

2015-10-16

Fråga-svar

Afghanistan. Grupperna Ittehad-e Islami, Jumbish-i-Milli Islami och Hezb-i-Islami under 1990-talet

Fråga

1. Vad gjorde gruppen Ittehad-e Islami runt 1990 och vilka eventuella brott mot mänskligheten eller krigsbrott har de utfört runt den tiden?
2. Vad gjorde gruppen Hezb -i- Islami runt 1990-1992 och vilka eventuella brott mot mänskligheten eller krigsbrott har de utfört runt den tiden?
3. Vad gjorde gruppen Jumbish -i- Milli Islami mellan 1993 och 1999 och vilka eventuella brott mot mänskligheten eller krigsbrott har de utfört runt den tiden?
4. Hur är dessa grupper uppbyggda och vilket eventuellt ansvar vilar på gruppledarna?

Svar

Sammanfattning:

I nedanstående sammanställning finns information angående Jumbish-i-Milli Islami och Ittehad-e Islami. I *Open Society Institute (OSI) (2005)* står bl.a. att läsa i kapitel 6.6 "*Torture, Rape and Summary Executions by Junbish forces 1991-2001*" att Junbish män enligt vittnesuppgifter våldtagit kvinnor och plundrat deras hem, detta har utförts av både underordnade som höga befälhavare. Vidare har rån, kidnappningar och sexuella övergrepp utförts av befälhavare och trupper från alla parter. Även vittnesuppgifter om att jumbish män har dödat förekommer.

I *Human Rights Watch (Oct 2001)* uppges att olika fraktioner, däribland Ittehad-e Islami, har utfört våldtäkter, avrättningar, godtyckliga arresteringar och tortyr i Kabul. *Amnesty International (1995)* uppger att både Ittehad-e Islami och Jumbish-i-Milli Islami har egna fängelser där tortyr, misshandel och våldtäkter varit vanligt förekommande.

Ingen information om gruppen Hezb -i -Islami har hittats under åren från 1990 till 1992 om eventuella brott mot mänskligheten eller krigsbrott. Inte heller hittades någon information om hur de ovanstående grupperna var uppbyggda och vilket ansvar som låg på deras gruppleadare?

Nedan följer en sammanställning av information från olika källor. Sammanställningen gör inte anspråk på att vara uttömmande. Refererade dokument bör alltid läsas i sitt sammanhang.

Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) (2013):

Even after the Taliban capture of Kandahar in 1994 and Kabul in 1996, Mazar was administered by the General Dostum-led Jumbish-e Milli. The administration was relatively stable, although it is remembered as being highly abusive due to the free rein given to local commanders. The situation changed in May 1997, when the defection of one of Dostum's commanders allowed the Taliban to capture Mazar, initiating a year of violence and fragmentation with seemingly endless rounds of killings, mostly along ethnic or sectarian lines, and exacerbated by shifting alliances and the arrival of outsiders. The Taliban were expelled by local forces in September 1997, but again captured Mazar in August 1998. While there was subsequently some limited resistance during the subsequent period called mawqawmat (resistance), the Taliban remained essentially in control until November 2001, when they were expelled from Mazar by commanders linked up with U.S. forces. (s. 16)

Tufts University (2010):

The next two years saw the most chaotic and violent period in the modern era for Balkh, as a result of the unending changes in alliances between local commanders, Taliban, and other forces. Even during periods of calm, the members of the administration were at odds with each other, and Mazar was unstable and fragmented. The shifting alliances also encouraged the influx from outside of various ethnically aligned troops, which accentuated ethnic and sectarian schism. Finally, in August 1998, the Taliban again took Mazar, with

significant killing along ethnic lines, and senior commanders of most other groups either re-aligned with the Taliban or fled the country. While there was some resistance by mid-level and local commanders, the long supply and communication lines from their bases and the hostility and competition amongst commanders, along with the strength of the Taliban, limited their effectiveness. An additional factor was an alienated population tired of warlord rule and craving stability. (s. 14)

