospect. I saw no policemen in the streets, but near the UVD [local department of Ministry of Interior] we saw huge number of policemen, fully armed and in bullet-proof vests.

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Early in the morning a green car with black windows arrived from the side of Cholguzar with three people inside. Two of them came out of the car and fired several shots from sniper rifles at the crowd through the fence around hokimiat. A seven- or ten-year-old boy was killed. The bullet hit him in the head. I saw it with my own eyes. A big group of people rushed there, surrounded and detained these people with their bare hands and took away their weapons. They tied them up, beat them and brought them to the hokimiat. These three people wore very light green or yellowish military uniform, caps and army boots.

Fifteen or twenty minutes later people detained a policeman with a submachine gun who was dressed in police uniform but wore a red and blue jacket over the uniform. He made a few shots from his Kalashnikov and also killed a guy.

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However, at various points during the day, troops in armored personnel carriers (APCs) and military trucks periodically drove by, firing randomly into the edge of the largely unarmed crowd. The government had also deployed snipers above the square, but neither the snipers nor the drive-by shooters appeared to be directing fire at persons who were posing any threat.

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Another journalist, who was standing near the hokimiat at the time, provided a similar account to Human Rights Watch:

At 5:15 p.m. I saw an APC and then a truck moving along Navoi Prospect. They passed by me and moved up towards Cholpon Prospect... Five minutes later I saw another truck on Navoi Prospect. While the first truck was covered with an awning and there were submachine-gunners inside, the second one had an open top and there were thirty or forty soldiers with Kalashnikovs sitting there. There wore camouflage uniforms. Those were military uniforms and a military truck.

I felt that something is about to happen and moved to a more secure location, closer to the pavement. The truck stopped at a distance of

five or six meters from me. And as soon as it stopped, they opened fire, without any warning.

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Around 5:00 a.m., five KAMAZ trucks arrived and a bus with soldiers. The soldiers would ask the wounded, "Where are the rest of you?" When they would not respond, they would shoot them dead and load them into the trucks. There were no ambulances there. Soldiers were cleaning the [area of] bodies for two hours, but they left about fifteen bodies on the spot.

Den kanske mest noggranna redogörelsen av olika strider i maj 2005 är sammanställd av en före detta amerikansk försvarsattaché i Uzbekistan. Även här saknas dock detaljerad information om exakt vilka enheter som gjorde vad. Hartman, Jeffry W. (maj 2016):

On May 12, 2005, just before midnight, Parpiyev and Sharif Shakirov began their attack. Their group of around fifty Brothers armed with a few AK-47s and various other firearms attacked the provincial headquarters of the Ministry of Internal Affairs on Navoi Prospect and then the Ministry of Defense Barracks 34 immediately next to it. The attackers achieved an element of surprise at both installations, killing four policemen, wounding four, and killing five soldiers at the neighboring MoD compound. Reportedly, the few low-ranking police officers present at the time of the attack retreated from the Ministry of Internal Affairs compound. Junior soldiers on watch at Barracks 34 withdrew to the rear of the MoD compound and continued firing, but lost control of the arms room and ammunition storage area. (s. 27-28)

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Throughout the day, a large part of the government's problems would be command-and-control over the many types of responding government forces. The initial responsibility fell upon the provincial office of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but, as described earlier, the ministry was temporarily expelled from its own headquarters and failed to comprehend what was happening until much later in the morning. It furthermore had no control over the NSS, Ministry of Defense or Border Guards, each of which was independently rallying forces to respond to the mayhem in Andijan. Additionally, the interior ministry's and army's special forces units, which also responded, retain significant independence from their parent units and do not necessarily work easily within their command structures. There is no doubt therefore that "the stovepipe structures" of the Uzbek government contributed to the problems with Uzbek agencies failing to communicate well laterally, especially at lower action officer levels.

