

GUINEA: PUTTING THE TRANSITION BACK ON TRACK

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

After the election of Alpha Condé to the presidency in November 2010, legislative elections are set to complete a new phase in Guinea's political transition. However, recent violent ethnic politics and the political actors' mistrust in the electoral arrangements are cause for concern. Condé's unilateral move to overhaul the electoral system has gained little praise, and with his party's gloomy prospects for the legislative elections, suspicion is increasing. He has done too little too late to promote reconciliation or dialogue with the opposition. Guinea can afford neither a makeshift electoral system, nor a new campaign based on ethnic factors. Rising pre-electoral tensions could spark inter-communal violence and offer an opportunity to take action for those in the army unhappy about loss of power. The 19 July military attack launched by some soldiers on the presidential residence confirmed this is a real possibility. A genuine agreement between the main political actors on the organisation of the legislative elections is crucial and urgent. Without the international community's significant involvement, chances of success are slim.

Condé's accession to power provided an extraordinary opportunity to end 50 years of authoritarianism and economic stagnation. The new government faces immense challenges with limited means, even if donors seem prepared to increase aid. The failure of the 19 July attempt against the president's life indicates that, for the moment at least, it has the military hierarchy's support. Condé has consolidated the normalisation process begun by his predecessor, General Sékouba Konaté, and sent the army back to the barracks and away from Conakry. The imposition of heavy security measures since 19 July, however, has set the process back. Security sector reform is still at a preliminary stage. The new authorities show willingness to provide good economic and financial governance, but strict budgetary discipline will depress the economy, at least in the short term, so they are trying to compensate by responding to social demands, importing food and improving electricity supply. There are indications of an ambitious long-term economic restructuring program.

On the other hand, it is only recently that dialogue with the opposition has begun and some conciliatory gestures have been made. For example, on 15 August the president

met with one of the leading opposition representatives for the first time since the election. He plays both sides though, for example accusing the main opposition party of being responsible for the 19 July attack before the judiciary has even looked into the case, and long ignoring, before rejecting, a memorandum about the organisation of the elections handed by the opposition to the government on 17 August.

The legacy of his own election is cause for some concern, including for the legislative contests, because it gave new impetus to the idea that Guinea's history is a struggle between its four major ethno-regional blocs. In the first round, most politicians started by organising their own communities. The second round – during which ethnic rhetoric built steadily on all sides – was a scarcely disguised debate on supposed Peul domination, with Condé, a Malinké, attributing hegemonic ambitions to that community from which his opponent and the main opposition party leader, Cellou Dalein Diallo, comes. Although the security forces were responsible for the worst violence, political mobilisation along ethnic lines sparked clashes and claimed victims. Organisational weaknesses of the electoral process fed these tensions by allowing mutual accusations of fraud at every stage.

The new government has done little to cope with this grim legacy and has been slow to organise the legislative elections, which are indispensable for completing the institutional arrangements required by the constitution. It kept quiet for months about the elections procedure, until, on 15 September, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) suggested they be held on 29 December 2011. However, the authorities had already begun to overhaul the electoral register, made changes to the INEC and redefined the division of labour between it and the territorial administration ministry. The National Transition Council (an interim legislative body) and civil society tried to mediate, and under domestic and international pressure, the authorities finally called for consultations and abandoned the creation of a new electoral register. The initiation of a dialogue has not so far enabled any agreement on the bones of contention: the composition and functioning of the INEC, the electoral register and the elections date.

The suspicions generated by the electoral system risk accentuating tensions in certain areas and leading to inter-communal violence. This could in turn spark reprisals elsewhere in the country or provoke a brutal reaction from an army that 19 July showed is still divided about the return to a civilian government capable of putting an end to crude activities of illicit enrichment. It is also split by factionalism, partly along ethnic lines. Further delaying the elections is not an option: it would only worsen tensions and suspicions, and a national assembly based on a popular mandate is urgently needed in order to restore balance in the political system and take further steps toward democracy. Because another period of electoral instability could endanger the young Guinean democracy, the government and the opposition must discuss electoral arrangements at the highest level, and all political actors must refrain from stirring up inter-ethnic tensions.

The international community, which partly withdrew after Condé came to power, must accompany this final stage of the transition, providing guarantees for the legislative elections as it did for the presidential election. The Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS), the African Union (AU) and the UN must reinvest vigorously in Guinea to preserve the gains acquired since the demise of Lansana Conté's regime in December 2008 and the removal of the military junta led by Captain Moussa Dadis Camara in January 2010. Unfortunately, the democratic transition in Guinea is not irreversible.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To President Condé:

1. Engage in direct and periodic political dialogue with the leaders of the most important parties (those that received more than a certain percentage of the votes in the first round of the presidential election, 5 per cent, for example), at least until the legislative assembly is in place.
2. Refrain from ambiguous and dangerous rhetoric accusing unidentified citizens of "sabotaging" government actions; avoid misusing his prestige as an opponent of authoritarian regimes as justification to avoid the political debate that is indispensable for a democratic system; and take a clear public stand against the ethnically-laden provocative speeches by some of his allies and supporters.
3. Avoid any political statement which may be understood as interfering with the judicial process for investigating the 19 July attack.

To the Guinean Government:

4. Work with opposition parties, especially the Union of Guinean Democratic Forces (Union des forces démocratiques de Guinée, UFDG) and the Union of Republican Forces (Union des forces républicaines, UFR), to seek a genuine consensus about the electoral process, including the calendar, the voters register and the Electoral Commission.
5. Continue to accept the National Transition Council (NTC) as a legitimate legislative partner until the National Assembly starts functioning, as set out in the constitution.
6. Prepare draft organic bills on the institutions required by the constitution, especially the Supreme Judicial Council, the Supreme Court and the Economic and Social Council.
7. Guarantee the freedom to demonstrate, a constitutional right.
8. Continue efforts to promote good governance and implement commitments made to this effect, notably publication of mining contracts and asset declarations by the president and ministers.
9. Continue the fight against impunity by both:
 - a) increasing the resources available to the judges investigating the massacre of 28 September 2009 and ensuring independence and fairness of the judicial process, as well as witness protection; and
 - b) continuing efforts to punish abuses of power committed routinely by members of the security forces.
10. Proceed expeditiously with security sector reform, including by transforming strategic plans into concrete actions and by taking into account all the security actors, among which the almost 6,000 young men recruited by Moussa Dadis Camara.

To the Opposition Parties:

11. Accept government proposals for dialogue on the electoral process and other important issues without insisting that strict observance of the constitution is the answer to all the country's problems.
12. Play a constructive role in the NTC and use this forum to defend their positions.
13. Cease questioning the legitimacy of President Condé's election.
14. Take a clear, public position against the escalation of ethnic tensions promoted by some of their supporters.

To the Independent National Electoral Commission:

15. Prepare, in cooperation with civil society, a code of conduct to be signed by all political parties contesting the elections, committing them to refrain from any comment that risks stirring up inter-communal tensions during the campaign, and ensure it is widely available to citizens.

To the National Transition Council:

16. Continue to fulfil the legislative role attributed to it by the constitution, including by adopting organic bills on the institutions required by the constitution, in particular the Supreme Judicial Council, the Supreme Court and the Economic and Social Council, independently of whether the government takes the initiative or not.

To Guinean Civil Society:

17. Watch and contribute to the establishment of a code of conduct that must be prepared by the INEC and create an independent observatory, possibly in association with the Independent National Human Rights Institution, to monitor the respect of the above-mentioned code, the treatment of ethnic issues in the media and political life, document abuses and publish regular reports.
18. Create an independent observatory, possibly in association with the Independent National Human Rights Institution, on impunity, with representatives of civil society, jurists, military and ex-military personnel, to monitor judicial cases involving members of the defence and security forces and publish regular reports.

To Guinea's International Partners, especially the Group of Friends of Guinea:

19. Reaffirm their availability and vigilance regarding completion of the transition, especially monitoring of the legislative elections, notably by:
 - a) convening rapidly a Group of Friends meeting with member states' foreign ministers and member organisations' high-level representatives in Conakry; and
 - b) continuing regular meetings with the ambassadors of the main political actors.

To the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for West Africa, the President of the ECOWAS Commission and the President of the African Union Commission:

20. Continue to the establishment of the National Assembly the prominent political role they played before the presidential election, including by:

- a) resuming the offer to mediate, which they did successfully until the presidential elections, this time with the objective of facilitating dialogue between the president and his opponents; and helping the government and the main political parties to reach an agreement on the Independent National Electoral Commission, the electoral agenda and register, as well as on the role of international guarantors;
- b) preparing, with other relevant actors in the UN system, a technical assistance mission for the elections; and
- c) allowing General Sékouba Konaté, whose role in the first stage of the transition was unanimously welcomed and who now has important responsibilities in the African Union, to demonstrate his continuing commitment to the transition, especially through meetings with President Condé.

To the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for West Africa:

21. Take on entirely the coordination of international efforts in support of security sector reform, liaising with the UN Development Programme (UNDP), as the Guinean authorities requested to the UN, through the rapid establishment of the permanent coordination mechanism necessary to attract and preserve donors' trust in pursuance of the reform.

To the President of the Commission of the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS):

22. Mobilise, as of now, the necessary means to send an election monitoring mission, which would be deployed in all regions of Guinea before and after the legislative elections.

To the UN Peacebuilding Commission:

23. Work with the government to define a calendar for priority tasks, especially security sector reform and national reconciliation.

**To All Bilateral Donors Interested in Security
Sector Reform, especially the U.S., France and the
Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS):**

24. Reaffirm support for security sector reform and advance its coherence by strengthening coordination of bilateral initiatives by the UN.

Dakar/Brussels, 23 September 2011

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I. INTRODUCTION

After 50 years of dictatorship and a brief military junta that ended with a bloodbath at the 28 September 2009 massacre, the transition in Guinea achieved its first result: after several dozen years in opposition, Alpha Condé won the second round of the presidential election held on 7 November 2010, obtaining more than 52 per cent of votes and defeating Cellou Dalein Diallo. General Sékouba Konaté, interim president during the transition, handed over power on 21 December 2010. This was a historic outcome in a country that has not had a genuine electoral contest or democratic change of power since independence in 1958. At the end of 2010, as neighbouring Côte d'Ivoire was suffering another outbreak of violence, Guinea seemed to have made a decisive breakthrough.

But there is still a long way to go. Guinea certainly has important assets: considerable mineral wealth, enormous water resources, significant agricultural potential, a small but cosmopolitan elite and a dynamic diaspora. Meanwhile, the West African region as a whole seems to be heading in the direction of political stability and economic growth.

At the end of the 1990s, the country only just avoided being sucked into conflicts that tore West Africa apart. The 2000s witnessed the slow death throes of President Lansana Conté, who had come to power through a coup in 1984.¹ As internal and international pressures mounted, the Conté regime made superficial concessions to democracy, all carefully emptied of any meaningful content. After the political opposition was broken, it was civil society's turn to oppose the regime after 2006, leading to several episodes of bloody repression, new concessions and as many government manoeuvres.² It was only after Conté's death on 22 December 2008 that a new phase began.

A military junta took power, a complex coalition of the various forces present in the army, with the mission to

organise a democratic transition. After being wooed by politicians from all sides, its leader, Captain Moussa Dadis Camara, finally decided to stand for president, contrary to his promise not to do so. His announcement, combined with erratic governance and military abuses, caused civil society to mobilise again, in alliance with the main political parties, to form the Forces Vives coalition to oppose Captain Camara's presidential ambitions. The bloody repression of a Forces Vives demonstration on 28 September 2009 (more than 150 civilians killed) sealed the fate of Camara, caught between international pressures and the defence of his men. Wounded shortly afterwards by one of his assistants, he went into exile in Morocco and then Burkina Faso.

The junta's number two, General Sékouba Konaté, took over leadership of the government and relaunched the transition.³ On 15 January 2010, he signed the Ouagadougou Accord with Captain Camara. This created a National Transition Council (NTC), formed of representatives of civil society, the political parties and the junta, appointed by the president of the transition, endowed with legislative powers and made responsible for establishing a legal framework for the presidential election to be held within six months.⁴

The international community played a crucial role during these initial stages. Captain Camara's fantasies indicated he was not an acceptable interlocutor, and there was also a desire to end two painful decades of conflict that had torn West Africa apart. The increase of tension in Guinée Forestière, the militarisation and criminal nature of the regime and the rise of a new class of military officers all owed and still owe much to the many years of war in the region.⁵ A sense of collective responsibility played a major part in the international community's interest in the Guinean situation.

¹ Crisis Group Africa Report N°74, *Guinea: Uncertainties at the End of an Era*, 19 December 2003; Crisis Group Africa Report N°94, *Guinea: Stopping Guinea's Slide*, 14 June 2005.

² Crisis Group Africa Report N°121, *Guinea: Change or Chaos*, 14 February 2007; Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°49, *Guinea: Change on Hold*, 8 November 2007.

³ Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°66, *Guinea: Military Rule Must End*, 16 October 2009.

⁴ For the text of the agreement, see www.electionsafrique.org/Guinee-Accord-de-Ouagadougou-du-15.html. The establishment of the CNT gave rise to a sharp controversy, obliging the government to increase the number of its members from 101 to 159.

⁵ Crisis Group Africa Report N°164, *Guinea: Reforming the Army*, 23 September 2010.

However, the international community's attention and influence slackened after Alpha Condé's election. The election of President Condé was an important turning point in the transition but it does not mark the end of it. The International Contact Group on Guinea (ICG-G), formed on the initiative of the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA), played an important role but was dissolved soon after President Condé took power, apparently at his request.⁶ ICG-G members based in Conakry continue to meet informally as the Group of Friends of Guinea, operating without a mandate and therefore with less influence. However, the inclusion of Guinea on the agenda of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission in February 2011, at the government's request and in the absence of a genuine armed conflict, indicated the international community's continuing interest.

This report analyses events in Guinea-Conakry since Alpha Condé was elected president and makes recommendations on the completion of the transition to the national and international actors involved.

II. A HOTLY DISPUTED PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Holding the presidential election was itself a considerable success in a country that has an unfortunate electoral history. In 1993, at the time of the first multiparty presidential election since 1958, the Supreme Court annulled all results in Kankan and Siguiri prefectures, where the opposition's Alpha Condé probably had a large majority, ensuring victory for General Lansana Conté. At the following election in 1998, Condé was simply arrested and imprisoned for 28 months. The 2003 election was boycotted by the opposition parties, which had good reason to believe it would be rigged. Despite these experiences, Guineans flocked to the polls in 2010.⁷

However, the presidential election itself was accompanied by worrying signs of violence, accusations, controversy and even trials. It is possible that the electoral process may not have been completed without the pressure applied by the international community and the president of the transition, General Sékouba Konaté, and also without the threat of continued military government in case of failure. Any assessment of the outcome of the presidential election must take into account at least two issues, because they cast a long shadow over the current situation and will have a considerable effect on the forthcoming legislative elections: the politicisation of ethnicity and the difficulties involved in organising a credible electoral process.