Konrad Adenauer Foundation /Ruttig) (2006):

While Jombesh-e Melli Islami-ye Afghanistan, or 'National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan', is a military-political organization like the Islamist tanzim, it has to be treated separately for its different background. Initially a pro-government militia, Jombesh allied itself with the NA in 1992. Only then was Jombesh officially established as a party. Since the fall of the Taleban, it has been oscillating between the government and the opposition camps. While its internal mechanisms, like that of the tanzim, are still dominated by its leader General Abdulrashid Dostum, as Giustozzi says, it is 'not just a loose coalition of military commanders, but also included political parties and groups'. Among them are former leftists (from PDPA, Groh-e Kar, SAZA activists and even former Maoists) to whom Jombesh's secular outlook appealed after the collapse of the PDPA/ Hezb-e Watan regime in 1992, Uzbek and Turkic nationalists as well as Islamists, who prevented Jombesh from developing a clear political and ideological identity. It also did not have a clear ethnic identity, until the time of the two Loya Jirgas in 2002 and 2003, when, according to Giustozzi, the Jombesh leadership increasingly started to focus on ethnic issues. But while 'public statements about the Turkic character of Junbesh were never issued (...), it became common practice for the national and local leaders of Junbesh to present themselves in public and private discussions as the defenders of the rights of the Uzbek and Turkmen in Afghanistan' present themselves in public and private discussions as the defenders of the rights of the Uzbek and Turkmen in Afghanistan'. (s. 26)

Open Society Institute (OSI) (2005):

6.6 Torture, Rape and Summary Executions by Junbish forces 1991-2001

General Abdul Rashid Dostum served as the head of one of the most powerful militia forces that had the support of

the Najibullah government before 1992. His militia was vital to the Najibullah government for guarding the natural gas fields and the trade and supply routes north to the Central Asian states that were then part of the Soviet Union. Dostum's militia, the Jauzjani (named for the province from which they came), was considered the most powerful and effective of all the militia forces working with the government, and was large enough to be organized as a full division, the 53rd, with over forty-thousand men.²⁰³ (For more on the early years of the Jauzjani militia see chapter one)... Eventually, after outbreaks of fighting, looting and abuses they, along with other militias, were ordered out of Kabul in 1991.²⁰⁴ It was during this period that the Jauzjanis acquired the nickname *Gilam Jam*, which literally means, 'the carpet is gathered up' and referred to their reputation for thorough looting, for cleaning victims out completely and for human rights abuses and excessive violence.²⁰⁵

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Dostum, who had trained as a paratrooper before the Saur Revolution, joined a 'selfdefence unit' to 'defend the Revolution' in the Shibergan oil fields where he worked. His unit grew throughout the 1980s, becoming a platoon, a company and finally, in 1989, Division 53. It initially recruited from his home village and Jauzjan province, but by the late 1980s, he started to attract some defecting mujahidin commanders and their units, including Rasul Pahlawan, an Uzbek from Faryab and Ghaffar Pahlawan, an Uzbek from Saripul. Both were major commanders. A number of the small cadre of educated Uzbek, as well as some Tajik, professional officers within the army also joined the 53rd Division. These included General Majid Rozi, an Arab Uzbek artillery officer from Balkh province and General Jura Beg, an Uzbek infantry officer from Jowzjan. They served to professionalize the militia and increase its technical capacity, particularly in terms of armour and artillery. Among the group of officers drawn to Dostum, the majority were members of the Parcham wing of the PDPA, as was Dostum. (s. 101)

While Mazar-i Sharif remained relatively stable during this period, Junbish troops participated fully in the factional fighting in Kabul and associated abuses against civilians.

