

2015-02-03

Fråga-svar

Afghanistan. Internflykt på grund av familjemedlemmars tjänstgöring i den afghanska armén

Fråga

Sökanden är från Paktia-provinsen och är pashtun. Fadern har blivit dödad av talibaner och sökanden själv har blivit hotad av taliban. Fadern har haft en lite högre ställning inom den afghanska armén. Kan faderns ställning inom armén utgöra en särskild riskgrupp att bli utsatt? Finns det möjlighet för internflykt?

Svar

Sammanställning av information från olika källor:

Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) (2014):

Although civilian casualties decreased in 2012 in Paktya province, UNAMA and UNOCHA recorded a number of incidents in the province resulting in civilian deaths in 2013.⁴² These included deliberate attacks on civilians by Anti-Government Elements, as well as casualties from escalation of force at check points, and from armed conflict between Anti-Government Elements and Pro-Government Forces. Civilian protection remains weak in Paktya province and Government presence is limited almost entirely to the district centre.⁴³ It has been indicated that Anti-Government Elements are assuming greater control in some districts in the province, increasing the vulnerability of civilians in these areas. ⁴⁴ In some instances, power-sharing deals and peace agreements were made between the Government and

Anti-Government Elements. These reduced levels of violence in the communities in the short term, but left a longer term state of insecurity without legal structures of protection. (s. 10)

The Conversation (2014):

The family, deported from Norway on 17 January, have no relatives in Kabul, and since shortly after their arrival have been staying with the relatives of someone they knew from their time in Iran, more than five years before. They are conscious of the burden they are putting on these strangers and aware that they need to move on, but they are paralysed by the fear that drove them from Afghanistan in the first place, by the shock of their deportation and, unfamiliar with Kabul and without contacts, they are at a loss as to what to do next.

An Afghan colleague had asked me to come and hear what the family had to say, to see if I could help them in some way. I had explained that it was very unlikely that I would be able to help, but that if they wanted I could try and explain why they had been deported. We thought perhaps talking through what had happened, and why, might help them come to terms with it. Part of their confusion was that the Norwegian authorities seem to have accepted that they could not return to Uruzgan, but like those assessing claims in other EU states, had decided that the family would be able to relocate to Kabul, which it is argued provides a “safe internal flight alternative”.

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Kabul may well be more secure than other parts of Afghanistan, but that security is relative and fragile, as the bombing on the 17 January shows. In the run-up to the elections in April, and given the international withdrawal in December, there are very real and reasonable security fears here – and not just among the international workers.

But it is not only the fears of suicide attacks, roadside bombings and kidnapping that worry ordinary Afghans and those who are deported. How are they to survive in Kabul? Unemployment is at least 48% . Those who do find work, accommodation or support find it through social networks, so single young men who are deported to Kabul face a desperate struggle.

The overwhelming majority of those deported to Afghanistan are single young men, but in the last year I

have come across four families: three deported from Norway and one from Sweden.

Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation (ACCORD) (2014):

Paktia is among the restive provinces in eastern Afghanistan that border Pakistan and have endured some of the highest levels of fighting during the US-led 12-year war in Afghanistan. Paktia has been a hotbed of insurgent activity, both for Afghan militants and Pakistani insurgents who are frequently crossing the border to attack Afghan and coalition security forces.” (KP, 3. November 2013)

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2) Innerstaatliche Fluchtalternative in Kabul für Personen, die dort über kein familiäre bzw. soziales Netzwerk verfügen.

Se:

UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Afghanistan (2013)

<http://www.refworld.org/docid/51ffdca34.html>

Asylum Research Consultancy (ARC) (2013):

However, the Assistant Professor said that the Taliban might be able to track someone down in Kabul (ibid.). He indicated that he was also aware of cases in which mid- and high-level officials in Kabul were being threatened by the Taliban (ibid.). Giustozzi also indicates that the Taliban has harassed and targeted on a "small scale" perceived "collaborators" in Kabul, including police and army colonels and commanding officers in the security forces (Norway 9 Sept. 2011, 14).

Both the Assistant Professor (13 Dec. 2011) and the Senior Program Coordinator (13 Dec. 2011) noted that another factor in the ability of the Taliban to track the target is whether the targeted individual relocates with family members. The Assistant Professor pointed out that relocating as part of a large or extended family can make it easier for the Taliban to find the target (13 Dec. 2011). However, the Senior Program Coordinator noted that if a targeted individual relocates on his or her own, the Taliban might lure the target back by threatening or attacking family members or relatives left behind (13 Dec. 2011). [...]