A. MISTRUST OF ELECTORAL INSTITUTIONS

In addition to very real technical and organisational problems and their interpretation and instrumentalisation by those involved in the struggle, the electoral process, far from easing political tension by ensuring an indisputable result, provided a thousand opportunities for the spread of rumours and accusations. Each attempt to disprove accusations only strengthened the mutual suspicions of each side. The presidential election therefore established profound mistrust in electoral institutions.

Before the ballot, the new electoral register, prepared by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), was hotly disputed.⁸ The biometric data of 462,780 regis-

⁶ Crisis Group interviews, diplomats, Conakry and Dakar, April 2011. The ICG-G was created only after the junta took power. It included representatives in Guinea of members of the Security Council and representatives of the AU, EU, ECOWAS, the International Organisation of La Francophonie and international financial institutions.

⁷ Although there was no doubt about who won, the gross figures are not reliable, especially for the first round. It is therefore difficult to give a definitive participation rate. In the first round, the rate was 77 per cent for the provisional results but only 52 per cent after annulled votes were discounted. In the second round, participation reached 68 per cent.

⁸ Sagem, funded by the European Union through the UNDP, was responsible for the computerised register and the production of voting cards, but the data collection for the register was

tered voters (more than 10 per cent of the electorate) was not processed. These voters had to use their receipt to vote on the complementary list in the first round and were given non-biometric cards for the second round. After the first round, which was held on 27 June 2010, the Supreme Court annulled no less than 900,000 votes, more than a quarter of the 3.3 million votes cast, because of procedural irregularities.⁹ The participation rate therefore fell from 77 to 52 per cent. But the irregularities themselves were hotly debated: the European Union electoral observation mission stated that some of the votes annulled by the Supreme Court on the grounds that they were not communicated were in fact available to the INEC but the Court did not request their communication.¹⁰

The extent of the problems gave candidates many new reasons for questioning the results. Sidya Touré, candidate of the Union of Republican Forces (Union des forces républicaines, UFR), who came third and was therefore excluded from the second round, claimed second place, accusing the transition authorities of rigging the ballot in Alpha Condé's favour.¹¹ Emphasising convincingly that the problems were general, and that the annulations probably harmed Condé more than the other candidates, the international community suggested that the classification was beyond dispute even though the gross voting figures were unreliable.¹² General Konaté reacted sharply to being questioned in this way and threatened to resign. Sidya Touré eventually accepted third place, at least officially.¹³

After this problematic first round, nearly four months elapsed before the second round could take place. There were many challenges on every aspect of the electoral process followed by as many reconciliations or accusations of favouritism. For example, the distribution of polling stations across the country was the subject of controversy. Alpha Condé pointed out that his electoral stronghold, Haute Guinée, had significantly less polling stations than

other regions, especially Fouta Djallon, where Cellou Dalein Diallo was well supported.¹⁴ To appease Condé's supporters, 1,500 supplementary polling stations were opened in time for the second round. After his defeat, Cellou Dalein Diallo's Union of Guinean Democratic Forces (Union des forces démocratiques de Guinée, UFDG) accused the transition authorities of deliberately allowing Condé time to consolidate his coalition and mobilise his electorate, and of organising all manner of frauds. Diallo even proclaimed his victory unilaterally, before recognising that his opponent had won.¹⁵

These challenges also involved the senior electoral authority. Alpha Condé's Rally of the Guinean People (Rassemblement du peuple de Guinée, RPG), suspecting the INEC president, Ben Sékou Sylla, of being biased in favour of the UFDG, accused him of not delivering certain voting reports to the Supreme Court. On 9 September 2010, Sylla was sentenced to one year in prison and a fine by the court in Dixinn and deprived of his civic rights for two years. He died shortly afterwards. The appointment of his successor was so controversial that, on 19 October, a few days before the second round, General Konaté finally appointed Siaka Toumani Sangaré, a Malian general with recognised expertise in the electoral field.

On 22 October, the UFDG accused the INEC vice-president, Louncény Camara, of concealing voting reports and thereby acting in favour of the RPG. He was sentenced by the same court to the same sentence as Sylla. Appeals to the Supreme Court after the second round were all rejected on what were in some cases questionable technical grounds: although the political parties displayed poor understanding of juridical principles when making their challenges, the electoral justice system suffered from an extreme formalism that damaged its credibility.¹⁶

This over-extended process was accompanied by violent protests, which were sometimes brutally repressed.¹⁷ On

done by the INEC through more than 900 census commissions operating across the country.

⁹ Unsigned or inflated lists of results, transfer of polling stations, number of voters higher than the registered number, etc. A post-electoral evaluation revealed no less than 45 problems with the ballot. See "Election présidentielle 2010. Rapport de synthèse", Republic of Guinea, Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralisation and the Independent National Electoral Commission, 26 March 2011, pp. 26-28.

¹⁰ "Election présidentielle de 2010. Rapport final", European Union, Electoral Observation Mission to the Republic of Guinea, February 2011, p. 61.

¹¹ "Sidya Touré conteste les résultats provisoires et revendique la deuxième place", koaci.com, 4 July 2010.

¹² "Election présidentielle de 2010. Rapport final", European Union, op. cit., p. 54; Crisis Group interviews, European diplomats, Conakry, April and May 2011.

¹³ "Sékouba Konaté menace de démissionner", rfi.fr, 6 July 2010.

¹⁴ There was an average of one polling station for every 372 voters in the district of Labé, Cellou Dalein Diallo's stronghold, against one polling station for 570 voters in Kankan, Alpha Condé's stronghold. Figures calculated using INEC data available in "Election présidentielle de 2010. Rapport final", European Union, op. cit., p. 44.

¹⁵ "Guinée: Diallo se déclare vainqueur", Agence France-Presse, 15 November 2011.

¹⁶ "Election présidentielle de 2010. Rapport final", European Union, op. cit., p. 63 and following.

¹⁷ Although violence during the electoral campaign received widespread coverage in the press and was the subject of many reports and rumours on Guinean websites, there was no definitive official assessment of how many people were affected. For a summary based on research after the events, see "Rapport d'enquête sur les violences et violations des droits humains du-

19 October, the security forces fired live rounds at UFDG supporters demonstrating in Conakry, leaving at least two dead and 29 wounded. A Special Force for Electoral Security (Force spéciale pour la sécurisation du processus électoral, FOSSEPEL) was created and equipped with extra resources. Although there was no repeat of the repression that took place in 2007 and 2009, FOSSEPEL personnel were implicated in serious abuses – rapes, summary executions, torture and extortion – in circumstances not yet brought to light.¹⁸ Nobody has yet been punished for these crimes. The impunity of the security forces and their inability to maintain order, because of a lack of training and equipment,¹⁹ pose considerable problems with political consequences.

Neither have the security forces managed to avoid the ethnic issues that characterised the election. Officers of the security forces often expressed anti-Peul sentiments to the extent that some of them nicknamed the FOSSEPEL “Special Anti-Peul Force”.²⁰ For historical reasons, the Peul are not well represented in the security forces,²¹ and there is a long-standing antagonism between the “men in uniform” and the Peul intellectual elite and world of commerce, an antagonism that was revived by the 28 September 2009 massacre.²²

B. ETHNICITY, A POTENT POLITICAL INFLUENCE

The idea that politics is a battle between ethnic groups (and that it is therefore in everyone’s interest to line up with their own ethnic group) is a major influence on how Guineans conduct themselves. And this sometimes resulted in violence during the electoral process. However, the existence of strong mechanisms to restrain inter-communal conflict meant that the death toll during the election period was not as high, for example, as during the bloody repres-

sion meted out by the security forces in 2007 and 2009.²³ However, ethnicity is a potent influence, which has surprised observers of trade union and civil society mobilisations against Lansana Conté in recent years, when ethnicity appeared to play a limited role.²⁴ Conté’s death in 2008 opened the door to genuinely competitive elections and brought ethnicity to the fore as an issue.²⁵

1. Ethnicity as a political idea in post-colonial Guinea

Ethnicity’s role in Guinean political history is itself a strategic issue. In every community, you can find people who will tell you they have been discriminated against and who look for and find evidence of this throughout their country’s history.²⁶ The long-standing idea that Guinea is organised on the basis of four ethno-geographic blocs is in the process of becoming more generally accepted and has become an important way of interpreting politics²⁷: the Soussou and associated groups on the coastal plain; the Peul in the Fouta Djallon mountains; the Malinké in the eastern savannah; the Forestiers in the forests of the southeast. On this four-squared chequerboard, cultural differences seem to be validated by nature and geography. Historians and ethnologists may say this picture is more complex, and refer to the vagueness of these “frontiers”, the way people work in the same way, the way they move about the coun-

rant le processus électoral guinéen de 2010”, Open Society Initiative for West Africa, July 2011.

¹⁸ On FOSSEPEL abuses, see *ibid*.

¹⁹ In at least some cases, FOSSEPEL used firearms only because it was not equipped with non-lethal arms. Crisis Group interviews, diplomats, Conakry, April and May 2011.

²⁰ Crisis Group interviews, UFDG militants, Conakry, April 2011.

²¹ Peuls often have a good level of education and some officers, including senior officers, are Peuls.

²² Although Guineans from all communities were present and affected by the 28 September massacre, Peul civilians were targeted because of their ethnicity. See “Bloody Monday. The 28 September Massacre and Rapes by Security Forces in Guinea”, Human Rights Watch, December 2009, p. 58, 72 and 94; and “Report of the United Nations Commission of Inquiry Mandated to Establish the Facts and Circumstances of the Events of 28 September 2009 in Guinea”, United Nations, International Commission of Inquiry on Guinea, undated, p. 26.

²³ Crisis Group Africa Report N°121, *Guinea: Change or Chaos*, 14 February 2007.

²⁴ Although ethnicity often played a role in the various social movements, the coalitions that mobilised were genuinely trans-ethnic.

²⁵ Ethnicity was of course used by the authoritarian regimes of Lansana Conté and his predecessor Sékou Touré. See Bernard Charles, “Les désespérances de l’indépendance: l’unité nationale”, in Odile Goerg, Céline Pauthier and Abdoulaye Diallo (eds.), *Le NON de la Guinée (1958). Entre mythe, relecture historique et résonances contemporaines* (Paris, L’Harmattan, 2010). However, in Africa and elsewhere, because elections bring to the fore issues of identity, citizenship and rights and offer the opportunity for a head count, they are often the occasion for community mobilisation and some politicians base their campaigns on ethnic issues. See for example Jean-François Bayart, Peter Geschiere and Francis Nyamnjoh, “Autochtonie, démocratie et citoyenneté en Afrique”, *Critique internationale*, no. 10, 2001, pp. 177-194.

²⁶ Non-partisan interpretations are rare. However, see “Report of the Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide on his Mission to Guinea from 7 to 22 March 2010”, United Nations, Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide, undated.

²⁷ On the history of this quadripartition, see Odile Goerg, “Couper la Guinée en quatre ou comment la colonisation a imaginé l’Afrique”, *Vingtième Siècle, Revue d’histoire*, no. 3, 2011, pp. 73-88.

try, the alliances, the inter-ethnicity and the multilingualism,²⁸ but this quadripartite representation dominates.

A whole series of structures, which Guineans often use the word “coordination” to describe, plays a special role. Banned under Sékou Touré, these associations, which bring together Guineans by location, ethnic group and region, grew quickly in the 1980s, especially in Conakry. They aim to offer a forum for people to socialise, help the development of their homeland and defend the interests of the communities that they represent, but sometimes also the interests of certain members of these communities who know how to mobilise them and obtain their support when dealing with the authorities.²⁹ Over time, they have become battlegrounds where politicians compete to have their contribution to communities recognised and are sometimes moulded into genuine political forces, sometimes becoming the focus of electoral slogans and at other times working with other coordinations in an effort to calm tensions.

One of the main ethnic controversies is of course access to political power. Many Guineans and external observers say that an ethnic group is in power when one of its members is president, as if everything depends on this. The Malinké can say they lost power when Sékou Touré died in 1984; the Soussou can claim to have lost it on the death of his successor, Lansana Conté in December 2008; the Forestiers can assert they were in power for one year only, until the fall of captain Moussa Dadis Camara in December 2009. As for the Peul, they can complain they have never been in power.

Each of these versions of Guinea’s history highlight certain events that allegedly illustrate the oppression suffered: Peul plots under Sékou Touré, Lansana Conté’s purge of Malinké officers, the ravages of the “border war” at the beginning of the 2000s in the Forêt and the killing of Forestier militants at Cosa.³⁰ Historically unequal access to education, employment in the public sector and commerce are also interpreted as symptoms of ethnic exclusion. For historical reasons, the Peul have a strong presence at every

level of commerce throughout the country.³¹ This causes particular resentment. Everyone can, if they want to, tell a story of marginalisation and discrimination to justify their demands and everyone can denounce the ethnic-based ideas of other groups, demand justice and try to mobilise their electorate.

2. Ethnicity in the 2010 presidential election

The electoral importance of the ethnic (or “regional” as the European Union tactfully puts it³²) variable was clear from the first round of the presidential election. Most candidates drew their votes from very localised places in their home area and found it difficult to mobilise voters elsewhere. There were of course “mixed” areas, where several communities were well represented, not least Conakry.

Cellou Dalein Diallo, a Peul, obtained more than 80 per cent of his votes from several prefectures in the Labé and Mamou regions in the Fouta Djallon, mainly populated by Peul. These two regions accounted for 400,000 of the million votes he received. Alpha Condé, a Malinké, received 72 per cent of his votes in Kankan region and 44 per cent in Faranah region. He received 240,000 of his 550,000 votes in Haute Guinée. Sidya Touré, in third place, received a few more than 300,000 of his 417,000 votes in Basse Guinée (including Conakry).³³ The ethno-regional concentration is even clearer in the case of the

²⁸ For example, see Véronique André and Gilles Pestaña, “Les visages du Fouta-Djallon, des campagnes en mutation: des représentations au terrain”, *Les Cahiers d’Outre-Mer*, no. 217, 2002, pp. 63-88.

²⁹ Some Guinean media commented on the case of the Malinké, Moussa Keita, outgoing director of the Société des télécommunications de Guinée, who is alleged to have successfully mobilised the Haute Guinée coordination to keep his job after the change in government, in preference to Morlaye Youla, from Basse Côte and backed by the minister of telecommunications. “Partage du ‘gâteau post électoral’: le président Alpha Condé pris en sandwich”, *guineenews.org*, 19 March 2011.

³⁰ See Crisis Group Africa Report N°74, *Guinea: Uncertainties at the End of an Era*, 19 December 2003, p. 18.