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Junbish forces were initially reinforced from the north and for the next two years, troops were rotated in and out of the capital through Khaja Jowash airfield. Junbish's leader, Abdul Rashid Dostum, remained in the north, but all his senior commanders served in Kabul at one stage or another during the civil war. The initial command structure in Kabul in May 1992 placed General Majid Rozi as the overall military commander, Gen Hamayoon

Fauzi in charge of political affairs, Gen Jura Beg in charge of troop deployments and rotations, and Gen Aminullah Karim in charge of logistics. Majid Rozi was recalled to Mazar at the end of 1992 leaving Gen Fauzi in charge.²⁰⁹ Junbish's other major leader in Kabul was Abdul Chirik, from Sayyidabad, north of Sar i -Pul town, who, like Dostum, had initially joined a self defence group and ended up commanding a Najibullah era militia regiment (54th) (s. 102)

However, Junbish's main operations center from the fall of Najibullah until the takeover of Kabul by the Taliban was the Naqlia Base which was built before the war and lies on the road between Kart-i Nau and Shah Shahid, just to the south-east of the city center. This was Junbish's command and control center in Kabul. Weapons and troops would be flown into Kabul and then brought to Naqlia for distribution and deployment. Until the Shura Hamangani pact of January 1994, it was also the place where senior Junbish leaders met to co-ordinate military operations. Naqlia Base is also repeatedly cited by civilians alleging abuse by Junbish soldiers. The Afghanistan Justice Project has spoken to numerous witnesses from the Kart-i Nau and Shah Shahid areas who allege that soldiers from Naqlia committed rape, murder and looting. (s. 103)

The Afghanistan Justice Project has heard testimony from many women saying their husbands were beaten, their homes were looted and they themselves suffered rape or attempted rape by Junbish men. ²¹² (s. 104)

Witnesses and survivors of Junbish abuses tend to use the terms *Junbishis*, *Gilam Jams*, and occasionally *Uzbekis* and *Dostumis* interchangeably. There are few named commanders in their testimonies. However, the districts where the abuses took place were firmly in the hands of Junbish throughout the war and witnesses repeatedly cite soldiers from the Naqlia Base as having carried out the abuses. As with Sh., cited earlier in this report, the base is also remembered as a place where women and girls were taken to be raped. While senior Junbish commanders lived with their families outside in other districts which were deemed safer, for example Wazir Akbar Khan and Microrian, the Naqlia Base was the logistics and command center for the faction. The high authorities of Junbish in Kabul were therefore placed very close to where their soldiers were carrying out rape, murder and looting. The abuses had no relation to factional fighting and appear to have been carried out solely because soldiers could get away with it. These patterns of abuses and the impunity with which Junbish troops carried them out recalls the earlier excesses of the Jauzjan militia. In

both cases, troops deployed from outside their home area were allowed to prey on civilians, with the connivance or the indifference of the high command. In the later part of the 1990s, however, it became apparent that the actions of Junbish troops were no better in northern Afghanistan. (s. 105)

Senior faction leaders and commander did not always have full control over their subordinates. Intense rivalries have defined battles for control of territory and resources in Afghanistan; senior commanders secure the loyalty of their subordinates at a cost, and operate with the knowledge that any effort to weaken their power may lead them to switch sides, taking their men with them. While this does not absolve the leaders of responsibility for the actions of their forces, it is critical in understanding command and control within the armed factions at the local level in the rural areas, commanders of all parties continued the countrywide process of self-aggrandizement and of positioning themselves as the sole locus of administration.

The situation varied enormously among commanders. Many simply continued collecting agricultural taxes and conscripting troops, or collected conscription exemption payments, as they had done under the previous regime. Others, however, assassinated potential sources of opposition or criticism, appropriated individual property, abducted women or took them in “forced” marriages, and took control of common property assets for their personal use.