In the meantime, the Ministry of Defense, NSS, and Border Guards tried to coordinate responses as well as establish a cordon around the militant-held area near the provincial capitol building. An infantry brigade in Andijan responded along with units from elsewhere in the Ferghana Valley. By late morning, the problem was that some headquarters were unclear as to which areas the armed

rebels held. Units received reports that the prison, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, NSS and Ministry of Defense headquarters had been attacked. As units tried to marshal and respond to the different sites, they kept accidentally driving through or past the Brothers' positions and cordons near the theater fires and provincial capitol building. Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Internal Affairs and later Border Guard BTRs and other military vehicles unexpectedly ran into the Brothers' obstacles, came under fire from 83 or so armed Brothers, freed prisoners and other supporters – causing them to either turn around, drive around, or even barrel through the barricades. There were numerous accounts of BTRs, KAMAZ trucks with soldiers in the back, UAZ jeeps and other vehicles driving toward or around Bobur Square with troops firing wildly at the periphery of the crowds on the square and near the provincial capitol building. (s. 34-36)

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Occasionally, gunfire can be heard on the film. This came from Navoi Park, on the far side of Bobur Square. That was the last area during daylight where the Brothers' and their backers traded gunfire with Border Guards, and perhaps an Army unit, throughout the afternoon. (s. 41)

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In truth, the plan to arrange safe passage to Kyrgyzstan would probably have been far more complicated than Ministry of Internal Affairs officials realized. Throughout the day, the Uzbek security forces' serious command-and-control problems continued. At first, the Ministry of Defense attempted to organize cordons around the area at the provincial capitol building. Then, after Almatov's arrival, the Ministry of Internal Affairs took over orchestrating the perimeter. The challenge was that there were Army infantry battalions, a brigade headquarters, an Army Special Forces unit, an NSS Special Forces unit, various Ministry of Internal Affairs units (to include their own Special Forces), plain clothes NSS, and Border Guard units all converging on the area from separate directions. Most had different tactical communications and had no way to talk via tactical radio to units from the other agencies, although these deficiencies were never noted publicly. (s. 44)

2. Vilka MR-brott har begåtts av inrikesministeriets specialförband sedan 2004?

Information om detta har inte gått att hitta. Information av mer allmän karaktär följer nedan.

US Department of State skriver generellt om säkerhetssektorn i Uzbekistan (2016-04-15):

While the constitution and law prohibit such practices, law enforcement and security officers routinely beat and otherwise mistreated detainees to obtain confessions, incriminating information, or for corrupt financial gain. Sources reported torture

and abuse were common in prisons, pretrial facilities, and local police and security service precincts. (s. 3-4)

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Impunity was a problem. The Ministry of the Interior investigated abuses and disciplined officers accused of human rights violations, but the government rarely punished officials who committed human rights abuses. A human rights and legal education department within the ministry investigated some police brutality cases. (s. 7)

Enligt den icke-statliga organisationen ACAT France (2015):

The main perpetrators of torture under this system are investigators, police officers, security forces working directly under the authority of the Interior Ministry (Ichki Ishlar Vazirligi), penitentiary personnel and officers from the intelligence agency (Milliy Xavfsizlik Xizmati (MXX) – national security service, formerly the KGB).

Torture takes place on premises that fall under the jurisdiction of these authorities: police stations, offices of the internal affairs department, where arrestees are placed in pre-trial detention cells (KPZ), pre-trial detention units under the control of the Interior Ministry (IVS) or pre-trial detention centres (SIZO). (s. 3)

Global Security (2013-03-13):

The government has not held anyone publicly accountable for the civilian casualties [in Andizjan].

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The law prohibits torture; however, police and the NSS routinely torture, beat, and otherwise mistreat detainees to obtain confessions or incriminating information. Police, prison officials, and the NSS allegedly used suffocation, electric shock, rape, and other sexual abuse; however, beating was the most commonly reported method of torture. Torture was common in prisons, pretrial facilities, and local police and security service precincts.

Informationen nedan kommer från ett sekretessbelagt dokument, som antingen läckt eller senare avklassificerats, som härrör från den amerikanska ambassaden i Tashkent, där en icke namngiven person bedömt sannolikheten att myndigheterna skulle agera liknande som de gjorde i Andizjan vid ett senare tillfälle (december 2007):

Every city and province in Uzbekistan has at least one MVD special forces unit that is normally company-sized (100-120 personnel).