³¹ In pre-colonial times, long-distance trading networks were mainly controlled by the Malinké (and one became Malinké simply by joining these networks, which covered the former Mali empire). The Peul began to have a presence in commerce towards the end of the colonial period. Under Sékou Touré, when private commerce was banned and the Malinké elite joined the civil service in massive numbers, many Peul emigrated to other West and Central African countries, Europe and North America. After economic liberalisation under Conté, the Peul were numerous among the small minority of Guineans who had the capital and international networks required to invest. See Agnès Lambert, “Les hommes d’affaires guinéens”, *Cahiers d’études africaines*, vol. 31, no. 4, 1991, pp. 487-508; and Amadou Oury Bah, Binta Keita and Benoît Lootvoet, “Les Guinéens de l’extérieur: rentrer au pays?”, *Politique africaine*, no. 36, 1989, pp. 22-37.

³² “Election présidentielle de 2010. Rapport final”, European Union, op. cit., p. 52.

³³ Touré is not a Soussou, the main group in Basse Guinée. He is from the Diakhanké ethnic group. He was certainly one of the candidates least clearly identified with any of the four communities. His 300,000 votes in Basse Guinée and Conakry only came from people born in these areas but owed more to the fact that he was an efficient prime minister in 1996-1999. The coastal towns particularly appreciated his capacity to ensure electricity supply.

other candidates, who received most of their votes from particular prefectures.³⁴

Ethnic tension increased significantly during the second round. The two remaining candidates, the Malinké Alpha Condé and the Peul Cellou Dalein Diallo, represented the country's two main ethnic groups. Although both candidates mobilised support from their ethnic group, this was particularly true of the former Prime Minister Cellou Dalein Diallo, who, unlike his opponent, was unable to reap the rewards of a long history in opposition. More than Condé, Diallo identified and allowed himself to be identified with his ethnic group. Their economic power, demographic weight³⁵ and alleged hegemonic pretensions were used by their opponents as arguments with which to mobilise their own communities.

This mobilisation on behalf of the Peul has a recent history. At least as much as the memory of the repression suffered under Sékou Touré, what fuelled the development of a Peul discourse was the Lansana Conté regime's growing reliance, during the final years of his regime, on a network centred on Basse Côte, in which the Diakhanké businessman Mamadou Sylla played a major role and competed against Peul traders. A certain number of powerful Peul traders lined up behind Cellou Dalein Diallo, who had lost his job as prime minister in 2006 to another associate of Conté, the Soussou, Fodé Bangoura. UFDG activists willingly and proudly describe the building of this coalition between Conakry and Dakar, with the financial support of the Peul commercial elite.³⁶ It was the latter that, rather late in the day, imposed Cellou Dalein Diallo, a reassuring and familiar technocrat, from among the crowd of Peul politicians and intellectuals who were in a position to represent their community and who entrusted him with leadership of the UFDG, the party of the famous Peul opposition figure, Mamadou Bah.

Cellou Dalein Diallo and the Peul militants that supported him did not behave any differently from most of the other political actors. They focused on their own community, for example, helping their electorate to register in the context of INEC's poor organisation.³⁷ They drew on the resources and support of the Peul community throughout the country. Their opponents had a field day denouncing the presumed arrogance and wealth of the Peul (as though all Peuls were rich traders) and their "ethnocentrism" in order to mobilise among other communities. It was in this way that Condé was able to bring together the Malinké vote, scattered in the first round, and align all the Malinké candidates behind him in the second round. That was also how he was able to rally to his side many other candidates representing the country's other communities, and make some headway in their regions. The transfer of votes to Condé did not however function so well in Basse Guinée and Guinée Forestière, which shows that the Peul question was not such a powerful mobilising force as all that.³⁸

Other factors and values influence how Guineans make their political choices: the association of candidates with past regimes, the results obtained by candidates in government, their reputation for honesty, their level of education, technical competence, international contacts and personal wealth.³⁹ However, there is no doubt that ethnicity is one of the most important of all these factors. Although they may claim they want to represent and defend all Guineans, the politicians themselves make the ethno-regional variable a central focus in their calculations.⁴⁰ Ethnicity does not exclude inter-ethnic alliances. On the contrary, it structures and authorises it. The most striking example was Alpha Condé, a Malinké, who, during his campaign in Basse Côte, used the fact that his mother was of Soussou origin and that he himself could speak the language.

It nonetheless remains true that ethnic tension escalated as the campaign for the presidential election went on. Many Peul felt stigmatised and grew closer to the UFDG. On the other hand, the "ghost town"⁴¹ demonstrations and moped processions organised by the UFDG and supported

³⁴ Jean-Marc Telliano received 34,000 of his 51,000 votes in the Guékédou district, where he was born; Papa Koly Kourouma received 40,000 of his 130,000 votes in N'Zérékoré district; and Ibrahima Abé Sylla received 40,000 of his 90,000 votes in Kindia district. We have used here the first round's provisional results, available on the INEC website. The definitive results for each district were never published.

³⁵ The only census to include ethnic data took place in 1954-1955. It provides the following data: Malinké and related, 30-34 per cent; Foulah (Peul) and related, 29-30 per cent; Soussou and related, 17-18 per cent; Forestiers, 17-18 per cent. See Bernard Charles, "Les désespérances de l'indépendance: l'unité nationale", art. cit., p. 147, note 47.

³⁶ Crisis Group interviews, Conakry and Labé, April 2011. Alpha Condé received financial support from Malinké and Lebanese businessmen and contributions from the barons of previous regimes who supported him. Crisis Group interviews, Conakry, April and May 2011.

³⁷ Crisis Group interviews, Labé, April 2011.

³⁸ For example, "Election présidentielle de 2010. Rapport final", European Union, op. cit.

³⁹ This last factor is singularly ambivalent: some Guineans argue that a rich man will have no need to pillage or say that his wealth shows how clever he is. Others see it as a sign of dishonesty and cupidity. Crisis Group interviews, Conakry, April and May 2011.

⁴⁰ Crisis Group interviews, Conakry, Labé and Kissidougou, April 2011.

⁴¹ UFDG supporters sometimes called for shops to be closed during meetings and demonstrations.

by many Peul shopkeepers, raised concerns and provoked irritation among the non-Peul sectors of the population.⁴²

The tension mounted and in an incident that has yet to be clarified,⁴³ a rumour circulated saying some Alpha Condé supporters had been poisoned. About a hundred people attending a meeting on 22 October 2010 in Conakry were hospitalised after drinking water. Nobody died. Some of Condé's supporters accused Peul street sellers and denounced "crimes against humanity" aimed at "massive elimination".⁴⁴ In several places in Haute Guinée, including Siguiri, Kankan, Kissidougou and N'Zérékoré, Peul were attacked and several were killed.⁴⁵

The failure of the transition authorities to react to the rumour and the security forces' alleged failure to respond to the ensuing incidents further fuelled the frustration and suspicion felt by the Peul community. Several hundred Peul fled, seeking refuge in the Fouta Djallon, where their arrival caused quite a stir. Condé supporters were attacked in some of Fouta's towns, but mediation efforts by administrative, political and traditional authorities and intervention by the security forces contained the incidents – there were apparently no deaths.

Violence made a spectacular return on 15 November, when the provisional results for the second round were announced. UFDG supporters demonstrated in Conakry and Fouta, expressing their anger at those who they believed responsible for stealing victory from them.⁴⁶ These demonstrations were met by severe repression and at least a dozen people were apparently killed, some of them shot at point-blank range by members of the security forces, and there were also several cases of rape.⁴⁷ Under strong international pressure and in order to avoid the situation getting out of control with unforeseeable consequences, Cellou Dalein Diallo finally recognised Alpha Condé's victory when the definitive results were announced on 3 December 2010.

There were fewer deaths in the long electoral process than during the 28 September 2009 massacre. A recent summary put the number at eighteen, including four in a road accident that was partly election-related.⁴⁸ The great majority of people killed were victims of the security forces and not inter-ethnic violence. Although some local inter-ethnic conflicts can indeed be bloody,⁴⁹ the overwhelming majority of Guineans did not seem ready to kill or to die in response to ethnic demands.

Moreover, ethnic violence was often organised from above, through party activists and was often resisted by inter-ethnic links at the grassroots. In the few places affected by violence, many witnesses say that the Peul protected their Malinké friends and vice versa. Local and traditional authorities intervened to dissipate tensions and called for their communities to respect "their foreigners".⁵⁰ As Francis Deng, the United Nations Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide noted in a report before the elections, Guinea is still a long way from witnessing genocide.⁵¹

⁴² Crisis Group interviews, Conakry and Kissidougou, April 2011.

⁴³ For more on all these incidents, see "Rapport d'enquête...", Open Society Initiative for West Africa, op. cit.

⁴⁴ "Crimes contre l'humanité à Conakry. Des centaines de militants de l'Alliance arc-en-ciel empoisonnés", *echosdeguinee.com*, 23 October 2010. This article, written in an incredibly violent style and signed by an anonymous "Redeemer", still appeared on many Guinean websites, including the official website of Alpha Condé's RPG (<http://rpg-guinee.com/>) in July 2011.

⁴⁵ "Rapport d'enquête ...", Open Society Initiative for West Africa, op. cit.

⁴⁶ Crisis Group, *Conflict Risk Alert: Guinea*, 18 November 2010.

⁴⁷ "Guinea: Witnesses Describe Security Force Excesses", Human Rights Watch, 29 November 2010; "Climat tendu en Guinée où l'état d'urgence a été décrété", *rfi.fr*, 18 November 2010.

⁴⁸ On the number of deaths and what followed, see "Rapport d'enquête...", Open Society Initiative for West Africa, op. cit.

⁴⁹ At the beginning of May 2011, a conflict between Malinké and Kpellé caused 25 deaths in the village of Galakpaye, in Guinée Forestière. See "Guinée: au moins 25 morts dans des violences inter-communautaires", Agence France-Presse, 6 May 2011.

⁵⁰ Crisis Group interviews, members of NGOs and peace committees, Conakry, Labé, Mamou, Kissidougou, April 2011.

⁵¹ See "Report of the Special Adviser ...", United Nations, Office of the Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide, op. cit.

III. TAKING POLITICS AND THE MILITARY IN HAND

Once in power, Alpha Condé proceeded with the utmost caution. When forming his government and organising his presidential cabinet, he appointed a wide range of personalities, a few RPG militants and technocrats and a vast group of political allies, supporters and leading figures, including some from previous governments with a doubtful reputation. The appointment of this very political group provoked controversy. President Condé adopted a strategy of close control over the Army, sidelining the main allies of General Konaté. By doing so, he fuelled suspicions that he was acting on ethnic grounds. This was clearly one of the main factors in the attempted assassination of 19 July 2011. The sequence of events and the result seem however to indicate that Condé has for the moment control over the military.

A. THE POLITICAL PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN THE “CHANGE”: A HETEROGENEOUS GROUP

On 11 October 2010, during the long period between the two rounds of the presidential election, the two candidates agreed on the need to form a government of national unity after the election. President Condé raised the idea again after his victory but Cellou Dalein Diallo said on 14 December that he preferred to stay in opposition. He later explained that President Condé had proposed nothing precise and that, in any case, he did not want to work “with those who instigated the violence that took place between the two rounds and that tried to exclude one community”.⁵² On 24 December, President Condé appointed Mohamed Saïd Fofana as head of the government. A little-known technocrat, Fofana is a Soussou, and was apparently appointed on the basis of commitments made by Condé to the Soussou coordination and because of his links with Kassory Fofana, Soussou political leader and head of Guinea For All (Guinea pour tous, GPT), part of the Rainbow Alliance (Alliance Arc-en-Ciel) that supported Alpha Condé in the election.⁵³

The government, named in three separate announcements between 28 December and 4 January, is overstaffed. This reflects the president’s efforts to reward and consolidate his coalition, especially in the context of the forthcoming legislative elections. Fofana therefore has 37 ministers and several other individuals have ministerial rank in the

presidential cabinet. In recognition of the need for ethno-regional balance, President Condé, a Malinké from Haute Guinée and his prime minister, a Soussou from Basse Guinée, are flanked by two ministers of state from the two other main ethnic groups,⁵⁴ Papa Koly Kourouma, from Guinée Forestière and close to Moussa Dadis Camara, and Ousmane Bah, one of the few Peul politicians to rally to Condé between the two rounds.⁵⁵ Bah and Kourouma control, at least theoretically, important and well-resourced ministries, namely Energy and Environment for Kourouma, and Public Works and Transport for Bah.⁵⁶

The government includes representatives from other parties in the Rainbow Alliance, including Jean-Marc Telli-ano of the Rally for the Integrated Development of Guinea (Rassemblement pour le développement intégré de la Guinée, RDIG), Ramatoulaye Bah, wife of Alpha Ibrahima Sila Bah, president of the Guinean Party for Rebirth and Progress (Parti guinéen pour la renaissance et le progrès, PGRP), and Souleymane Cissé, planning minister and associate of Lansana Kouyaté, leader of the Party for Hope for National Development (Parti de l’espoir pour le développement national, PEDN) and Mohamed Dorval Doumbouya, minister of trade, and associate of Mamadou Sylla, leader of the Democratic Union of Guinea (Union démocratique de Guinée, UDG).

The government also includes three generals who were members of the junta,⁵⁷ several representatives of the trade unions and the Forces Vives, including some members of the transition government, a number of technocrats, some of them long-time associates of President Condé (particularly Alhassane Condé, who was given the sensitive portfolio of Territorial Administration and Decentralisation, MTAD) and some members of the Conté and Dadis governments, considered to be vote-bearers, such as Moussa Condé and Moustapha Koutoubou Sanoh. The presidential

⁵⁴Two members of the presidential cabinet, François Loncény Fall and Mohamed Diané, have minister of state rank. General Mamadouba Toto Camara, one of the army’s eminent representatives in the government, and who has the Security portfolio, demanded, and obtained, the rank of minister of state.

⁵⁵Ousmane Bah, heir apparent of the great Peul opposition leader Siradio Diallo, joined Alpha Condé after having been replaced at the last minute as political representative of the Peul community by Cellou Dalein Diallo.

⁵⁶However, it is no coincidence that they are among the few ministers to be flanked by vice ministers, respectively Saran Mady Touré, formerly with the United Nations Development Programme, as minister with special responsibility for the Environment, and Tidiane Traoré, RPG secretary for social affairs, minister with special responsibility for transport.

⁵⁷General Mathurin Bangoura is minister of urbanisation, housing and construction, General Mamadou Korka Diallo is minister of farming and General Mamadouba Toto Camara is minister of state, with special responsibility for security and civil defence.

⁵²“Cellou Dalein Diallo: ‘Pourquoi je ne travaillerai pas avec Alpha Condé’”, *jeuneafrique.com*, 1 January 2011.