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1994-1997: increasing instability In 1994 Junbish sided with Hizb-i Islami against Shura-i Nazar/Jamiat in Kabul. Junbish was ultimately defeated in Kabul. At the same time, conflict also erupted between Jamiat and Junbish throughout the north. After heavy fighting in Mazar, Jamiat was effectively pushed out. Humanitarian agencies reported sexual assaults on women and the killing of prisoners by both forces during this conflict. As had been the case in the Kabul fighting, forces on both sides detained hundreds of prisoners for possible exchange or simply for extortion. An unknown number were summarily executed. In the vacuum created by retreating or defecting Jamiat commanders, Junbish expanded, administering the former areas as they did their own. Conflicts lingered in the hills where Jamiat retained a traditional hard core of support, though the years 1994-1997 saw a high level of internal stability. (s. 106)

The Afghanistan Justice Project has interviewed witnesses who have described abuses by the subordinates of some of Junbish’s senior commanders. For example,

Shir Arab, commander of the 51st regiment within Junbish, amassed considerable wealth with the help of his subordinates who engaged in looting and “taxation” of local villagers. As he expanded his political base, he assassinated political rivals and in some cases, their family members. The Afghanistan Justice Project has also interviewed witnesses who have described killings carried out by Shir Arab’s men who then looted the victims’ property.²¹⁹ (s. 107)

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Robberies, kidnapping and sexual assaults by commanders and troops of all parties were commonplace. Mass demonstrations took place in Mazar in March 1998 to protest against the situation. ... In some areas, however, Junbish troops engaged in looting and sexual violence against communities suspected of supporting Malik, many of them Pashtun. The Afghanistan Justice Project has interviewed a number of witnesses who were the victims of assault and looting by Junbish forces during this period. According to one witness, “when General Dostum defeated General Malik and captured Faryab province and Malik escaped, Dostum’s military associates looted the entire property of all Pashtuns in these areas. Some commanders of Dostum committed sexual crimes in our area.”²²³ (s. 108)

6.7 Abuses by Other Factions, Kabul 1992-1996

The Afghanistan Justice Project has documented in some detail the 1993 Afshar Massacre, a specific event which involved multiple atrocities carried out against civilians by Shura-i Nazar and Ittihad-i Islami (see above), as well as detailed testimony of war crimes and abuses carried out by two other factions, Hizb-i Wahdat and Junbish-i Milli. However, members of all the factions involved in the factional fighting for control of Kabul committed summary executions, rape, torture, hostage taking and other abuses. (s. 110)

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Z. said he spent the next year in captivity, passed from one Ittihad commander to another, beaten and tortured in a number of ways, including sleep and food deprivation, not being allowed to go to the toilet when he had diarrhoea, having his hands and feet tied at night with nylon rope that left visible scars, being threatened with death and tormented with the bodies of dead Hazara prisoners, and asked where his house was as Ittihad soldiers launched rockets into his area of Dasht-i Barchi. He was forced to perform hard labor, digging out basements and making roads. Unable to wash or change his clothes, he quickly got lice. “Our conditions were worse than animals’ conditions,” he said. “They violated human rights and dignity. They tortured us for being

Hazara. We had no other crimes. We were only Hazara.”
... 234 (s.114)

A Giustozzi (2003):

The North of Afghanistan represented a very important exception, as several army generals joined together and formed the Jumbish-i Milli (National Front) under the leadership of Abdul Rashid Dostum. They received some support from remnants of Hizb-i Demokratik-i Khalq, but Jumbish was mostly a military structure. Although many of these officers were Uzbeks, there were quite a few Pashtuns and especially many Tajiks in their ranks. Their distrust of the mujahidin and the opportunity an independent existence offered by Dostum were the main factors cementing this alliance.

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Even Jumbish experienced this type of problem, despite the fact that it was dominated by former army officers, because many groups of mujahidin too were absorbed into it over the years and several former mujahidin commanders were part of it from the very beginning. The prominent role played by some of these former mujahidin contributed to drive regular army officers away from leading positions within Jumbish. Moreover, there were conflicts between established regular army officers and former militia commanders, such as Dostum himself.
(s. 8)

UNHCR (2002):

In 2002, the environment in the north of the country was marked by the competing presence of various factions. The three main ethnically based armed militias in the north are Jumbish- i Milli- yi Islami-yi Afghanistan (National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan), Jamiat- i Islami- yi Afghanistan (Islamic Group of Afghanistan), and Hezb- i Wahdat-i Islami- yi Afghanistan (Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan). The two most powerful factions, Jumbish and Jamiat, are in clear opposition and frequent clashes involve commanders affiliated to them. In this context, most of the abuses reported in the north are linked to the armed power of local commanders; incidents are numerous and they affect the entire population, settled civilian populations and returnees alike. (s. 10)

Human Rights Watch (July 2001):

Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan (National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan, hereinafter known as Junbish).