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Question 4 :

^9. (C) What, if any, indications have there been that special forces units would be reticent to carry out orders to shoot against a crowd of protesters, such as occurred in Andijon in May 2005? Are there

any units considered more loyal to President Karimov than others?
Any units whose loyalty is questioned by Uzbekistani leadership?

J.10. (C) We are not aware of loyalty problems within the Uzbek security forces, as they are relatively well-paid, incidents of "dedovschina" (hazing) are rare, and there are very few desertions (ref tel). The Armed Forces saturate their troops with pro-government propaganda to reinforce patriotism, improve teamwork, and overcome potential loyalty problems.

The Armed Forces also ensure that trainees, officers, and foreign military visitors know that many protesters at Andijon in May 2005 were armed and fired on Uzbek security forces. Nevertheless, the officer corps views its response at Andijon as panicky and tragically brutal. Special forces units would be far more likely to open fire on hostile, armed people if ordered than on peaceful demonstrators. (Comment: An unidentified number of people in the anti-government movement at Andijon in May 2005 were armed and shot at security forces, as verified by independent observers. Six MOD troops were killed at Andijon, and the MVD, Border Guards, and NSS all suffered casualties. In addition to the organized armed opposition group present at Andijon, there were unarmed local civilians who gathered at the square both out of curiosity and to demonstrate against the GOU, who suffered an unknown number of fatalities and injuries in the firing. End comment.)

Question 5:

1[11. (C) What, if any, indications have there been that the leadership of the MVD, MOD, or NSS would hesitate to carry out orders to use lethal methods to crack down on large protests?

^12. (C) The MOD has undertaken reforms aimed at ensuring a controlled response to counter civil disturbances. Since 2005, MOD units have pursued escalation of force, law of land warfare, and rules of engagement training with the German Armed Forces and the International Committee of the Red Cross. The former Commander of the Eastern Military District was sacked for his command's reaction and at least two of the special forces commanders at Andijon were arrested, tried, and convicted for dereliction of duty — failing to follow protocols and hence allowing the situation to spiral out of control. (Comment: It is unclear whether any of these were tried for improper use of force or, indeed, whether the GOU believes after its investigation that the totality of circumstances warranted prosecution. End comment.)

The GOU plans to have MOD units isolate protest areas so that VD or NSS units — which are better-suited for internal security missions — can deal with protesters inside the cordon. While we believe the GOU would attempt a controlled response to civil disturbances consistent with recent training, if these measures failed, it probably would resort to whatever means it felt necessary to deal with an armed uprising.

Gällande händelseförloppet i Andizjan är redogörelserna disparata och både antalet döda och vilka som initierade eldstriderna varierar kraftigt mellan källorna.

Daly, John C. K. (2016-05):

On May 13, 2005, in the Uzbek city of Andijan, an armed confrontation took place between Islamic militants and troops from the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In the course of the ensuing melee close to 200 persons from both sides were killed. There is no doubt that the militants initiated the confrontation by attacking local government offices and a maximum security prison, and that the appalling number of deaths was due to deliberate actions and poor judgment exercised by both sides. However, specific details on the day's events were lacking at the time and, on some points, remain unclear and in dispute down to the present day. (s. 5)

Ur förordet, Polat, AbduMannob (2007-06-01):

Every element of the incident is hotly disputed. Even the number of dead and injured is unclear—Tashkent maintains that less than 200 died; Western human rights groups place the death toll in the hundreds; and Hizb ut-Tahrir claims that up to 10,000 were killed. Many elements have contributed to making uncovering the truth about what happened difficult, not the least of which is the paucity of primary source material available in both Uzbek and Russian. (s. 1)

Polat har även i rapporten presenterat en relativ balanserad sammanfattning av händelseförloppet i stort, där olika versioner inkluderas och vägs mot varandra.

3. Hur har Uzbekistans militära enheter och förmågor generellt sett ut sedan 2004, och framför allt inrikesministeriets specialtruppers organisation och uppdrag/uppgifter?

Marat, Erica (2012):

Uzbekistan's intelligence service consists of the Foreign Intelligence Service (Slubja vneshnei razvedki), the National Security Service (Slubja nazional'noi bezopasnosti), the President's Security Service (Slubja bezopasnosti prezidenta), and the Ministry of Interior. Virtually no information is available about the functions of these institutions. (s. 43)

Weitz, Richard (2012-11-05):

It is difficult to ascertain the exact size of Uzbekistan's military due to a lack of transparency, with government publications providing little information.