⁵³Crisis Group email correspondence, Guinean political journalist, July 2011.

party, the RPG, only has a few ministers, but these include the Ministry of Youth (Sanoussy Sow) and Women's Promotion (Mme Nanténin Chérif Konaté), two important ministries because of their capacity to mobilise networks of activists.⁵⁸ The group is heterogeneous but firmly controlled through the Ministry of the Economy and Finances, which has a very strict budgetary policy, so much so that some ministries have complained.⁵⁹

At the side of the government is a powerful presidential cabinet, with a large group of often very political advisers. In addition to some of his comrades in arms, such as Mohamed Diané, RPG administrative secretary, who became director of the cabinet, and allies gathered during the course of the electoral campaign, such as the former prime minister, François Loncény Fall, general secretary of the presidential cabinet, Kiridi Bangoura, assistant campaign director, now head of cabinet, and Ousmane Kaba and Fodé Idrissa Touré "Briki Momo", two defectors from the UFR, Alpha Condé has assembled a group of politicians many of whom were associated with the Lansana Conté and Captain Dadis Camara governments, such as Alpha Ibrahima Keira, Fodé Bangoura, Ahmed Tidiane Souaré, Fodé Soumah and Ahmed Kanté. The presence of these politicians, at least some of whom have been implicated in the misappropriation of funds and political manipulation, around the "president for change", has aroused controversy and concern.⁶⁰

Defenders of the government justify these doubtful appointments by arguing that it is necessary to learn from mistakes, that the president needs to keep these people under his thumb (and out of the government itself) and that he needs to focus on the legislative elections and cannot do without these people, who are often "spokespersons" for their communities.⁶¹ Although the president has stressed that he will not protect any advisers or ministers who are found to have committed irregularities, many see these appointments as a worrying sign.

B. IS THE ARMY UNDER CONTROL?

Condé logically acted very quickly in the military field. Although he has not reorganised the army through and through, he has sought to create his own intermediaries

and to counterbalance General Sékouba Konaté's influence. On 19 July 2011, a small group of soldiers attacked the president's private residence. He was present at the time. The attackers were repelled after fighting that officially left one dead and several wounded among the presidential guard. Several dozen military personnel and some civilians were later arrested and, on 6 August, 37 individuals (including four civilians) were referred to the courts.⁶² A lot is not yet known about this incident, especially with regard to the wider ramifications. Although the incident indicated the existence of dissatisfaction within the armed forces, its failure showed that, for the moment at least, President Condé has succeeded in keeping most of the army on his side.

Soon after Alpha Condé took office, tension very quickly reached breaking point with the chief of staff, major-general Nouhou Thiam, an associate of Konaté.⁶³ On 27 December 2010, General Thiam was replaced by Kéléfa Diallo, who was promoted to general. Thiam immediately adopted a defiant attitude to the government and, on 21 January, just before Alpha Condé's first trip abroad, he was detained for a few days because of his appeals for disobedience and revolt.⁶⁴ He was one of the first to be arrested after the 19 July affair. In another sign of prudence, President Condé disbanded Konaté's U.S.-trained presidential security unit and recruited several dozen men to attend training in Burkina Faso.⁶⁵

An indication of the importance of the military question, President Condé took charge of the defence portfolio, assisted by a vice minister, the lawyer Abdoul Kabélé Camara, former ministerial adviser to the cabinet of General Konaté. He created a Higher Council for the Armed Forces

⁵⁸ Nanténin Chérif, historic RPG militant, who is minister for women's promotion, social affairs and children, has a vice minister, Djaka Diakité, also from the RPG.

⁵⁹ Kourouma recently complained that the tap of public finances was turned off. See "Pénurie d'électricité à Conakry: le ministre Papa Koly Kourouma veut des 'actes concrets'", *africaguinee.com*, 29 June 2011.

⁶⁰ See for instance Crisis Group Africa Report, *Guinea: Change or Chaos*, op. cit., p. 5.

⁶¹ Crisis Group interviews, associates of the presidential cabinet and Rainbow Alliance militants, Conakry, April and May 2011.

⁶² Only one person was added to the list of those charged, a Colonel David Sylla, imprisoned since November 2010 for his part in another affair but yet to be charged. Some sources state that the questioning by the gendarmerie on 19 September 2011 of the businessman Kerfalla Person Camara "KPC", president director general of the public works company Guicopres and close to the military junta, was related to his suspected involvement in the 19 July attack. "Kerfalla Camara KPC interpellé au PM3", *guineenews.org*, 19 September 2011.

⁶³ Perhaps at the request of Sékouba Konaté, General Thiam took it upon himself to protect Tibou Kamara, the general secretary of the presidential cabinet, disliked by the new government and implicitly threatened with sanctions, until he left the country.

⁶⁴ He was released on 2 February, after a meeting between President Condé and General Konaté in Addis-Ababa. Associates of Thiam in the army have apparently been dispersed to garrisons across the country. "Le général Nouhou Thiam enfin libre", *koaci.com*, 4 February 2011.

⁶⁵ Crisis Group interview, Conakry, April 2011; and Crisis Group email correspondence, July 2011.

es, chaired by himself. He appointed as chief of staff, General Boureima Condé, who has a good knowledge of the very sensitive region of N'Zérékoré, home of Captain Moussa Dadis Camara, where he was prefect and then governor. To lead his cabinet at the Ministry of Defence, he appointed General Aboubacar "Idi Amin" Sidiki Camara, a well-educated gendarmerie officer, famous for his rows with Dadis Camara and who was in the group of reformers mobilised by Sékouba Konaté to bring the army back into line, before he fell out with Konaté.⁶⁶ Quite quickly, almost all the military governors and prefects appointed by the junta, several of whom had rather questionable styles of government, were dismissed.⁶⁷ There were only a few exceptions, notably in Conakry, where the battalion commander, the publicity-conscious Sékou Resco Camara, remained in post.

The fact that many of the men promoted by Condé in the army are Malinké like himself, with the notable exception of the chief of staff,⁶⁸ has raised questions. Some observers say that the president has also prioritised the recruitment of Malinké for the presidential guard.⁶⁹ In April 2011, a pamphlet circulated in the Conakry barracks, denouncing the growing control exercised by the Malinké in the mili-

tary hierarchy,⁷⁰ and this resentment might have played a role in the attempt to assassinate Condé on 19 July.

Although he sought and promoted allies in the armed forces, President Condé gave guarantees to the military, with whom he felt it was necessary, in his own words, to "take it easy".⁷¹ Three members of the junta remained ministers in the new government and the president confirmed the main chiefs of staff in their posts. On the other hand, he renewed the lower ranks commanding operational units.⁷² Condé respected the status quo constructed by Konaté with regard to lieutenant-colonel Claude Pivi "Coplan", a Forestier who, according to the United Nations Commission of Inquiry, might have been "criminally responsible" for the 28 September 2009 massacre and the aftermath,⁷³ leaving him as head of presidential security. However, he overturned Konaté's decision when he put Colonel Moussa Tiegboro Camara back in charge of the special services and the battle against drugs and organised crime. The colonel was implicated by the United Nations Commission of Inquiry.⁷⁴ While Pivi conducts himself discreetly, Camara is at the forefront of the scene. His men are the armed wing of the new government's control policies and they clearly exceed their official mandate.⁷⁵

Between January and March 2011, Condé also released about 30 military associates of Dadis Camara, arrested in March 2010 by Sékouba Konaté for an attempted coup and detained without trial.⁷⁶ More generally, the president looked after the interests of the troops. In February 2011, he made good on Konaté's promise to increase wages by

⁶⁶ Camara was dismissed by Konaté just before the second round of the presidential election. In the light of his later appointment, this could have been because he was getting closer to Alpha Condé. See "Les dessous du limogeage du chef d'état-major général adjoint de l'Armée, le général de brigade Aboubacar Sidiki Camara, alias 'Idi Amin'", guinea-forum.org, 29 November 2010.

⁶⁷ Symptomatic of the partial "privatisation" of the Guinean state, two of the outgoing military prefects refused to hand over equipment ranging from vehicles to mattresses to their civilian successors. See "Les déboires du nouveau préfet de Kouroussa: M. Douty Oularé", aujourd'hui-en-guinee.com, 18 April 2011; and "Gaoual: 'je ne voudrais pas commencer l'exercice de ma fonction par le paiement d'une dépense injustifiée', dicit le nouveau préfet", leverificateur.com, 31 March 2011.

⁶⁸ Some critics put this exception into perspective: General Diallo is a Malinké-ised Peul from Wassoulou and speaks two languages. A source close to the army believes he has connections with Malinké officers. Crisis Group email correspondence, June 2011. UFDG supporters point out that Diallo was commander of the Kankan military region during the electoral period, where many of the attacks against Peuls took place. Crisis Group interviews, Conakry, April 2011.

⁶⁹ Crisis Group interview, Conakry, April 2011; and Crisis Group email correspondence, July 2011. Names provide a rough indication of ethnicity in Guinea, but all the military hurt on the presidential side in the 19 July assassination attempt have typically Malinké names. See "Attaque au domicile du chef de l'Etat: le bilan provisoire de la Présidence", guineelive.com, 19 July 2011.

⁷⁰ Crisis Group interview, Conakry, April 2011.

⁷¹ "Réformes de l'armée: 'Je ne veux pas une confrontation avec les militaires...', assure le président Condé", africaguinee.com, 25 March 2011.

⁷² The president appointed new commanding officers for the artillery and armoured vehicle units and for the infantry battalions at the Camayenne base and army headquarters as well as for the special standing battalion of commandos. The commanding officer of the latter unit announced that he was going to move closer to the capital, from N'Zérékoré to Samoryah, on the outskirts of Conakry. See "Armée guinéenne: le successeur de Sâa Alphonse, le lieutenant-colonel Abdoulaye Keita face à la presse à N'Zérékoré", guineenews.org, 7 March 2011.

⁷³ "Report of the Commission of Inquiry...", United Nations, op. cit., p. 51 and following.

⁷⁴ Ibid, p. 46 and following. Pivi and Camara are among the last to appear on the list of individuals sanctioned by the European Union for their alleged role in the 28 September massacre after it was reviewed on 21 March 2011.

⁷⁵ Camara and his men regularly appear in the media because of their interventions against fuel smuggling, illegal clinics, the illegal occupation of public land and also inter-ethnic violence in rural areas.

⁷⁶ "Guinée: libération du dernier groupe dans l'affaire Kaléa", lejournaguinee.com, 1 March 2011.

50 per cent after the presidential election⁷⁷ and made an effort to improve the living conditions and transport services for soldiers based outside Conakry.⁷⁸

In this way, President Condé was able to consolidate the restoration of control begun by Konaté. Heavy arms and some troops were relocated outside the capital.⁷⁹ The military were banned from wearing their uniform when attending sports and other recreational events, where many abused their position to avoid paying. There were hardly any soldiers carrying weapons in the streets and the many checkpoints where the military extorted money from civilians were removed in towns and along the main roads. However, since 19 July, the security forces are again present throughout the capital and the population is feeling the pressure. The chief of staff could only acknowledge the return of inter-urban checkpoints.⁸⁰

Some steps seem to have been taken in the fight against impunity. Proceedings have been initiated against some military personnel. In May 2011, the Dixinn court issued a warrant for the arrest of Commander Mohamed Nabé, prefect of Fria under the junta, on charges of criminal activities (Nabé was among those questioned and then released after the 19 July assassination attempt), and in June, an army officer was arrested for smuggling cannabis,⁸¹ while others were arrested for their role in the inter-ethnic violence in Galakpaye in May.⁸² It is nevertheless true that the military are still regularly implicated in crimes against civilians, and blunders bear witness to the fact that the military's bad habits have not disappeared.⁸³ Moreover, in recent months, Conakry has suffered many thefts, sometimes violent, involving men equipped with

army weapons and often in military uniform.⁸⁴ Not all the military welcome normalisation.

The events of 19 July 2011 confirmed the existence of malcontents in the armed forces. The fact that it was a commando operation against a single location rather than a coup mobilising whole army units to take control of all strategic sites nevertheless indicates that President Condé has succeeded in keeping the army leadership on his side, at least for the moment. However, some media noted the slow reaction of the armed forces in coming to the aid of the president and his guard. Was this because of organisational problems or a calculated delay aiming to give the conspirators a chance to achieve their goal? In any case, a Colonel Sambahou Diamankan, commander of the Special Battalion in Conakry, at the Alpha Yaya Diallo army base, was among the accused. But he is the only officer with an operational command to have been arrested.⁸⁵

Except for Diamankan, the list of those arrested or accused so far only includes individuals marginalised in the armed forces.⁸⁶ Some of them were sidelined by the new government because they were close to Sékouba Konaté, such as General Nouhou Thiam, his chief of staff, General Bachir Diallo, the director of his cabinet, and Commander Sidiki Camara, his aide-de-camp. Their involvement raised questions, especially as relations between Konaté and President Condé are not very good. The audits conducted by the new government have implicitly questioned Konaté's government⁸⁷ and on at least one occasion, Konaté publicly hinted at his dissatisfaction with the way in which Condé was conducting the rest of the transition.⁸⁸ These questions were raised again when, on 11 September

⁷⁷ The money was apparently taken from the Ministry of Defence's special funds. Crisis Group interview, Conakry, April 2011.

⁷⁸ 50 pick-up trucks, fifteen lorries and 120 motor-bikes were returned to the army in April 2011.

⁷⁹ The commandos trained by Israeli mercenaries and suspected of having been recruited by Dadis Camara on ethnic criteria, had already been redeployed on the borders under Sékouba Konaté, after closure of the Kaléa base. Crisis Group interviews, Conakry and Kissidougou, April 2011.

⁸⁰ "Sécurité: le chef d'état-major général des armées monte au créneau contre les nombreux barrages clandestins...", *africaguinee.com*, 25 August 2011.

⁸¹ "Plus de 20 personnes arrêtées pour trafic de drogue", *Xinhua*, 20 June 2011.

⁸² "Justice: du nouveau dans l'affaire Galakpaye...", *guineenews.org*, 27 June 2011.

⁸³ A man who had leaned against the parked vehicle of the minister of security, General Camara, was beaten up by his bodyguards. See "Guinée: Conakry – La garde du général Toto décharge toute sa puissance sur un jeune", *aminata.com*, 5 February 2011.

⁸⁴ "Insécurité: une famille attaquée à Bambéto par des hommes armés", *africaguinee.com*, 12 April 2011; "Insécurité: deux Européens agressés et dépouillés!", *guineenews.org*, 6 June 2011; "Insécurité: un haut cadre de l'administration assassiné par des hommes en tenue militaire", *guineenews.org*, 15 June 2011; "Insécurité: un Ivoirien agressé par des hommes en armes et sa voiture emportée!", *guineenews.org*, 17 June 2011. On 17 June, the Gendarmerie announced the introduction of hotlines for calls to the Operations Centre of the National Gendarmerie.