However, these escapees who no longer collaborate for

the government are a low priority target to the Taliban, whose assets in the cities are limited and usually devoted to high profile targets, ranking from serving government officials upwards. In Kabul, for example, colonels of the police and army have been targeted, as well as commanding officers of the security services. In the provinces, particularly in the south, government officials of any rank, even low ones, have been targeted. The Taliban do not seem to systematically transfer information about targeted individuals from one area to the other; they maintain no databases. What typically happens is that the Taliban operating in a specific area will request information from other Taliban about a suspect individual, whenever needed. The flow of information therefore depends on the intensity of Taliban operations: the greater the presence, the greater the request of information. Often individuals apprehended by the Taliban as suspect spies are asked to provide references in order to verify their identity and activities. The risk to the escapees from Taliban-controlled areas seems to derive mainly from chance contact with the Taliban, who may consider them an opportunity target.

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The Taliban potentially has the resources and skills to track down people, particularly if these are not in hiding but have to work; extensive infiltration of the police also helps the Taliban's information gathering efforts. However, these escapees who no longer collaborate for the government are a low priority target to the Taliban, whose assets in the cities are limited and usually devoted to high profile targets, ranking from serving government officials upwards. In Kabul, for example, colonels of the police and army have been targeted, as well as commanding officers of the security services. In the provinces, particularly in the south, government officials of any rank, even low ones, have been targeted. The Taliban do not seem to systematically transfer information about targeted individuals from one area to the other; they maintain no databases. What typically happens is that the Taliban operating in a specific area will request information from other Taliban about a suspect individual, whenever needed. The flow of information therefore depends on the intensity of Taliban operations: the greater the presence, the greater the request of information. Often individuals apprehended by the Taliban as suspect spies are asked to provide references in order to verify their identity and activities. The risk to the escapees from Taliban-controlled areas seems to derive mainly from chance contact with the Taliban, who may consider them an opportunity target. Usually the poorest and the Pashtun-populated areas of the big cities are the places where most Taliban infiltration of the cities occurs; in Kabul these are

Bagrami suburb, south-eastern Kabul, Southern Kabul and parts of western Kabul. (s. 49)

Udlændingestyrelsen (2012):

Regarding the security in Kabul, UNHCR commented that in general Kabul could be an option for safety, but to what extent the city could be a safe place for a person fleeing a conflict depends on the profile of the person and the nature of the conflict the person has fled from. Therefore, an assessment of internal flight alternative (IFA) should be made carefully and on a case by case basis.

Regarding security in Kabul, an international NGO informed the delegation that Kabul is one of few places in Afghanistan where the security situation is relatively good and stable even though incidents are occurring also in Kabul.

Regarding the security situation in Kabul, IOM said that there have been a number of suicide attacks which influences the lives of ordinary people. However, apart from suicide attacks, Kabul is safer than other places in Afghanistan, and the area is more under control. This is, according to IOM, due to the fact that Afghan National Army (ANA) and ANP in general are more trained in security operations in Kabul and other big cities like Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif and the situation is more under control in these cities compared to other parts of the country. In Jalalabad, however, the authorities are not yet that efficient, and the Taliban has a strong influence. Safety is an issue in Kabul because of suicide bombings, according to AIHRC.

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An international organization stated that if someone is fleeing a conflict in his or her area of origin, it depends on the seriousness of the conflict whether he or she will be traced down in Kabul.

Afghanistan is a tribal society with close family networks, which means that if you really want to find someone, you will be able to trace him/her down. Concerning the possibility of tracking down someone in Kabul, an independent policy research organization in Kabul stated that Kabul is a big city and people do not even know their neighbors anymore. There are newcomers every day and people move around and stay in rented accommodations if they have the financial resources. On this basis, the source believed that if someone flees a conflict and moves to Kabul, it will be quite difficult to find him. The independent policy research organization in Kabul pointed out, however, that it is not difficult for the government to find people in

Kabul if they are in search of a particular person. This means that if someone is fleeing someone senior in or well-connected to the government, police or army, they would be in greater peril.

When asked whether it is possible to trace down a person in Kabul who has fled from a conflict in his or her place of origin, an Afghan law practitioner replied that this possibility exists if one has the exact address of that person. However, the Afghan law practitioner added that due to the fact that there is no registration of address in Afghanistan, tracing down a person in a big city like Kabul without an address would be difficult. The same source added that people normally do not go to the police to ask about other people's place of residence because there is still not a good organized police system to help people to do so.

