

2016-05-30

Fråga-svar

Iran. Cyber Police (FATA)

Fråga

- Hur arbetar Cyber Police (FATA) i Iran?
- Hur fungerar samarbetet mellan FATA och andra iranska myndigheter när de uppmärksammat någon person?

Svar

Nedan följer en sammanställning av information/länkar kring iranska Cyber Police (FATA). Sammanställningen gör inte anspråk på att vara uttömmande. Refererade dokument bör alltid läsas i sitt sammanhang.

Cyber Police (FATA) arbetsmetoder

Detaljerad information om iranska FATA:s arbetsmetoder har inte gått att finna i konsulterade källor.

International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran (ICHRI) beskriver i en rapport (2014) översiktligt FATA:s arbetsmetoder:

FATA pursues, through harassment, arrest, and interrogation, any citizen who expresses dissenting views online.

/---/

The FATA cyber police have also pressured Internet providers to provide them with evidence they can use to pursue online activists. (s. 33)

I sammanhanget kan nämnas att Iran, enligt en artikel (maj 2016) på pakistanska nyhetssajten The Express Tribune, kommer att kräva att utländsk social media överlämnar information om iranska medborgare till iranska myndigheter:

Iran has set a one-year deadline for foreign social media to hand over data on their Iranian users, state news agency IRNA said Sunday.

It said the decision was taken on Saturday at a meeting of an Iranian committee on the use of cyberspace headed by President Hassan Rouhani that serves as an IT regulator.

I ett svar från kanadensiska IRB (2014) beskrivs översiktligt FATA:s metoder och kapacitet att bevaka iraniers nätaktiviteter:

Without specifying whether it applies to anti-government activists, a Small Media report indicates that the Iranian Cyber Police (FATA): often uses unconventional methods to catch cyber criminals, including acts of manipulation on social networking sites. One of the most popular methods used by FATA is the creation of fake Facebook profiles, through which they may encourage other users to divulge personal information. (Oct. 2013, 3)

The Director of Small Media indicated that Iranian authorities do not have the technical capacity to conduct "blanket monitoring," which means that they do not follow all Iranian citizens' online activities (14 Jan. 2014). Similarly, the Professor of history indicated that the government does not seem to monitor all online activities (Professor of History 13 Jan. 2014). The Professor of history stated that the Iranian government:

mostly focuses on monitoring the activities of people that they think want to overthrow the regime. Their definition of people who want to overthrow the regime does not only consist of people who want to overthrow the regime militarily, but also any real or perceived organized opposition to the regime, including people who take on the cause of religious minorities. For example, people who take on the cause of Baha'is may be considered to want to overthrow the regime ...(ibid.).

Även Article 19 nämner i en artikel (maj 2015) myndigheternas möjligheter till övervakning:

Beyond anecdotal evidence, documenting and confirming evidence of surveillance and monitoring of social media has proved difficult. However, at times, officials have publicly stated that they are actively monitoring Iranian citizens' activities on both blocked and unblocked websites and platforms.

En rapport från Article 19 (juli 2015) beskriver hur myndigheterna generellt arbetar med nätövervakning:

Use of fragmented and incomplete intelligence

Fragmented intelligence gathered by the authorities from various sources was used as a means of intimidation, resulting in the individual surrendering more information about themselves in the (mistaken) belief that the authorities already knew everything about the arrested individual.³⁶

This method, reinforced by the pervading climate of fear in Iranian society, had an impact on the online behaviour of some respondents who believed that no matter how much they tried to be careful, the authorities already knew every detail of their lives. As a result they believed safety precautions to be useless.

Psychological pressure

Some respondents reported that the authorities threatened to share embarrassing private information about them unless they cooperated. Others reported that threats were made against their family members to put additional pressure on them. Family members were threatened by the authorities that their relatives would be treated harshly if they spoke out about their imprisonment. In various instances, the authorities made false promises to family members that if they cooperated and revealed information to the authorities, this would make it easier for their loved one in jail.