⁸⁵ For the names of the accused, see "Attaque contre le président Condé en Guinée: 16 personnes inculpées", *Agence France-Presse*, 2 August 2011; "10 nouveaux assaillants remis à la justice", *aminata.com*, 4 August 2011; "Guinée: poursuite des interpellations à Conakry", *Panafrican News Agency (PANA)*, 6 August 2011.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ See Section IV.B.

⁸⁸ "I would like to be able to say that Guinea enjoys the same serenity and confidence in its future [as Niger]". Speech by General Sékouba Konaté, high representative of the African Union for the Operationalisation of the African Standby Force, responsible for planning and the strategic management of peacekeeping operations, at a conference of defence and security forces in Niger, Niamey, 29 March 2011.

2011, President Condé brought in for questioning Tibou Kamara, secretary general of the presidential cabinet under Konaté.⁸⁹

However, Konaté, who now has a senior post in the African Union, clearly condemned the 19 July attack, not without taking the chance to reiterate his dissatisfaction with the Condé presidential cabinet.⁹⁰ The list of accused also included officers close to the Conté and Moussa Dadis Camara governments.⁹¹ Camara also expressed his disapproval of the attempted assassination of Alpha Condé.⁹²

The more directly political aspects of the 19 July attack remain obscure.⁹³ Immediately after the event, President Condé alluded to its “communal” dimension.⁹⁴ Searches targeted senior UFDG figures and some of their associates (including Cellou Dalein Diallo’s son-in-law) were questioned. The energetic vice-president of the UFDG, Oury Bah, disappeared for two weeks before announcing from an unknown location that he had fled the country for his own safety.⁹⁵ Although the names of those arrested seem to indicate a range of ethno-regional origin, many Peul are on the list.

Some sources talk of two different attacks on 19 July, organised by two different networks, one comprising a small group of officers and civilians led by Alpha Oumar “Boffa” Diallo (nicknamed AOB) and at least partly inspired by an “extremist Peul” vision and another mobilised around Sidiki Camara’s soldiers from Sékouba Konaté’s

entourage.⁹⁶ Whatever the truth may be, and although one cannot exclude individual initiatives by some of its more radical supporters, it seems difficult to imagine the UFDG was involved, given it is a political party that draws some of its strength from its legalism and which has an electoral base made up of a community which has notoriously bad relations with the army.⁹⁷ Perhaps the government had ulterior motives when it emphasised the political and communal dimension of the affair.

On 11 September, President Condé openly accused Oury Bah and other UFDG figures⁹⁸ of having worked with Tibou Kamara from Dakar, the Senegalese capital, to organise the 19 July attack. Condé took care to stress that he “never mentioned Cellou Dalein”.⁹⁹ This intervention, which was accompanied by a not very diplomatic questioning of the Senegalese and Gambian authorities, who stood accused of at least doing nothing to stop the attack,¹⁰⁰ was surprising: by implicating leaders of the UFDG, the main opposition party, in this way, before any proceedings have been taken against them, and at a time when political dialogue seems at last to be opening up, President Condé was exacerbating tensions and promoting rumours that will be difficult to contain. Either the authorities have evidence against the persons mentioned and judicial proceedings should be taken against them or their evidence is slim and it would be more responsible of them to keep quiet.

Several questions remain unanswered: was it simply one or two networks of dissatisfied and marginalised officers who wanted to return to their commands? Were they trying to defend the broader interests of an army that felt threatened by the return to order and the prospects of reform? Were they trying to go beyond the legalism of the opposition, judged too timid by some? Did they see themselves as the heirs to Sékouba Konaté’s transition programme, which they felt had been betrayed by President

⁸⁹ Just like the questioning, shortly afterwards, of the businessman Kerfalla Person Camara, also known for his closeness to Konaté. See fn. 62.

⁹⁰ “Attaque contre le président Condé: ‘J’avais recommandé au Pr Alpha Condé d’approfondir les réformes de l’armée ...’, réagit le Général Sékouba Konaté”, *africaguinee.com*, 20 July 2011.

⁹¹ David Sylla, Issiagha Camara and Alpha Oumar “Boffa” Diallo were associates of President Lansana Conté and all three were arrested by the junta – Camara on suspicion of drugs trafficking. Chérif Diaby and Mamadou Bondabon Camara were more associated with Dadis Camara.

⁹² “Capitaine Moussa Dadis Camara se fait voix”, *guineelive.com*, 21 July 2011.

⁹³ Some claim that the attack was a fake organised by the government, like those organised by Sékou Touré to get rid of his enemies. This seems unlikely but illustrates the prevalence of mistrust in Guinean political life.

⁹⁴ He told Radio France Internationale: “the people arrested belong to a certain community”, without elaborating. See “Alpha Condé sur RFI: ‘Ce n’était pas un coup d’Etat mais une tentative d’assassinat’”, *rfi.fr*, 19 July 2011.

⁹⁵ “Bah Oury, opposant guinéen, vice-président de l’UFDG”, *rfi.fr*, 3 August 2011. Bah was seen in New York on 16 September. “VP of Guinean Opposition Party, UFDG, Bah Oury, in New York”, *guineaoye.wordpress.com*, 17 September 2011.

⁹⁶ Crisis Group interview, Dakar, September 2011. Although it is possible that two different networks existed, they could have been connected – Alpha Oumar Diallo was General Nouhou Thiam’s aide-de-camp during the Konaté presidential cabinet.

⁹⁷ Crisis Group email correspondence and telephone calls, July 2011. However, some Guinean businessmen (including Peul) are implicated in various sub-regional trafficking operations (especially of cigarettes) in the course of which they have made strong links with some sectors of the defence and security forces. Crisis Group interview, expert on transnational crime, Dakar, April 2011.

⁹⁸ Including the businessman Amadou Oury “Sadaka” Diallo, thought to have made financial contributions to the UFDG.

⁹⁹ For a transcription of the interview, see “L’intégralité de l’interview d’Alpha Condé dans laquelle il accuse le Sénégal et la Gambie de complicité dans l’attaque contre lui”, *guinee58.com*, 12 September 2011.

¹⁰⁰ Tibou Kamara is the brother-in-law of the Gambian President Yahya Jammeh.

Condé's policies and the rise of a pro-Condé clique of Malinké officers? Were UFDG members involved? If so, at what level? Will the government now target its political opponents in order to increase ethnic tension and strip the "Peul camp" of its credibility?

In any case, the episode illustrated two things: first, there are indeed malcontents in the Guinean army; second, it did not, as an institution, come out against the president. There is no doubt however that the still fragile legitimacy of the new government and the incompleteness of the transition helped to create the conditions for the 19 July 2011 attack. Finally, although it seems that the repression has resorted to some level of violence,¹⁰¹ we can be grateful that charges were relatively quickly brought against at least some of the suspects, breaking with the national tradition of prolonged arbitrary detentions, sometimes terminating in releases without trial. However, it is regrettable that President Condé made accusations in what was an abnormal intervention in the judicial process. It would be desirable for the courts to quickly take control of the whole issue. It is also necessary to give General Konaté, still very influential in the Guinean army, a chance to confirm he had nothing to do with the attack and that he remains committed to the transition.

IV. THE REFORMS

In his inauguration speech, Alpha Condé forcefully announced: "Guinea is back". Although he was exaggerating when he said he had inherited "a country without a state", he faces enormous challenges. First comes the reform of the security sector, with which the international community indicated its willingness to help after General Konaté came to power. Progress has been slow on this very sensitive issue. President Condé has also shown his willingness to adopt austere economic and financial policies while trying to respond to the population's expectations with regard to their basic needs: food, health, water and electricity. In that, he is no different from many other governments that have run the country since independence, even though the new government really does seem more rigorous than most of its predecessors. It has taken structural measures that might have a major impact if they are not implemented according to criteria that are too political. The new authorities seem to be hesitating about what tools to use to meet "social demands" but the money from mining contracts and support from donors should allow the government to achieve results.

A. REFORM OF THE SECURITY SECTOR – SLOW PROGRESS

There is no need to reiterate the importance and sensitive nature of the armed forces in Guinea-Conakry.¹⁰² Under the military junta led by Moussa Dadis Camara, the army attained new levels of impunity and unprecedented factionalism. The armed forces are over-manned (officially, there are more than 45,000 men in the armed forces and gendarmerie¹⁰³) and living conditions are unsatisfactory for most soldiers despite the budget allocated to this sector.¹⁰⁴ Although he aggravated this trend, increasing ex-

¹⁰¹ Some media announced that one of the suspected military, Alpha Oumar Barry, died in detention. The authorities denied this and Barry remains on the list of those charged. Another alleged conspirator, Sidiki Camara, was photographed at the time of his arrest, with his face bruised. Thierno Madjou Sow, president of the Guinean Human Rights Organisation (Organisation guinéenne de défense des droits de l'homme, OGDH) was apparently "unofficially" informed that suspects were tortured. See "Attaque chez le PRG: Tous les militaires suspects ont été arrêtés sur fond de tortures!", conakryinfos.com, undated.

¹⁰² See Crisis Group Africa Report N°164, *Guinea: Reforming the Army*, 23 September 2010. The question of security sector reform will soon be dealt with in an International Crisis Group report specifically on this issue.

¹⁰³ "Rapport d'évaluation du Secteur de la Sécurité en République de Guinée", Joint Mission of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN) for security sector reform in the Republic of Guinea, May 2010, p. 25. This figure is not the result of a survey, but simply a statement by the armed forces themselves and may not be accurate.

¹⁰⁴ The transition has seen the proportion of its resources consumed by the army increase further. Without reference to a particular year or explanation of the basis for calculations, the idea is circulating that the army consumes 30-35 per cent of the Guinean state budget. See "Country Report Guinea", Economist Intelligence Unit, March 2011, p. 9. According to another source, in 2010, the army cost FG920 billion (about \$180 million at the exchange rate of the first half of 2010), which is 30

penditure and signing doubtful government contracts that were profitable for the army in order to preserve his popularity and keep the peace.¹⁰⁵ General Konaté did however begin to restore a semblance of discipline and prepare reform of the sector with international support. Some members of the army, ashamed of the 28 September 2009 massacre and more generally of the way the institution operated, welcome the return of civilian rule and reform with relief.¹⁰⁶ However, implementation of reforms could cause problems, especially because continuing divisions in the army could stimulate ethno-political tensions.

Condé continued the reform project begun under Konaté. He made contact with international partners and based himself on the assessment prepared by the joint ECOWAS, AU and UN mission, submitted to President Konaté on 4 May 2010 after a series of consultations with army representatives, as well as with the public administration and ordinary citizens across the country.¹⁰⁷ This report was used as a base document at a national seminar attended by security sector actors at the end of March 2011, which prepared a roadmap for reform. A first institutional step was taken on 21 June, with the creation of a national steering committee responsible for reform. Soon after the events of 19 July, the authorities held another meeting and confirmed to donors the army's commitment to reform. A national action plan was then prepared and awaits definitive validation. The government is currently re-evaluating its contract with a South African company for a biometric census of the armed forces.¹⁰⁸

Although the Guinean government is working hard to keep donors on board with the reform project and has asked the United Nations to ensure coordination of inter-

national efforts in this domain,¹⁰⁹ not much progress has been made with planning. The technical monitoring commission and its sub-committees have yet to meet. Progress is very slow and not without pernicious effects,¹¹⁰ as it tries to weave together all the varied and sometimes contradictory perspectives and interests of the donors and the Guinean actors into a coherent whole.

The reform is being managed by part of the general staff, a small elite of well-trained officers, who know they are well-placed to get out while the going is good. But for the moment at least, the privileges of the military have only been brought into question superficially. Although Minister of the Economy and Finances Kerfalla Yansané has publicly noted the exorbitant cost of the subsidised sacks of rice provided to the military,¹¹¹ the armed forces continue to benefit from this and to receive salaries much higher than those of civil servants. The operational budget for the armed forces continues to be completely opaque.¹¹²

Simply reforming the management and getting rid of the "ghost" soldiers, could make it possible to improve conditions for the military without the budget soaring. But what will happen if reform really interferes with the way of life of the military class? Is there not a risk of a division opening up between the reforming elite and a group of soldiers of greater age, or with less education, like those who rose through the ranks thanks to the turmoil of the 2000s? Might the tensions within the army find an echo in the ethnic divisions that run through society and politics? Was the 19 July 2011 attack on the residence of Alpha Condé an indicator of this?

There remains the special case of the 5,600 young soldiers recruited under Dadis Camara.¹¹³ Trained but not statutori-

per cent of the state budget. See Cécile Sow, "Les militaires remis au pas", *Jeune Afrique*, no.2633, 26 June-2 July 2011.

¹⁰⁵ "For example, the 'FAG [Forces Armées Guinéennes] Banquet and Commercial Convention Centre' megaproject in Matoto, which is still at the stage of constructing the foundations; the 112 appartments for customs officers costing €180,000 each; the order for 50,000 medals in one delivery; and the 39,000 military uniforms at €700 each". See "Marchés publics sous Dadis et Konaté: la boîte de Pandore guinéenne", *jeuneafrique.com*, 31 May 2011.

¹⁰⁶ Crisis Group interviews, Guinean military officers and participants in the consultations for security sector reform, Dakar and Conakry, April 2011.

¹⁰⁷ "Rapport d'évaluation du Secteur de la Sécurité en République de Guinée", Joint Mission of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN) for security sector reform in the Republic of Guinea, op. cit.

¹⁰⁸ Crisis Group interview, diplomat involved in security sector reform, Dakar, September 2011.

¹⁰⁹ Crisis Group email correspondence, United Nations diplomat, September 2011.

¹¹⁰ The army presented an inflated number of personnel to the reform programme and it is now recruiting massively in order to reach this number and protect its share of the budget as best it can, a classic tactic in this type of situation. Crisis Group interviews, Conakry, April 2011.

¹¹¹ "Guinée: Armée – Quelle solution pour le riz des militaires?", *aminata.com*, 7 February 2011. The armed forces have the right, depending on their grade, to buy between one and twenty sacks each month, benefitting from a double subsidy: the state foregoes taxes (10,000 Guinean francs, or about \$1 per sack), and the price of a sack is less than half its market value. Those who can buy more than they consume do so for resale, further destabilising the market.

¹¹² Crisis Group interviews, security sector reform actors, Conakry, April and May 2011.

¹¹³ The number was originally 6,000, but 400 were sent home after aptitude tests were conducted under Konaté. Although the group includes many Forestiers, recruitment was not exclusive, and many non-Forestiers obtained places through the influence of their military friends or by buying them from influential

ly integrated into the defence forces, they are stationed at three locations, Kindia, Kankan and Kissidougou, and the army provides them only with accommodation and food. On 7 March 2011, those at Kissidougou protested and demanded registration and a salary. The protest was repressed leaving three dead and others wounded. The base was closed and the apprentice soldiers dispersed. The authorities have since launched a communications campaign to convince the soldiers to return to barracks. The government absolutely must take into account the situation of these young men.