Junbish brought together northern, mostly ethnic Uzbek, former militias of the communist regime who mutinied against President Najibullah in early 1992. It also included former leaders and administrators of the old regime from various other ethnic groups, mainly Persian-speaking, and some Uzbek mujahidin commanders. In 1998 it lost all of the territory under its control, and many of its commanders have since defected to the Taliban. Its founder and principal leader was Abdul Rashid Dostum, who rose from security guard to leader of Najibullah's most powerful militia. This group took control of the important northern city of Mazar-i Sharif in alliance with other groups in early 1992 and controlled much of Samangan, Balkh, Jowzjan, Faryab, and Baghlan provinces. A coalition of militias, the Junbish was the strongest force in the north during 1992-97, but was riven by internal disputes. Since 1998 the Junbish has largely been inactive, although Dostum returned to northern Afghanistan in April 2001.

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In the west, fighting resumed in 1997 as the Taliban attacked the predominantly Uzbek Junbish forces commanded by General Dostum. Dostum had carved out what amounted to a mini-state in northern Afghanistan comprising five provinces and administered from Mazar-i Sharif, and up to this point had appeared to be one of the strongest powers in Afghanistan. Hizb-i Wahdat also maintained a significant force in Mazar-i Sharif (which has a large Hazara population) in an uneasy alliance with Dostum. As had happened elsewhere, however, the military stalemate was broken when one of Dostum's deputies, Gen. Abdul Malik Pahlawan (generally known as "Malik"), allied with the Taliban and turned on Dostum on May 19, 1997, arresting a number of Junbish commanders and as many as 5,000 soldiers.

Human Rights Watch (Oct 2001):

Ittihad-i Islami Bara-yi Azadi Afghanistan (Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan). This party is headed by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. (s. 3)

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Late May 1997: Some 3,000 captured Taliban soldiers were summarily executed in and around Mazar-i Sharif by Junbish forces under the command of Gen. Abdul Malik Pahlawan. The killings followed Malik's withdrawal from a brief alliance with the Taliban and the capture of the Taliban forces who were trapped in the city. Some of the Taliban troops were taken to the desert

and shot, while others were thrown down wells and then blown up with grenades.

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On the night of February 11, 1993 Jamiat-i Islami forces and those of another faction, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf's Ittihad-i Islami, conducted a raid in West Kabul, killing and "disappearing" ethnic Hazara civilians, and committing widespread rape. Estimates of those killed range from about seventy to more than one hundred.

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There was virtually no rule of law in any of the areas under the factions' control. In Kabul, Jamiat-i Islami, Ittihad, and Hizb-i Wahdat forces all engaged in rape, summary executions, arbitrary arrest, torture, and "disappearances".(s. 4)

UNHCR (1999):

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the government's non-Pashtun militias in the north centred in the city of Mazar-i Sharif, constituted themselves into a new organization, the Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami. Junbish included many former Parchamis. A large number of fighters forming part of this organization (the numbers vary between 15,000 and 160,000) have had a reputation of being the best equipped of Afghanistan. General Dostum received support from Uzbekistan and from Russia. He had formed an alliance with G. Hikmatyar in 1994 and was part of the alliance formed against B. Rabbani, the 'Supreme Coordination Council' (Swiss Federal Office for Refugees, February 1996). In May 1997, he was defeated by his own Commander, Abdul Malik Pahlawan who defected to the Taliban, and fled the country. Malik then turned on the Taliban and is accused of killing several thousand Taliban prisoners taken in Mazar at that time (Amnesty International, November 1997). Dostum, having fled to Turkey, returned to Afghanistan in September 1997 to oust Malik with the assistance of Uzbekistan and lead the successful relief of Mazar against another Taliban assault.