An independent research institute in Kabul explained that Kabul has grown tremendously over recent years. In Afghanistan, most people do not have a proper address in the way citizens of other countries have (street names are problematic, as are house numbers). The standard Afghan method to record and identify a person's name is to cite their father's name, e.g. Sarwar Ali, s/o (son of) Mohammad Naveed. In this way, it is very difficult to trace individual people, particularly in the big cities.

UNAMA did not rule out the possibility that the Taliban would target high profile persons in Kabul, but it did not find it likely that the Taliban would make it a priority or have the capacity to track down low profile persons in the city. This is, according to UNAMA, the main reason why UNAMA sometimes brings its staff who faces security risks from the provinces to work and live in Kabul.

UNAMA informed the delegation that the greatest security risk in Kabul is posed by criminal groups.

UNHCR said that if a low profile person flees a conflict with the Taliban in the area of origin, it would be possible for him to seek protection within his community in Kabul. UNHCR stated that most probably the Taliban would not make it a priority to track down low profile people in Kabul. However, a thorough assessment of the claim and the IFA should be made on a case by case basis. Regarding the Taliban activities in Kabul, AIHRC informed the delegation that the Taliban certainly has the means to act and kill in Kabul, and that the Taliban can harm high-profile people anywhere. (s. 7)

European Asylum Support Office (EASO) (2012):

According to a staff member of an international development agency in Afghanistan, for ANA and ANP soldiers it might not be sufficient to simply quit their job

in order to escape the threat by insurgents. They would have to change sides in order to avoid further targeting. (s. 35)

Afghanistan's National Security Forces (ANSF) consist of the Afghan National Army (ANA), the Afghan National Police (ANP) and the National Directorate of Security (NDS). (s.49)

The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), including the Afghan National Police (ANP), the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the National Directorate of Security (NDS), are a proclaimed target of the Taliban and other insurgent groups. The ANP, including the Afghan Local Police (ALP), is particularly vulnerable to insurgent attacks due to their exposure in local and remote positions in the field.

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In the documented episodes of 2012, abundant evidence was found of the very frequent to regular targeting of ANSF in all regions of Afghanistan. They are subject to targeted killings, abductions, poisoning, mutilation, IEDs, attacks and complex attacks. They are not only targeted when on the job but in around 15 documented episodes, they were targeted when off duty or acting in a private capacity. In around 10 documented episodes, their family members or relatives were targeted as well. Sometimes, they were addressed by an individual night letter or sentenced by a Taliban court. (s. 52)

The targeting of ANSF members by insurgents is frequent and widespread. They are subject to attacks, targeted killings, public executions, death sentences by Taliban courts, abduction and mutilation. Family members of ANSF staff are targeted as well to put pressure on the policemen or soldiers to defect. There are examples of the targeting of ANSF members while they are off duty, at home or acting in a private capacity. Several elements of the targeting give an indication that the individual had been tracked down by the insurgents. (s. 53)

UNICEF (2010):

Facts: 16 year old boy, Pashtun ethnicity, eldest of three children. He is from Kunduz, Chardarq district. His mother and one younger brother and sister remain in Afghanistan. His father was killed by Taliban four months ago because his father was a member of the Afghan army. The Taliban tried to force him to finish

with army and join them. They sent many letters to force him, and then one day someone said something has happened and he saw that his father was killed. His maternal uncle is looking after his mother. He attended school before he started his journey to the west. He has never worked because his family had enough money because his father was working. One day the Taliban came to his house and said he must join them. He refused and told Taliban that he had to study. He went with them for three days and then they forced him to fight. He came back and told his mother the stories and she said you must leave. Two reasons why he left: Taliban killed his father and forced him to join. "It is true they forced me I did not have any power." (s. 50)

Denna sammanställning av information/länkar är baserad på informationssökningar gjorda under en begränsad tid. Den är sammanställd utifrån noggrant utvalda och allmänt tillgängliga informationskällor. Alla använda källor refereras. All information som presenteras, med undantag av obestridda/uppenbara fakta, har dubbelkontrollerats om inget annat anges. Sammanställningen gör inte anspråk på att vara uttömmande och bör inte tillmätas exklusivt bevisvärde i samband med avgörandet av ett enskilt ärende. Informationen i sammanställningen återspeglar inte nödvändigtvis Migrationsverkets officiella ståndpunkt i en viss fråga och det finns ingen avsikt att genom sammanställningen göra politiska ställningstaganden. Refererade dokument bör läsas i sitt sammanhang.

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