B. GOOD ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE – AN END OR A MEANS?

The new government has been very active in its attempts to promote good economic and financial governance. The government team includes technocrats with a good reputation, many of whom have had experience with major international organisations.¹¹⁴ President Condé has hammered out appeals to both the public and private sector, transnational companies and Guinean entrepreneurs and shopkeepers. The government has taken regulatory action and adopted cash-based accounting (the state can only spend what it has in its accounts) and the single treasury principle (all tax revenue is paid into the Treasury).¹¹⁵ Public expenditure other than spending on operating costs has been almost suspended. This has allowed the minister of the economy and finances to exercise better control, although some ministers have complained.¹¹⁶ The eradication of multiple salaries paid to the same person, fictional

people, including close relatives of Moussa Dadis Camara. One of these young men interviewed by Crisis Group, with a higher education diploma, said he had sold a taxi he had been looking after in order to buy a place in the army. This is revealing about how the army is perceived in Guinea: as one of the few ways left of moving up the socio-economic ladder. Crisis Group interviews, Kissidougou, April 2011.

¹¹⁴ Such as the minister of the economy and finances, Kerfalla Yansané, the minister of audits and economic control, Aboubacar Koulibaly and the vice-governor of the Central Bank, Yéro Baldé.

¹¹⁵ In May, the Conakry Port Authority announced that it had three accounts at the Central Bank and payments should only be paid into these accounts. Many state enterprises and services had previously had accounts at commercial banks, with each manager administering receipts and expenditure with no controls and sometimes for their own personal profit. See “Economie: le PAC sera bientôt opérationnel 24 heures sur 24 et 7 jours sur 7”, Agence guinéenne de presse, 27 May 2011.

¹¹⁶ See fn. 59. Minister Papa Koly Kourouma’s announcement of his decision to tax the production of mineral water sachets and have the proceeds paid into a fund in his ministry could perhaps be interpreted as a reaction to this budgetary austerity. “Hydraulique: vers la taxation des sociétés commercialisant l’eau dans les sachets...”, *tamtamguinee.com*, 3 April 2011.

jobs and absenteeism is under way and attendance by civil servants seems to have improved.¹¹⁷

President Condé has indicated he will question abusive privatisation of public assets, called for improvements in the management of state-owned property and reminded prefects and governors that they have no power over these assets. In May 2011, the government issued a decree providing for the return to state ownership of a number of factories allocated to private individuals who have not respected the terms of the transfer agreement. The government revoked the Jean-Marie Doré transition government’s controversial allocation of land to all its members.¹¹⁸ Some dishonest civil servants have been asked to reimburse misappropriated sums and some have been punished.¹¹⁹

The Ministry of Audits and Economic Control is at the forefront of the fight through two flagship measures. First, it checked dozens of audits carried out by various state agencies over the past ten years, the results of which had never been used. The private persons and legal entities implicated were invited to reimburse misappropriated funds or face legal action. This was followed by an audit of the junta’s public tenders, which revealed the extent of the misappropriation of funds, frauds, overcharging and non-observance of award procedures.¹²⁰ Almost all public works contracts being implemented were suspended for assessment. An audit committee, an independent body but reporting to the presidential cabinet was also created. The Supreme Court’s Chamber of Accounts is to become a fully-fledged Accounts Court and the government relaunched a reform of public procurement procedures. Ministers and their deputies have been banned from participating in “mamayas”, festivities and inaugurations or sporting meetings where politicians are in the habit of displaying their generosity to establish their credibility.

¹¹⁷ Crisis Group observations of various administrative services, April and May 2011.

¹¹⁸ “Le Prof Alpha Condé a repris tous les terrains”, *aminata.com*, 18 March 2011.

¹¹⁹ Eight judges were suspended for two months. “Guinée: Des magistrats, avocats et procureurs ‘punis’ pour corruption !”, *aminata.com*, 15 March 2011.

¹²⁰ The audit examined 82 out of 617 public works contracts concluded in 2009 and 2010 worth a total of €1.5 billion. Only three were put out to tender. All of them were “riddled with irregularities: the use of ‘letters of payment’, ‘payment orders’ and fictitious ‘imprest accounts’; ‘start-up payments’ not followed by execution of the agreed task; construction sites at a standstill; successive contracts for the same operation; double payments; buildings built out of breeze blocks but invoiced as reinforced concrete; vehicles bought at two or three times the catalogue price, etc.”. See “Marchés publics sous Dadis et Konaté: la boîte de Pandore guinéenne”, *jeuneafrique.com*, 31 May 2011.

The desire for regulation and formalisation is so far-reaching that the government is taking action against the illegal occupation of public land and flyposting of billboards and public monuments and buildings. The effects are also being felt in the private sector. The mobile telephone company Orange was fined for not providing services during an accidental interruption of its network.¹²¹

This policy is not only a virtuous exercise. It is a response to donors. International financial institutions said that the introduction of cash-based accounting was a precondition for the resumption of talks. The policy also seeks to strengthen the very weak financial basis of the new government. Private debtors of the state have been offered the option of settling their debts to escape legal proceedings and quite a few of them have done just that.¹²²

Under most of the governments that succeeded each other in recent years in Guinea, an initial tightening up of economic and financial governance was soon shown to be a political tool to punish those who held power previously or to ensure their loyalty by threatening them. Under President Condé, this question is posed in a very particular way – the government has dissolved the councils of about twenty local authorities (*collectivités*) for “poor administrative and financial management”. The four authorities whose political affiliation Crisis Group was able to check were all controlled by opponents of the RPG (Kerouané, Matoto, Boffa, Fria). While certainly this does not mean that these authorities have not committed fraudulent acts, suspicion remains that the government’s decisions may not have been politically neutral. The same is true of the dismissal of the Head of Customs, Colonel Alpha Yaya Diallo – some observers suggested that his management failures were all the more noticeable because he supported Cellou Dalein Diallo in the presidential election.¹²³

The test of the new government’s sincerity with regard to governance will come when key government figures are accused of malpractice. President Condé’s denunciation, at the beginning of July 2011, of government overcharging for agricultural inputs leaves room for hope,¹²⁴ but the affair has yet to be clarified and nobody has yet been punished.

Finally, although the new government states its desire for good governance, two controversies have somewhat clouded this image. First the *manu militari* transfer, by requisition, of management of the Conakry port container terminal run by the French company Getma to another French company on 8 March 2011. The legality of the operation has provoked a lively debate and Getma has taken the case to the French courts.

The second controversy regards the contract with the Australian-British company Rio Tinto and its Chinese partner Chinalco for iron-ore mining in blocs 3 and 4 of Mount Simandou. Contrary to the commitments made by the new government, this contract was signed before the new mining code came into force. Some observers say the agreement offers very favourable tax conditions to Rio Tinto.¹²⁵ Defenders of the government respond that the contract is based on current tax conditions (at least while awaiting the entry into force of the new mining code) and that the state has defended the country’s interests as best it could, obtaining guarantees of a quick start-up and the construction of significant infrastructure, including a trans-Guinea railway.¹²⁶ The contract apparently provides for an immediate payment of \$700 million to the government.¹²⁷ In comparison, the finance law voted in May by the National Transition Council set public expenditure for the year 2011 at FG (Guinean Francs) 7,496 billion (including 1,000 billion external finance), that is, a little over a \$1 billion.¹²⁸

These two episodes aside, the government seems to have taken structural measures. For the moment at least, it seems that state officials are closely monitoring the situation and applying more rigorous conditions. One entrepreneur said he felt there had been a change at customs, where staff have respected procedures scrupulously in recent months.¹²⁹ The government must consolidate this encouraging start and observe its commitments, beginning with the publication of asset statements by senior state officials.

¹²¹ “Téléphonie mobile: après l’incendie, Orange Guinée écope d’une pénalité de plus d’un milliard de francs guinéens”, *lejour-guinee.com*, 9 March 2011.

¹²² At the beginning of May 2011, after months of tension and the requisition of its subsidiary Areeba, the South African telephone company MTN finally agreed to pay €15 million tax on the purchase of Areeba.

¹²³ “Guinée: les raisons du limogeage du directeur de la douane”, *aminata.com*, 18 February 2011.

¹²⁴ “Gouvernement: Alpha Condé va procéder à des changements dès le lundi prochain”, *lejourguinee.com*, 9 July 2011.

¹²⁵ See for instance “Analyse du coût économique probable de l’accord minier entre la Guinée et Rio Tinto”, *guineenews.org*, 26 April 2011.

¹²⁶ “Droit de réponse du gouvernement sur l’accord avec Rio Tinto sur le projet Simandou”, *guineenews.org*, 3 May 2011.

¹²⁷ According to at least one source, the state only received a small part of this money (15 per cent), the rest being due as and when the project becomes profitable. Crisis Group interview, mining sector expert, Dakar, September 2011.

¹²⁸ Exchange rate: 8 July 2011, provided by *www.oanda.com*.

¹²⁹ Crisis Group interview, Conakry, May 2011.

C. ECONOMIC DISASTER LOOMS WHILE GOVERNMENT TAKES DEBATABLE SOCIAL MEASURES

The tightening up of economic and financial governance was made necessary by the disastrous economic legacy of the junta's two years in power. During this period, the money supply doubled, causing high inflation and depreciation of the Guinean franc.¹³⁰ Public debt to the Central Bank rose from about FG2,000 billion in 2008 to FG6,500 billion at the end of 2010. Foreign reserves collapsed – they covered no more than one and a half months of imports at the end of the transition.¹³¹ An adjustment was therefore indispensable for the Guinean economy and the new government got on with the job.

The new government's tightening up will depress the economy in the short term because almost all public works are at a standstill and the authorities have lost their freedom to spend. Less money is in circulation. In response, the government has taken a number of decisions to promote rapid improvements in the population's living conditions. However, it is not at all certain that these will be effective. It also has to be said that previous governments attempted this type of measure with limited success.

The new president immediately introduced two symbolic measures: free health care for pregnant women, and the cancellation of the Minimum Local Development Tax (Impôt minimum de développement local, IMDL). The IMDL was an annual FG5,000 (less than \$1) tax paid by all adults to the local authorities, and was widely criticised because of low collection rates, its non-progressive nature and the inefficient use made of the proceeds, so abolition made good sense. The introduction of free health care was more complex. A similar measure was announced in 2007 but was not implemented. It seems that implementation has been variable, to say the least, and that many patients still have to pay for medicines and materials.¹³² In July, the minister of health announced the in-

troduction of hotlines for service users to ring in the event of non-application of the measure.¹³³

The government's main and most expensive intervention was to promote access to basic goods, especially rice, the main cereal consumed in Guinea. Although local rice-growing is important (producing about 600,000 tonnes per year), the country imports between 300,000 and 400,000 tonnes per year. The new government first announced it would subsidise the price of rice. The first cargos arrived at the end of February 2011 and 35,000 tonnes of rice was sold outside usual market channels at the low price of FG160,000 (about \$25) per 50kg sack, while the market price could be as high as FG300,000. Opinion is divided on the way distribution was handled. The civil servants interviewed by Crisis Group could buy rice easily at their workplaces:¹³⁴ committees were created, often with the help of trade unionists, but it does not seem as though there was any attempt at political control.

On the other hand, in town neighbourhoods, inequalities and frauds have been noted, a possible indication of the politicisation of the system.¹³⁵ This first intervention failed to have a lasting impact on the market so the government seems to have decided on a change of approach. It decided to use "real businessmen"¹³⁶ and encouraged a pool of Lebanese entrepreneurs to get involved. In June and July 2011, tens of thousands of tons of rice were distributed at a slightly higher price than preceding consignments (FG187,000 per sack).¹³⁷

The government's attention to the rice market can be explained by the importance of the commodity, but it was also a very political move. Alpha Condé has regularly denounced the role of a handful of major Peul importers in the rice market, calling them a "mafia" and accusing them of "speculation".¹³⁸ This populist-socialist rhetoric is reminiscent of Sékou Touré (and his successor Lansana

¹³⁰ Inflation rose from 7.9 per cent in 2009 to 20.8 per cent at the end of 2010. An American dollar was worth FG4,984 on the official exchange change rate in December 2008, on the death of President Conté, and FG6,084 two years later. The depreciation of the currency was even greater on the parallel market, where the dollar rose from FG5,062 to FG7,255 in the same period. This data is from the National Statistics Office. See www.stat-guinee.org

¹³¹ The figures are from the governor of the Central Bank. See "Endettement du Trésor public: le gouverneur de la BCRG parle des chiffres à couper le souffle", guineenews.org, 26 March 2011.

¹³² "La gratuité de la césarienne et des soins aux femmes enceintes en Guinée: la réalité des faits", guineeinter.com, 27 May 2011.

¹³³ "Gratuité de la césarienne: des numéros verts pour informer le ministre de la Santé de la non-application !", guineelive.com, 2 July 2011.

¹³⁴ Some interlocutors hostile to the new government claimed the rice was of poor quality. Crisis Group interviews, Conakry and Labé, April 2011.

¹³⁵ This can operate at two levels: first, during distribution of ration coupons for subsidised rice, allocated to families by neighbourhood chiefs; second, in the selection of dealers, who receive a discount on each sack. Crisis Group interviews, Conakry, April 2011.

¹³⁶ "Vente et distribution de 'riz du changement'. Quand Alpha Condé prêche dans le désert !", guineenews.org, 13 April 2011.

¹³⁷ "Sécurité alimentaire: Alpha Condé recourt aux hommes d'affaires libanais pour faire baisser le prix du riz", guineenews.org, 14 June 2011.

¹³⁸ "Alpha Condé: 'En Guinée, tout est à faire'", lefigaro.fr, 16 November 2010.

Conté): he denounces the parasitic shopkeepers who let the people go hungry and conspire to increase the price to enrich themselves and “sabotage” his policies by amassing rice stocks (and stocks of other products, such as petrol) or fraudulently re-exporting them. The major retailers, who are the main targets of these attacks, generally supported his opponent, Cellou Dalein Diallo and the new government’s attitude no doubt has ulterior motives. The president hopes to lower the price of rice to increase his popularity, but also perhaps to undermine the financial base of his main opponent.