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The country's military reform program has aimed to downsize the regular army while strengthening the border guards (the government frequently closes its borders—it adjoins every Central Asian country as well as Afghanistan) in response to regional security threats) and the Special Forces, whose mobility is useful to counter terrorist forces or religious extremists.

To strengthen inter-agency coordination of all security forces, a two-layered system of command was established in 2002. The first layer consists of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), which has operational control over all regular units as well as all SOF and other paramilitary formations subordinated to other security agencies such as the MVD and SNB. The JCS also develops operational and tactical doctrines for all SOF units. The second tier consists of the national military districts, to which all regular military formations are subordinated. Operational control over all SOF units, regardless of their parent security agency, report to the joint mobile forces command based in Fergana.

Burnashev, Rustam och Chernykh, Irina (2007):

Uzbekistan's military structures include divisions of the Ministry of Defense, combat units from the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Emergencies, National Security Service, and the Customs Service. Starting in the early 2000s there were only slight changes in the amount of military personnel and servicemen in Uzbekistan's military structures. (s. 71)

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Although in the aftermath of the Andijan events the structure of Uzbekistan's Armed Forces remained the same, there were substantial changes in its functioning. The most visible change occurred during the Andijan upheaval, when the Ministry of Defense's divisions undertook police functions. This pointed to the fact that police forces were equipped and armed more substantially than the regular police. Furthermore, the Ministry of Interior's troops were abolished and its divisions and units that pertained to fighting terrorism and extremism were either put under the control of the Ministry of Defense or the National Security Service. (s. 71)

Gorenburg, Dmitry (januari 2014):

As with most post-Soviet states, the interior ministry has its own paramilitary troops. The force has 20,000 personnel tasked with guarding government facilities and putting down civilian unrest. It also has a commando unit. The National Security Service (NSS) also has an elite commando unit, which is assessed to be a highly capable and well-equipped counter-insurgency force that is descended from a Soviet military intelligence commando unit. The NSS also commands a national guard force with 1000 personnel, who are responsible for protecting top officials and strategic facilities. (s. 11)

Library of Congress – Federal Research Division (februari 2007):

Uzbekistan's security troops, under the administration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and including internal security and border forces, number between 17,000 and 19,000 troops. (s. 18)
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The National Security Service (NSS), under the direct command of the president through the Ministry of Internal Affairs, has the responsibility for suppression of dissent and Islamic activity and surveillance of all possible opposition figures and groups, as well as prevention of corruption, organized crime, and narcotics trafficking. Because it receives no effective oversight, the NSS is considered one of the most powerful security police forces in the former Soviet Union. In 2005 NSS forces numbered between 17,000 and 19,000. Conventional police operations are the responsibility of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Each governmental jurisdiction has a police force; the forces of larger jurisdictions are subdivided by function. The police forces reportedly are corrupt (particularly the tax and traffic police), and the level of public trust in them is very low. According to human rights organizations, both NSS and regular police use arbitrary arrest, intimidation, and violent tactics. At the community level, civilian police organizations of the mahallas aid the local police in crime prevention and deterrence of antigovernment activity. (s. 18)

Gelfgat, Vitaly (2014):

According to IHS Jane's assessment, the Uzbek military learned from the 2005 Andijan experience and improved its capabilities to conduct COIN operations: "The army's mobile forces command now controls a number of paramilitary units, including the special operations detachment 'Bars'." (s. 16)

Forster, Peter K. (april 2005):

Furthermore, command of the National Border Guards was vested with the Chairman of National Security and the MoIS [Ministry of Internal Security]. Integration of the internal security services is enhanced by a close connection between the border guard

commanders, who are the third and fourth ranking officers in the SNB and will return to the SNB upon completion of their duty. Moreover, all internal security services are ultimately subordinate to the SNB, which has approximately 8,000 paramilitary troops. Notwithstanding, the border troops remain the poorest trained, equipped, and cared for part of the security sector. Internal security sector integration obviously resulted in the creation of armed units outside of the military command structure /.../ (s. 233)

