

2015-06-04

Fråga-svar

Etiopien. Liyu police. Förhållandet till de regionala och federala myndigheterna.

Fråga

Hur ser förhållandet/samarbetet ut mellan Liyu police och de regionala samt de federala myndigheterna?

Svar

Källorna nedan redogör för specialstyrkan Liyu police vilken upprättades 2009. Styrkan ersatte den federala armén och polisen i att bekämpa Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). Källorna uppger vidare att polisstyrkan styrs av regionpresidenten och finansieras av den regionala budgeten samt att medlemmarna i Liyu police har fått utbildning, uniformer, vapen och lön från den etiopiska statsmakten via de regionala myndigheterna.

Se sammanställning av information:

Freedom House (2015):

The federal government generally has strong control and direction over the military, though forces such as the Liyu Police in the Ogaden territory sometimes operate independently.

Landinfo (2015):

Opprettelsen av Liyu Police og kommandostruktur
Spesialstyrken Liyu2 Police ble opprettet i 2009 (Hagmann 2014) for å styrke den interne sikkerheten i regionen, som i tillegg ivaretas av den etiopiske hæren (ENDF) og regionalt politi. Styrken opererer bare

innenfor grensene av regionen (ambassaden i Addis Abeba, e-post mai 2015).

3 Hovedformålet for styrken er å bekjempe opprørsbevegelsen Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), mens hæren vokter regionens yttergrenser og det regionale politiet tar seg av regulære politisaker. Styrken styres direkte fra kontoret til regionalpresident Abdi Mohamed Omar (Abdi Iley), som var den som opprettet styrken da han var ansvarlig for sikkerheten i regionen før han ble president (Hagmann 2014).

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Opprettelsen av Liyu Police synes å henge nøye sammen med at sentralmyndighetene i Addis Abeba i 2009 for første gang lot somaliske etiopiere slippe fullt og helt til i styringen av regionen. Etter at styrken ble operativ, ble den etiopiske hæren trukket ut av operasjoner knyttet til den interne sikkerheten i regionen (Crisis Group 2013). Ifølge en lokal organisasjon (samtale, november 2014) har styrken en velfungerende kommandostruktur med god intern kommunikasjon.
Rekruttering

International Crisis Group (2013):

At the same time, the SNRS presidency of Daud Mohammed (2007-2009), an Ogaadeni, marked the rise of a new generation of Ethiopian-Somali elites who took on a greater level of responsibilities for the region's administration and security.⁸⁰ A more competent and empowered Somali-led administration brought benefits, but a "loyalist", primarily Ogaadeni militia, the Special Police Force (liyu, "special" in Amharic), was created under the direct command of the head of the regional bureau of justice and security, Abdi Mohammed Omar (Abdi Iley).⁸¹ This was a classic counter-insurgency technique: empowering units from the same population as the insurgents, combined with a lower profile for external (highland-Ethiopian) political and military authorities.⁸² In 2009, Abdi Iley became SNRS president, and liyu police replaced federal army and police in the front line against the ONLF. Since Abdi Iley and the majority of the liyu force were from the same Ogaadeni sub-clans as the ONLF rank and file, the conflict rapidly became intra-clan.⁸³ (s. 13)

United States Department of State (2012):

Role of the Police and Security Apparatus

The Federal Police Commission reports to the Ministry of Federal Affairs, which is subject to parliamentary oversight; however, this oversight was loose in practice. Each of the country's nine regions has a state or special police force that reports to the regional civilian authorities. Local militias operated across the country in loose coordination with regional and federal police and the military, with the degree of coordination varying by region. In many cases these militias functioned as extensions of the local Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) political boss¹.

Human Rights Watch (2012):

The Liyu police have been implicated in numerous serious abuses against civilians throughout the Somali region in the context of counterinsurgency operations. The legal status of the force is unclear, but credible sources have informed Human Rights Watch that members have received training, uniforms, arms, and salaries from the Ethiopian government via the regional authorities.

African Rights Monitor (2011):

African Rights Monitor has interviewed former members of Liyu Police, a Janjaweed-like militia trained and armed by the Ethiopian Government in Dadaab, Kenya. These former members informed ARM that they were explicitly instructed to hinder or halt the economic activities of all the citizens. These include confiscating the livestock of suspected ONLF members and sympathizers and targeting the shops of business people. According to another member, Mohamed Cilmi (not real name), "we were told to target shops, street vendors, nomads with livestock, farmers, truck and bus drivers, and anyone who seemed to have money." According to Cilmi, in the rural areas the Liyu police simply shot livestock, while any villager or nomad that protested was killed as well. As Cilmi stated, "Everything was ours."⁵² (s. 19)

Rasaasa News (2011):

However, the Ethiopian government established new forces which were paid directly by the government and

equipped as the military. This group, called the Liyu police, was granted similar powers to those possessed by the military in the region. In mid-2008, the government collected unemployed young men, former militia members and regional police, and sent them to a training camp in Jinacsane, 20km north-western of Jigjiga. The first 800 Liyu police militia men celebrated their graduation ceremony in a Garab'ase military barack of Jigjiga in the presence of the region's President, Da'ud Mohamed, and its Peace & Security Head, Abdi mohamud (aka Abdi Ilay), in early January 2009.

The Liyu police are financed directly from the regional budget under the leadership of Abdi Mohamud Omar (Abdi Ilay), who was the head of Peace, Justice and Security Coordination and the new Head of the Region. Their military equipment is reportedly supplied by the Somali Region Administration of the Ethiopian Ministry of Defense. Nearly 20 Toyota four wheel drive (4WD) pickup trucks, and a dozen 26-30 ton Isuzu pickup trucks were purchased for the Liyu police, though they frequently use both civilian and government-owned vehicles. They are mostly equipped with AK-47s, PKMs and other military-grade weapons, and dress in green Ethiopian Federal Police uniforms.

Konsulterade källor

Sökning har gjorts i följande källor:

Dow Jones Factiva
Ecoi
Google
Landinfo
Lifos
Refworld
IRIN News

Denna sammanställning av information/länkar är baserad på informationssökningar gjorda under en begränsad tid. Den är sammanställd utifrån noggrant utvalda och allmänt tillgängliga informationskällor. Alla använda källor refereras. All information som presenteras, med undantag av obestridda/uppenbara fakta, har dubbelkontrollerats om inget annat anges. Sammanställningen gör inte anspråk på att vara uttömmande och bör inte tillmätas exklusivt bevisvärde i samband med avgörandet av ett enskilt ärende. Informationen i sammanställningen återspeglar inte nödvändigtvis Migrationsverkets officiella ståndpunkt i en viss fråga och det finns ingen avsikt att genom sammanställningen göra politiska ställningstaganden. Refererade dokument bör läsas i sitt sammanhang.

Källförteckning

Alla länkar hämtade 2015-06-04

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