The new government’s most effective tool is probably monetary policy: appreciation of the Guinean franc would reduce the price of imports. The government has tried to tighten control of the parallel market and to encourage money changers to enter the formal market, but with only limited success. A currency market has been put in place: the Central Bank auctions about \$5,000,000 every week, with priority given to imports of basic goods. Congo-Brazzaville has made a soft loan of several tens of millions of dollars to Guinea,¹³⁹ which allowed it to buy back Guinean francs and strengthen the currency. After the dramatic depreciation of the currency in the second half of 2010, the currency stabilised during the transition, before plunging rapidly again. It seems finally to have achieved some stability and the government has been able to build up foreign reserves again.¹⁴⁰

V. THE POLITICAL SITUATION REMAINS UNSTABLE

President Condé’s election was a major step in the transition, but further progress is essential to ensure a stable and effective political system. The country’s history has not prepared political actors to maintain the rule of law and respect the sanctity of institutions. One of the decisive steps will be the election of a National Assembly, now scheduled to take place in December 2011. The two initial problems that had such a marked impact on the presidential election, mistrust of electoral institutions and the ethnicisation of politics, are still present. The new government has only very gradually and ambiguously begun a dialogue with its political opponents on electoral arrangements and reconciliation. The government has therefore left itself open to suspicions from some quarters. These opponents believe that the government is manipulating the situation to gain advantage in the knowledge that its prospects in the forthcoming legislative elections are not good. However, both the government and the opposition are responsible for promoting a calm political atmosphere and reaching a consensus on the organisation of the elections.

A. INCOMPLETE INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, A PROBLEMATIC ATTITUDE TO THE LAW

Observers have noted that the new Constitution, which was the subject of open debate in the National Transition Council, takes account of the latest advances in institutional best practice.¹⁴¹ But promulgation is still incomplete and arrangements remain fragile. Contrary to what some of the president’s associates claim,¹⁴² the transition is far from over, even from the institutional point of view. Although President Condé was elected, a harmful vagueness still pervades the other institutions that are supposed to play the role of a counterweight to the executive power.

First, there is the National Assembly, which is discussed in greater detail below. But the same is true in the case of other important institutions such as the Independent National Human Rights Institution, the Economic and Social Council (Conseil économique et social, CES), the Court of Auditors (Cour des comptes), the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court, the Higher Council of the Judiciary (Conseil supérieur de la magistrature, CSM), the High Authority for Communications (Haute autorité de la communication, (HAC) and the High Council of Local Authorities (Haut conseil des collectivités locales, HCCL).

¹³⁹ Crisis Group interviews, Conakry, April 2011. Discussions also apparently took place with Angola on this point. Angola was one of the first countries visited by Alpha Condé, in January 2011, and his vice minister of defence also visited in August. Discussions are under way to establish an air route between the two countries. “Les négociations pour une liaison directe entre l’Angola et la Guinée-Conakry à bon rythme”, Agência Angola Press, 9 July 2011.

¹⁴⁰ “La BCRG ravitaillée en devises: son compte dispose désormais d’au moins huit mois d’importations”, infoguinee.com, 26 May 2011.

¹⁴¹ For example, see the blog of the constitutionalist Stéphane Bolle (www.la-constitution-en-afrique.org).

¹⁴² Crisis Group interviews, Conakry, April and May 2011.

Arrangements for some of these institutions depend on the election of a National Assembly, because the Constitution provides that they should be established “within six months of the inauguration of the National Assembly”.¹⁴³ However, the institutions not mentioned by the Constitution, including the CES, CSM and HAC, could be established before the election of the National Assembly. Nothing has been done so far.

Of course, in the meantime, the existing institutions (NTC, CES, CNC and INEC) remain in place.¹⁴⁴ However, the temporary nature and uncertain fate of these institutions make them weak vis-à-vis the executive power, which benefits from the legitimacy conferred by the ballot box. The executive has operated for nine months almost without institutional checks and balances and its representatives do not hesitate, when required, to emphasise the illegitimacy and transitory nature of other institutions¹⁴⁵ and interlocutors. It is difficult to avoid the feeling that the executive is quite happy with this institutional haziness.

Moreover, the government has sometimes displayed an astonishing disregard for the law, for example, in the appointments of Martine Condé as director of the HAC, and General Facinet Touré as Ombudsman of the Republic on 7 January 2011. Independently of the merits of these individuals¹⁴⁶, the appointments were made in flagrant violation of the Constitution. Martine Condé was appointed by presidential decree although article 7 of the Organic Law of 22 June 2010 on the organisation and functioning of the HAC provides for the election of the HAC president by his peers, who have yet to be appointed.¹⁴⁷

The Constitution provides that the Ombudsman of the Republic shall be “appointed by the President of the Republic for a non-renewable term of seven years, by a Council of Ministers decree from among senior serving or retired civil servants with at least thirty years’ service. He may

not be dismissed from office other than by definitive impeachment or gross misconduct as decided by the Supreme Court”.¹⁴⁸ Even if the constitutionality of the appointment of General Touré’s predecessor, Koureissy Condé, was debatable,¹⁴⁹ his replacement was clearly unconstitutional: and the government should have had the unconstitutionality of Koureissy Condé’s appointment established before appointing a replacement.

Despite the protests, General Touré is now in the post and had an official meeting with the president in July 2011. The appointment of Touré, who is very influential in Basse Guinea and is part of the government’s strategic alliance in this region, clearly seemed too important to the president. Martine Condé was appointed as head of the National Communications Council (Conseil national de la communication, CNC), the agency that the HAC is supposed to replace. Some observers think that the government realised that the HAC would be more open than the CNC and therefore less favourable to it. Hence the delay in implementing the law on the HAC, which was promulgated in June 2010 but has yet to appear in the Official Journal, is deliberate.¹⁵⁰ Some Guinean media organisations have referred the matter to the Supreme Court, which, on 25 August, recognised the validity of the law on the HAC.¹⁵¹

These two episodes and others, such as Alpha Condé’s intervention in the judicial process begun after the events of 19 July,¹⁵² have raised concerns about the new government’s attitude towards the law. It is to be desired that the constitutional arrangements are rapidly completed and that all Guinean political actors accept legal and institutional provisions and observe the rule of law, as this could have a major effect on the regulation of conflicts.¹⁵³

B. IS RECONCILIATION IMPOSSIBLE?

Along with security sector reform and the employment of young people, “reconciliation” was one of the three priorities set by the new government for its work with the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission. It has to be said that the government has so far kept a low profile on this

¹⁴³ Article 160 of the Constitution. Three months in the case of the HCCL.

¹⁴⁴ Article 155 of the Constitution.

¹⁴⁵ On 30 June, the Minister of Territorial Administration Alhasane Condé said “The NTC has no legitimacy, nor does INEC”. See “Alhassane Condé: ‘Entre la reprise intégrale et la révision du fichier, la différence est minime’”, *lejourguinee.com*, 30 June 2011.

¹⁴⁶ Martine Condé is a very experienced media personality but the fact that she managed Alpha Condé’s communications campaign means that she was probably not the best candidate. General Touré was a stalwart of the Lansana Conté regime and recently distinguished himself by affirming that the Peul controlled the economy and should leave politics to other groups. “Facinet Touré qualifié d’‘incompréhension’ sa mésentente avec le chef de l’Etat”, *aminata.com*, 23 May 2011.

¹⁴⁷ Crisis Group email correspondence, Guinean constitutional lawyer, August 2011.

¹⁴⁸ Article 129 of the constitution.

¹⁴⁹ He was appointed during the transition, when the Organic Law on the Ombudsman had not yet been adopted.

¹⁵⁰ Crisis Group interview, Paris, June 2011.

¹⁵¹ “La Cour suprême juge les lois sur la liberté de la presse et sur la HAC conformes à la constitution”, *guineenews.org*, 5 September 2011.

¹⁵² See Section III.B below.

¹⁵³ Curiously, the opposition abstained from challenging the clearly unconstitutional appointment of Facinet Touré in the Supreme Court. Perhaps Sidya Touré’s attempt to unite Basse Guinée around him explains this wariness.

issue and its initiatives are still very timid. In the judicial domain, the investigation into the 28 September 2009 massacre has made some progress but may have gone as far as it is going to go. Apart from some measures to promote reconciliation, the government has not paid much attention to dealing with the ethno-regional question and has therefore opened up space for the opposition to mobilise.

As soon as he was elected, Alpha Condé “followed the South African example and announced the creation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission”.¹⁵⁴ Six months later, the process had barely started and, in a statement on 8 June 2011, the National Council of Guinean Civil Society Organisations (Conseil national des organisations de la société civile guinéenne, CNOSCG) called for the establishment of a commission that would also deal with justice. It was only on 25 June that President Condé announced the creation of a “reflection commission” (*commission de réflexion*) on reconciliation. Two days later, the secretary general for religious affairs organised an “awareness-raising” forum attended by 130 “imams and heads of Islamic centres, priests and other church representatives, NGOs involved in promoting peace and representatives of women’s and youth groups”.¹⁵⁵ On 2 July, the president announced that resources would be made available to the “Minister of Culture, artists and ‘wise men’ to travel through the country taking a message of peace and national reconciliation to our courageous populations”.¹⁵⁶

On 15 July, the imam of the Fayçal mosque in Conakry, Elhadj Mamadou Saliou Camara, and the archbishop of Conakry, Bishop Vincent Koulibaly, were appointed as heads of the reflection commission. At the end of August, they travelled to Fouta to meet representatives of the Peul community and these talks seem to have been fairly open.¹⁵⁷ However, the belated and still preliminary nature of these efforts seems to indicate that the new government is not ready to embark on a genuine campaign of national reconciliation.

Faced with the classic problem of making a connection between reconciliation and justice, the authorities avoid mentioning justice, as many observers have noted.¹⁵⁸

President Condé himself emphasised that the government should not restrict itself to investigating the 28 September 2009 massacre and that the violence has a longer history. He recalled that he himself was a victim, had been condemned to death under the Sékou Touré regime and imprisoned under Lansana Conté, but that it is necessary to “forgive”.¹⁵⁹ There is a certain political logic in this prudent position: in Guinea, the transition is not the result of a military defeat and the parties whose battles have torn the country apart since independence are still in the political game. The government therefore fears the political consequences of judicialisation.

In fact, the judicial investigation into the 28 September 2009 does not only concern a small group of marginal military personnel, murderers and rapists. Captain Moussa Dadis Camara, currently based in Burkina Faso, represents a section of the army and at least part of the Guinée Forestière population.¹⁶⁰ To raise the issue of his impunity is therefore to risk upsetting his supporters in the army and in Forêt, an electorally important region. During his first meeting with Captain Camara in Burkina Faso, in January 2011, President Condé told the captain there were “no formal charges against him” and that he was “free to return to the country like any other Guinean”.¹⁶¹ Condé’s words were perhaps deliberately ambiguous, but the president was praised in June 2011 by Idrissa Chérif, a close adviser to Camara, and this seems to indicate that the two men are on good terms.¹⁶²

The minister for territorial administration, Alhassane Condé, said that Camara “was right” to highlight the responsibility of “political leaders” for the 28 September

¹⁵⁴ “L’OGDH salue l’idée d’une commission Vérité-Réconciliation en Guinée”, PANA, 6 December 2010.

¹⁵⁵ “Guinée: tenue d’un forum de sensibilisation en faveur de la réconciliation nationale”, Xinhua, 27 June 2011.

¹⁵⁶ “Alpha Condé annonce une tournée des artistes et des ‘sages’ pour lancer la réconciliation nationale”, Xinhua, 3 July 2011.

¹⁵⁷ “Réconciliation nationale: ‘Nous n’avons aucune dent contre le président Alpha Condé mais nous voulons qu’il soit le président de tous les Guinéens sans discrimination...’, dicit le porte-parole des Sages du Foutah”, le jourguinee.com, 31 August 2011.

¹⁵⁸ “Mme Touré Hadiatou Barry de l’AVCB: ‘Nous ne voulons pas une réconciliation bancal en Guinée’”, guineenews.org, 25 March 2011.

¹⁵⁹ “Guinée: ‘Ce n’est pas seulement le 28 Septembre 2009 que des crimes ont été commis en Guinée’, dicit le président Alpha Condé”, aminata.com, 7 February 2011; Crisis Group interviews, diplomats, Conakry, April 2011; Crisis Group telephone conversation, someone closely involved in the 28 September case, July 2011.

¹⁶⁰ Although the international community sees Moussa Dadis Camara as a half-grotesque, half-murderer boor, Crisis Group was struck, in the course of formal and informal contacts during a mission to Guinea in April and May 2011, to see how many Forestiers expressed their attachment to him.

¹⁶¹ “Le capitaine Dadis peut rentrer selon le président Alpha Condé”, lejourguinee.com, 25 January 2011. Between the two rounds of the presidential election, Cellou Dalein Diallo, on a visit to Guinée Forestière, announced that Dadis was free to return and there would be no international judicial proceedings against him. “Cellou Dalein Diallo: ‘Si le Capitaine Moussa Dadis Camara veut rentrer en Guinée, il n’y a aucun problème. Il est libre de rentrer quand il veut’”, guineenews.org, 8 September 2010.

¹⁶² “Interview-Idrissa Chérif, ancien ministre conseiller de Dadis: ‘Le président Alpha Condé doit éviter de tomber dans le même piège que ses prédécesseurs’”, mediaguinee.com, 3 June 2011.

2009 affair and that proceedings would be taken against “all those responsible”.¹⁶³ He was surely taking aim at Forces Vives and, more specifically, at Cellou Dalein Diallo. Although it is true that the Forces Vives tried to stop Camara from standing for president, it is absolutely unacceptable to equate the junta’s role in the affair with that of the Forces Vives.

However, the Guinean judiciary, with the encouragement of the International Criminal Court (ICC),¹⁶⁴ has made some progress: members of the security forces present at the massacre have been questioned and some have been referred to examining magistrates. However, the judges are facing serious difficulties. Some military officers have not responded to the summons addressed to them. The judges dealing with the case hardly have any staff to help them with their investigations,¹⁶⁵ and they share their offices with the military, who are precisely the people they are investigating. The authorities must ensure that the judiciary can do its work, especially with regard to Moussa Tiegboro Camara and Claude Pivi, who now hold senior positions in the security sector hierarchy.

However, the handling of inter-communal tensions primarily depends on how the government behaves. The government has hardly expressed any desire for appeasement, as shown by the minister for territorial administration’s statement mentioned above. The more cynical of observers interpreted this statement as intending to keep the Peul community, for which the 28 September 2009 issue is almost one of identity, frustrated and to provoke the more radical among them into making a mistake. A series of other gestures shows the extent of political tension. For example, President Condé has not visited Fouta Djallon, the UFDG’s stronghold, since his election. He would certainly not receive a warm welcome there and he is perhaps right to not go there and avoid aggravating the situation. Nevertheless, this is a worrying symptom of the uneasiness that persists and the divisions in the country.