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However, in late May 1997, the situation swiftly changed as the fragile coalition linking General Dostum with former government forces of President B. Rabbani, G. Hikmatyar's Hezb-i-Islam and the mainly Shi'a Hizb-i Wahdat fell apart following the defection on 19 May 1997 of General Dostum's senior commander, Abdul Malik. On 24 May 1997, Mazar-i Sharif was captured by the fighters loyal to Commander Malik and placed under the full control of ethnic Uzbek fighters who had until a week before been part of the northern alliance opposing

the Taliban. The towns of Kunduz, Baghlan and Samangan east of Mazar were announced as under Taliban control.

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Dostum also accused Malik of having massacred about 3,000 Taliban prisoners earlier in the year (Rubin, B., 1998, 25).

UNHCR (1998):

41. It was alleged that the burial sites in northern Afghanistan might contain up to 2,000 bodies, presumably of the Taliban fighters who were taken prisoner by the forces of the Northern Alliance led by General Abdul Malik Pahlawan, the Deputy of General Abdul Rashid Dostom, the leader of the National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (NIMA), whom he forced into exile in Turkey. General Abdul Malik briefly allied himself with the Taliban movement in May 1997 during their first offensive on the city of MazariSharif, the capital of Balkh province. It is estimated that up to 3,000 Taliban may have arrived in the north of Afghanistan at that time. They suffered very heavy casualties after General Abdul Malik switched sides back to the Northern Alliance, with which he joined forces in ousting the Taliban. According to some estimates, several hundred if not more than a thousand Taliban fighters may have been killed during their two offensives on the north of Afghanistan in May and September 1997. It is estimated that between 300 and 400 Taliban may have been killed in MazariSharif alone. It was also estimated that some 2,000 Taliban may have been taken prisoner.

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General Dostom alleged that the killings were ordered by his former deputy, General Abdul Malik. Apart from killing the Taliban prisoners as former and potential military opponents, allegations were made that the other killings were perpetrated out of revenge, in particular for the death in June 1996 of General Abdul Malik's brother, Rasul Pahlawan, as well as in order to eliminate potential military and political opponents from local militias or political groups, including from the ranks of persons loyal to General Dostom.

Amnesty International (1995):

Ittehad-e Islami reportedly keeps several hundred prisoners in the party's main prison, Qala Haider Khan, in Paghman. Most are reportedly unarmed civilians held on suspicion of supporting rival factions. Many are

from the Hazara ethnic minority. Pabo, another prison run by *Ittehad-e Islami*, is reportedly located in a border area on Pakistani territory and holds about 300 prisoners. Prisoners are reportedly tortured and ill-treated in both jails. General Dostum's forces had jails in Tapa Maranjan and Old Microrayan in Kabul when they controlled those parts of the city. They also hold prisoners in all the former prison buildings in northern areas under their control. Some of General Dostum's commanders have their own private jails. Torture and beating are reportedly widespread in all of these detention centres. In addition to these prisons, most commanders run their own private jails. According to reports, prisoners in these jails are routinely tortured, with women and children in particular being raped. The commanders' main reasons for holding prisoners are apparently to obtain ransoms or as a means of intimidating the local population. (s. 31)

Denna sammanställning av information/länkar är baserad på informationssökningar gjorda under en begränsad tid. Den är sammanställd utifrån noggrant utvalda och allmänt tillgängliga informationskällor. Alla använda källor refereras. All information som presenteras, med undantag av obestridda/uppenbara fakta, har dubbelkontrollerats om inget annat anges. Sammanställningen gör inte anspråk på att vara uttömmande och bör inte tillmätas exklusivt bevisvärde i samband med avgörandet av ett enskilt ärende. Informationen i sammanställningen återspeglar inte nödvändigtvis Migrationsverkets officiella ståndpunkt i en viss fråga och det finns ingen avsikt att genom sammanställningen göra politiska ställningstaganden. Refererade dokument bör läsas i sitt sammanhang.

Källförteckning

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