(s. 26)

Uppgifter i Freedom House årliga rapport om frihet på nätet tyder på att myndigheter pressar individer att själva ta bort publicerat innehåll på nätet:

Groups such as the IRGC are known to pressure social media users to delete content. For example, the IRGC announced in February 2015 that it had deleted (130) Facebook pages managed by 36 individuals since September 2014, which observers believe were deleted by the page owners while under coercion, given that Facebook does not have a relationship with the Iranian government.⁵⁸

Ett uppmärksammat fall rör arrestering av iranske bloggaren Sattar Beheshti 2012. Enligt uppgifter från Article 19 (okt 2015) hotades Beheshti först, sedan arresterades han och hölls i förvar, där han också dog:

His critical blog talked of the "Slaughterhouse" that the Iranian judicial system had become, a blog for which he had received numerous threats from the Iranian authorities. Beheshti was later picked up by Iran's cyber-police, Fata, for "actions against national security on social networks and Facebook." The 'slaughterhouse' failed to protect him from torture and inhumane treatment by his interrogator, leading to his untimely death.

Andra tycks ha arresterats utan förvarning, t ex på flygplats, i hemmet. Några exempel:

- Roya Nobakht, kvinnlig bloggare:
<http://jimmywalesfoundation.org/roya-nobakht-uk-iranian-woman-imprisoned-in-iran-for-facebook-posts/>
- Soheil Arabi, bloggare:
<https://www.iranhumanrights.org/2014/09/death-sentence-facebook/>
(arresterande myndighet var dock IRGC)

Flera källor nämner att en person kan kallas till förhör, ibland under falsk förespegling:

- UNHRC (2016): <http://www.refworld.org/docid/56f17fd14.html> (s. 20-22)
- ICHRI (2015): <https://www.iranhumanrights.org/2015/02/facebook-arrests/>
- OHCHR (2014): <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14926&LangID=E> date
- Reporters Without Borders (2013): <https://rsf.org/en/news/intelligence-ministry-admits-arresting-news-providers-blames-foreign-media>

Samarabete mellan FATA och andra myndigheter

Tillgänglig information tyder på att flera myndigheter, officiella och inofficiella, utöver FATA är involverade i övervakning av s.k. nättaktivister.

En [rapport från kanadensiska IRB \(2015\)](#) beskriver myndigheter involverade i övervakning och kontroll av bl a individers internetaktiviteter.

I en rapport från brittiska Small Media (2014/15) finns [en översiktsbild över myndigheterna](#) som är involverade i övervakning och kontroll av internetaktiviteter i Iran (s. 19).

ICHRI beskriver i sin rapport (2014) hur olika myndigheter samarbetar:

All of the various organizations typically work together. For example, material that is obtained by a hacking operation is then used in the arrest and interrogation (and, frequently, torture) of targeted individuals by police, intelligence, and security officials, and then the illegally obtained online content, as well as the forced confession elicited under torture or threat during interrogation, is then used to convict the individual in court under typically vague national security-related charges.

/---/

Other state organizations, official and semi-official, are active in the persecution of online activists as well. In fact, arrests of such individuals have increased since Rouhani's August 2013 inauguration, reflecting intensified efforts in this area by hardliners in the security and intelligence services.

(s. 35-36)

Enligt en rapport från Small Media (2013) har FATA ändrat fokus något och att ansvaret för politisk övervakning övergått till andra myndigheter:

Before Beheshti's death, FATA was very active in tracking and arresting political activists on the Internet, but since this episode, the organisation has shifted its focus to combatting financial cybercrimes, scams, and violations of privacy. This does not mean that activists are any safer online, however; the responsibility for political surveillance has simply shifted to the Ministry of Intelligence and National Security (INS), and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps' Cyber Information Unit. While FATA continues to lend assistance to these institutions, it is now far more reluctant to publicise such collaboration.

It seems then, that the Iranian regime has decided to divide cyber-intelligence activities amongst a number of different organisations, with FATA taking a public role in educating users and combating cybercrime. This allows it to operate in a largely politically-neutral capacity, whilst the INS and IRGC spearhead the online crackdown against opposition movements.