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Currently, all Uzbek Special Forces and 30% of the army are “contract forces.” (s. 236)

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In the case of Uzbekistan, the SNB and the MoIS fill this role most significantly as the enforcer of the government’s domestic policy as well as its efforts at counter-terrorism. (s. 238)

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A third structural challenge is the lack of willingness among the internal security services to reform. The internal security services retain broad responsibilities beyond counter-espionage and intelligence gathering and have overlapping powers that include intelligence, law enforcement, and prosecution. Their ethnic homogeneity; the KGB’s legacy for secrecy and autonomy, and the government’s propensity to use all security sectors, including law enforcement components, as a political entity designed to protect the regime further obfuscate reform and separate them from society. Relative to the military, internal security forces tend to reflect the attitudes of their leadership largely because their recruitment comes from clans loyal to the regime rather than through national conscription. (s. 239)

South Front (2016-09-19):

Though the Republic of Uzbekistan Armed Forces are perhaps one of the most capable in the region in real terms (total personnel, equipment, etc.), President Karimov directed far more funding, training and political focus toward the internal security apparatus of the state. Foremost among these assets is the National Security Service (NSS or SNB). Subordinated to the Interior Ministry since 2005, the SNB fills a similar function to the state as the CIA or the FSB. Much like the FSB, the SNB controls a number of Spetsnaz units, which it can utilize in a number of roles, including counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism, drug interdiction and a whole host of intelligence and paramilitary activities.

There are three Spetsnaz battalions under the jurisdiction of the SNB; Alfa, Bars and Scorpion. These units have been utilized by the SNB to interdict drug traffickers illegally entering Uzbekistan from neighboring countries, and more importantly, to raid and destroy Islamic militant strongholds and safe houses within the country and along the frontier. The Spetsnaz battalions are organized along Russian lines, their organization and equipment being quite similar.

These units provide the SNB with a viable tool to strike at IMU and IJU militants before they are able to conduct terrorist operations.

Although mostly embracing Soviet era and modern Russian arms and equipment, the Uzbekistan Army and SNB have adopted some Western equipment. Most notable are the U.S. manufactured M-ATV, over 300 of which are supposed to be donated (although still in negotiation) to the Uzbekistan government. It is also apparent, despite German attempts to hide the fact, that Airbus has signed a contract with the government of Uzbekistan to deliver rotary and fixed wing aircraft. Uzbekistan military promotional videos released this year have shown both AS332 Super Puma transport helicopters and C295W transport planes in use. Airbus had been in negotiations with the Uzbekistan government to deliver 14 helicopters, both AS332 Super Pumas and AS350 Ecureils, since 2014. It is unclear whether the German government finally acquiesced to the deal (there had been an export ban on weapons since the 2005 Andijan massacre, although lifted in 2009), or if a new deal has been signed.

Although the United States and other Western nations have chastised the often heavy-handed tactics of the SNB in its never ending struggle to insulate the state from Islamic militancy, both internally and externally, there is no doubt that these tactics have been successful over the past 27 years.

Notera: South Front uppger sig vara en oberoende nyhetssida men har kritiserats för att vara högervriden och publicera konspirationsteorier. Som källa kan den därmed betraktas som osäker och all information bör därför i hög grad vägas mot information från andra källor.

Denna sammanställning av information/länkar är baserad på informationssökningar gjorda under en begränsad tid. Den är sammanställd utifrån noggrant utvalda och allmänt tillgängliga informationskällor. Alla använda källor refereras. All information som presenteras, med undantag av obestridda/uppenbara fakta, har dubbelkontrollerats om inget annat anges. Sammanställningen gör inte anspråk på att vara uttömmande och bör inte tillmätas exklusivt bevisvärde i samband med avgörandet av ett enskilt ärende. Informationen i sammanställningen återspeglar inte nödvändigtvis Migrationsverkets officiella ståndpunkt i en viss fråga och det finns ingen avsikt att genom sammanställningen göra politiska ställningstaganden. Refererade dokument bör läsas i sitt sammanhang.

Källförteckning

(alla källor kontrollerades 2017-02-17)

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