(s. 6)

Enligt nyhetstjänsten Al-Monitor (2014) har även IRGC en cyberenhet:

Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps also has a cyber unit that monitors online activities. In December, it arrested 16 individuals for a variety of transgressions, including employees of technology website Narjenji.

Denna sammanställning av information/länkar är baserad på informationssökningar gjorda under en begränsad tid. Den är sammanställd utifrån noggrant utvalda och allmänt tillgängliga informationskällor. Alla använda källor refereras. All information som presenteras, med undantag av obestridda/uppenbara fakta, har dubbelkontrollerats om inget annat anges. Sammanställningen gör inte anspråk på att vara uttömmande och bör inte tillmätas exklusivt bevisvärde i samband med avgörandet av ett enskilt ärende. Informationen i sammanställningen återspeglar inte nödvändigtvis Migrationsverkets officiella ståndpunkt i en viss fråga och det finns ingen avsikt att genom sammanställningen göra politiska ställningstaganden. Refererade dokument bör läsas i sitt sammanhang.

Källförteckning

(källor hämtade 2016-05-30)

Al-Monitor, *Facebook activists sentenced to prison, lashes in Iran*, 2014-07-14, <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/07/iran-facebook-activists-sentenced-prison-lashes.html>

Article 19, *Computer Crimes in Iran: Risky Online Behaviour*, 2015-07-02, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/559d21a74.html>

Article 19, *Online Security: Who needs it?*, 2015-10-08, <https://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/38134/en/online-security:-who-needs-it>

Article 19, *The State of Surveillance in Iran's Cyberspace*, 2015-05-14, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/55657d924.html>

Freedom House, *Freedom on the Net 2015 - Iran*, 2015-10-28, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/5632179016.html>

OHCHR - UN Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner, *Iran: UN rights experts condemn the recent wave of arrest and sentencing of civil society actors*, 2014-08-08, <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14926&LangID=E> date

ICHRI - International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, *Internet in Chains - The Front Line of State Repression in Iran*, november 2014, https://www.iranhumanrights.org/wp-content/uploads/Internet_report-En.pdf

ICHRI - International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, *Iran's IRGC Intensifies Crackdown on Facebook Users with 12 Arrests and 24 Summonses*, 2015-02-05, <https://www.iranhumanrights.org/2015/02/facebook-arrests/>

ICHRI - International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, *Death Sentence for "Insulting the Prophet" on Facebook*, 2014-09-16, <https://www.iranhumanrights.org/2014/09/death-sentence-facebook/>

IRB - Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, *Iran: Government surveillance capacity and control, including media censorship and surveillance of individual Internet activity*, 16 January 2015, IRN104972.E, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/550fdcc34.html>

IRB - Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, *Iran: Treatment of anti-government activists by authorities, including those returning to Iran from*

abroad; overseas monitoring capabilities of the government (2012-2013), 2014-01-20, IRN104730.E, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/533923f74.html>

Jimmy Wales Foundation, *Roya Nobakht: UK-Iranian Woman Imprisoned in Iran Over Facebook Posts*, 2015-09-14, <http://jimmywalesfoundation.org/roya-nobakht-uk-iranian-woman-imprisoned-in-iran-for-facebook-posts/>

The Express Tribune, *Iran demands social media hand over data on its citizens*, 2016-05-29, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/1112451/iran-demands-social-media-hand-data-citizens/>

Reporters Without Borders, *Intelligence ministry admits arresting news providers, blames foreign media*, 2013-02-20, <https://rsf.org/en/news/intelligence-ministry-admits-arresting-news-providers-blames-foreign-media>

Small Media, *Iranian Internet Infrastructure and Policy Report*, sep-okt 2013, <https://smallmedia.org.uk/sites/default/files/u8/IIPSepOct.pdf>

Small Media, *Revolution decoded: Iran's digital landscape*, 2014/15, <https://smallmedia.org.uk/revolutiondecoded/a/RevolutionDecoded.pdf>

UN Human Rights Council, *Supplementary information on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran*, 2016-03-10, A/HRC/31/CRP.5, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/56f17fd14.html>