Similarly, when Cellou Dalein Diallo returned to the country on 3 April 2011 after several months away and

the UFDG wanted to mobilise his supporters to welcome him, the authorities reminded them that all rallies were banned in Conakry. The security forces intervened, on the grounds that some demonstrators were behaving violently. A Diallo supporter died from the injuries suffered during this intervention and dozens of others were wounded. About 60 participants in the march were quickly tried and sentenced. Three military personnel responsible for protecting Diallo,¹⁶⁶ and seven civilians belonging to the UFDG security received the heaviest sentences (two and one year prison sentences respectively). There was a lively debate about the legal dimensions of the repression and the number of victims, and it took a while for contradictory rumours and accusations to subside.¹⁶⁷

The episode clearly showed the inflexibility of the authorities and (as during the presidential election) the lack of a trustworthy reference capable of telling the truth about the facts and the dangerous escalation and rumour-mongering that such an absence allows. Moreover, the sanctions taken against members of his security personnel led Cellou Dalein Diallo to denounce that he was being harassed and he once again spent a long period outside the country on the grounds that he could not guarantee his security. On 15 August 2011, President Condé pardoned 37 of Diallo’s convicted supporters,¹⁶⁸ and Diallo returned to Conakry without a hitch on 4 September.

Although inter-ethnic tensions are acute in the political sphere, they are less so in society at large. However, some interlocutors emphasise that inter-ethnic relations are deteriorating, sometimes resulting in the termination of certain contracts (for example, tenancies, marriages, employment) between individuals and families belonging to different groups.¹⁶⁹ In addition, in some places, old conflicts between groups have become more acute since Condé’s election, as some people believe that “their” candidate’s victory provides an opportunity to change the local status quo to their advantage.

¹⁶³ “Massacres du 28 septembre: ‘Le Capitaine Dadis avait raison...’, affirme le ministre Alhassane Condé”, *africaguinee.com*, 1 July 2011.

¹⁶⁴ The ICC periodically sends a research mission to Guinea to verify progress in the investigation and has stated several times that it ‘will take responsibility’ if appropriate, in other words, if Guinean justice proves to be incapable of making progress with the case. “Quatrième Mission du bureau de la CPI à Conakry”, *radio-kankan.com*, 3 April 2011. See www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/Office+of+the+Prosecutor/Comm+and+Ref/Guinea.

¹⁶⁵ The pool includes three examining magistrates and two court clerks. It only has offices and computer equipment. Crisis Group email correspondence, Guinean lawyer, August 2011.

¹⁶⁶ After coming to power, Sékouba Konaté provided the most important politicians with military bodyguards to ensure their protection. The convicted soldiers maintained they had never received the order to return to barracks after Alpha Condé’s victory and therefore continued to follow their orders.

¹⁶⁷ Compare, for example, “Communiqué du gouvernement relatif au retour de Cellou Dalein Diallo en Guinée”, *guineenews.org*, 4 April 2011; with “Conférence de presse: Cellou Dalein dit tout sur la répression contre ses militants et les dérives dictatoriales d’Alpha Condé !”, <http://www.guineedirect.info>, 7 April 2011.

¹⁶⁸ “Guinée: grâce présidentielle à 37 partisans de l’opposant Cellou Dalein Diallo”, *rfi.fr*, 16 August 2011.

¹⁶⁹ Crisis Group interviews, Conakry, April 2011; and Paris, June 2011.

For example, in some parts of Fouta Djallon, groups descended from former slaves and their dependants, often Malinké, are pushing for revenge against their Peul “masters”.¹⁷⁰ Around Kissidougou, the idea is circulating among the Kissi autochthonous group and the Malinké that the long-held Peul monopoly over the timber sector must be ended, in the name of indigenous rights and “democracy” and also to defend the forests from indiscriminate felling.¹⁷¹ Throughout both Guinée Forestière and Basse Guinée, conflicts between indigenous farmers and livestock breeders, often Peul, seem to be intensifying. Of course, the reaction of the authorities to these local conflicts will be decisive in how they develop.

Meanwhile, some of the government’s general measures have been received and interpreted from an ethnic viewpoint. This is especially so in the case of the battery of economic measures already mentioned, including the tightening of control over the exchange rate and the sale of rice. Guinean shopkeepers, many of whom are Peul, manage their enterprises informally and at least some of them established ambiguous business relations with previous authorities. They are therefore a target for the government’s economic and financial measures. For example, Peuls claimed the government was discriminating against them when it announced a temporary ban on trade in currencies and when President Condé encouraged Lebanese businessmen to enter the trade in rice and industry.¹⁷² The government says it has acted in good faith, has no grudge against the Peul as an ethnic group and is only targeting a small “mafia”.¹⁷³

Above and beyond the government’s mixture of Marxism and populism, the formalisation of the economy, the establishment of fair and effective taxation, a more competitive rice market and industrialisation are definitely praiseworthy objectives. However, it is difficult to imagine that President Condé is not aware of the ethnic subtext of his interventions on these issues. In a January 2011 speech that has become famous, at Dixinn, in Conakry, he announced that the “lice” would be “removed”. In March, in Kindia, he denounced “the people who sabotage and increase prices in the country”, comparing them to “tor-

toises” whose backside had to be heated to make them move.¹⁷⁴ Amplified by some of his men and their allies, Alpha Condé is therefore increasing the tension and encouraging the idea that there is a “Peul threat”, an idea that played an important role in his victory in the presidential election.

Faced with a government that treats the opposition unceremoniously, which proudly states it does not need any “lessons in democracy”¹⁷⁵ and which makes hardly any efforts to pacify the frustration felt by the Peul community, it is tempting for Cellou Dalein Diallo to also play the ethnic card and present himself as the defender of this community.¹⁷⁶ Certain Peul intellectuals are engaged in a worrying escalation of rhetoric, especially in the Diaspora and on the internet. They comment obsessively on the ethnic criteria used by the government when making appointments¹⁷⁷ and sometimes go so far as to accuse it of “fascism”, “nazism” and “genocide”.¹⁷⁸ Recently, an opposition website claimed that bladed weapons were being distributed in Conakry “in neighbourhoods that support the government”, in a clear reference to the machetes used in the Rwandan genocide.¹⁷⁹ Influenced by the Rwandan and Ivorian precedents, this radical minority has not hesitated to point out President Condé’s foreign origins (Burkina Faso) while graffiti in Conakry invites him to “go back” to Burkina.¹⁸⁰

Is not President Condé’s minister for territorial administration also playing a dangerous game when he questions the nationality of his opponents and suggests that anyone who is not satisfied (the Peul?) should go and register for elections “somewhere else” and go “to Somalia” if they want to fight?¹⁸¹ Meanwhile, Mohamed Baba Keita, general secretary of the RDIG, a party allied to President Condé, has made a distinction between “genu-

¹⁷⁰ The Manden Djallon association, led by a member of the UPR, which forms part of the government coalition, is actively promoting a redistribution of land to the benefit of groups of servile origin. Crisis Group email correspondence, June and July 2011.

¹⁷¹ Crisis Group interviews, Kissidougou and Faranah, April 2011.

¹⁷² “Sécurité alimentaire: Alpha Condé recourt aux hommes d’affaires libanais pour faire baisser le prix du riz”, *guinee-news.org*, 14 June 2011; Crisis Group interview with a Lebanese businessman, Conakry, May 2011.

¹⁷³ “Alpha Condé: ‘En Guinée, tout est à faire’”, *lefigaro.fr*, 16 November 2010.

¹⁷⁴ “Dixinn, Conakry: Alpha Condé s’adressant à ‘ses oncles’: Le discours qui divise...”, *guineinter.com*, 28 January 2011.

¹⁷⁵ “Alpha Condé: ‘Qui oserait me donner des leçons de démocratie?’”, *jeuneafrique.com*, 31 May 2011.

¹⁷⁶ See “Guinée: Cellou Dalein Diallo, bon perdant”, *liberation.fr*, 27 December 2010.

¹⁷⁷ See “Nominations d’Alpha Condé: la ‘maninkanisation’ de la Guinée !”, *infoguinee.com*, 19 April 2011.

¹⁷⁸ See *www.nlsguinee.com*.

¹⁷⁹ “Distribution d’armes blanches dans les quartiers de Conakry”, *lejourguinee.com*, 29 May 2011.

¹⁸⁰ “Alpha Condé: la croisade va commencer contre les tortues peules dès le 7 April”, *lavoixpeuhle.info*, sans date; “Quand est-ce qu’Alpha Condé ira-t-il prier sur la tombe de son grand-père baroka?”, *guineepresse.info*, 7 May 2011; Crisis Group observations, Conakry, April 2011.

¹⁸¹ “Législatives: Alhassane Condé se prononce ...”, *lejourguinee.com*, 30 June 2011; “Le ministre Alhassane Condé projette une prochaine arrestation de Cellou Dalein Diallo”, *lejourguinee.com*, 30 June 2011.

ine Guineans” and “Africans born in Guinea”, “a category of people who are often rich and know how to manage their property” and “who have no interest in promoting peace and social harmony because they have no country”.¹⁸² By raising the ethnic issue, Guinean leaders of opinion could end up increasing social tension in general. Not all means should be used to win the battle.

C. DISPUTES OVER ELECTORAL ARRANGEMENTS

The main institutional vacuum is caused by the absence of a National Assembly, even though article 157 of the Constitution unambiguously states that the NTC shall fulfil all the National Assembly’s functions until it is formed. However, the legislative elections are the subject of a lively debate that revolves around three main issues: the electoral timetable, the electoral register and the INEC. On each of these points, the government has been slow to seek dialogue and still maintains an ambiguous attitude, leading the opposition to harden its position.

According to article 159 of the Constitution of May 2010, legislative elections must take place within six months of the adoption of the Constitution, therefore by November 2010, when the second round of the presidential election, originally scheduled for June 2010, finally took place. Without a genuine constitutional grounding, as the Constitution does not include any provisions regarding postponement, some observers have stated that the six-month period could begin on the date when the president was elected,¹⁸³ which would have meant the elections being held by May 2011. However, it soon became clear that the government (it is the president who sets the date of the ballot by decree) did not consider the legislative elections to be a priority and it ignored this suggestion.

This slowness has raised concerns among the opposition, civil society and international partners, who have all called for quick elections and the establishment of a precise timetable. The European Union reminded the government that funds from the Tenth European Development Fund could not legally be transferred until the transition is completed, that is, until after the legislative elections are held.¹⁸⁴ The situation gradually became clearer, with the government letting it be known in April 2011 that it planned to organise the elections for the final quarter of 2011, then more specifically, in November. On 15 Sep-

tember, the INEC president announced that the elections will take place on 29 December.¹⁸⁵ The opposition immediately said that this date had been chosen unilaterally, that its representatives on INEC had not been consulted and that, in any case, it was “virtual” and “false” given the lack of progress in organising the election.¹⁸⁶

The dilemma is at least in part the same as for the presidential election: is it best to hold the ballot as soon as possible in order to stop people becoming impatient and allay suspicion, even though the conditions for holding elections may well not be met and the electoral process cannot fail to provoke controversy and conflict? Would it not be better to take the time to consolidate electoral arrangements in the hope that this will contribute to lowering the tensions? In a statement issued on 8 September, the most prominent civil society organisation, the Guinean Social Movement (Mouvement social guinéen, MSG), took the risk of adopting a clear-cut position and attracting criticism from opposition figures: given the poor state of electoral arrangements, the MSG proposed holding the ballot sometime before the end of the first quarter of 2012.¹⁸⁷ This seems to be a reasonable proposal.¹⁸⁸ However, the most relevant response will be the one that comes from the main Guinean political actors themselves. They are the ones who need to take stock of their responsibilities and assess whether they are putting the country at risk and they must engage as quickly as possible in a serious and sincere dialogue to achieve a consensus.

The debate about the electoral timetable is related to the debate on the electoral register. The government has long maintained that a new electoral register is needed rather than just the periodic updating required by the electoral code.¹⁸⁹ This has of course caused concern about the

¹⁸⁵ “Organisation des élections législatives: la CENI propose le 29 décembre prochain”, guineenews.org, 15 September 2011.

¹⁸⁶ “L’opposition veut organiser des manifestations dans tout le pays, dès le 27 septembre !”, africaguinee.com, 16 September 2011.

¹⁸⁷ “Elections en Guinée: le mouvement social contredit l’opposition et exige des élections avant avril 2012”, 9 September 2011.

¹⁸⁸ It would need at least three months to organise a technically efficient election with a simple revision of the lists. It would still therefore be possible to hold the election in December 2011 if the revision were to begin immediately. Crisis Group interview, senior United Nations official, New York, 16 September 2011.

¹⁸⁹ Article 19 of the electoral code says that the electoral lists are “permanent” and should be “revised annually” and makes the following provision: “As a transitional measure, the first presidential and legislative elections after the entry in force of the Constitution shall be conducted using the electoral lists established and revised during the year of the said elections”. It seems clear that those who wrote the Constitution felt that the

¹⁸² “Guinée: quand Mohamed Baba Keita attise la haine ethnique”, actuelguinee.com, 25 June 2011.

¹⁸³ Contrary to what some observers maintain, the Ouagadougou Agreement of 15 January 2010 did not say when the legislative elections should be held, only the presidential election.

¹⁸⁴ “L’Union européenne y met la manière, mais exige les législatives”, guineeconakry.info, 26 February 2011.

timetable as conducting a new census would require considerable time.¹⁹⁰

To justify a new census, the authorities first pointed to the problems encountered during the presidential election, for example, regarding registration of biometric data. They also stated that the register was deficient because of the marked under-registration resulting from people's fear that the census would result in more taxation. President Condé said that is why he abolished the IMDL when he came to power.

The authorities have also maintained the 2010 biometric register must be incorrect because it had fewer electors than the non-biometric register from 2005. This was a surprising argument to make, especially coming from the RPG, which, at the time, had questioned the 2005 register, arguing, no doubt correctly, that it had been inflated to ensure Lansana Conté's victory.¹⁹¹ The authorities also maintained that the computerised register was inaccessible because it was controlled by the French company Sagem (now Morpho).¹⁹² International observers familiar with the electoral process all seemed to challenge the authorities' claim that they did not have access to the register.¹⁹³ On 23 June, the UNDP and Morpho organised a formal ceremony to hand over the keys of the computerised register to the authorities and acquit themselves of their responsibilities.¹⁹⁴

Finally, the government emphasised its interest in combining the electoral census with a general census of the population, an indispensable tool for the formulation of a serious development policy and the distribution of numerical identity cards.¹⁹⁵ Far from convincing anyone, this multiplicity of arguments aggravated suspicions about the government's intentions. The government did not seem to pay much attention to these reservations and said that a refusal by the international partners to finance the new electoral census would not be an obstacle because the

state budget and South African aid would cover the cost.¹⁹⁶ The government even took a certain number of steps to launch the process,¹⁹⁷ until on 18 July 2011, just before the attack on his residence, President Condé announced that he now agreed with the idea of simply revising the electoral register.¹⁹⁸

The question has been pending ever since and nothing is yet known about preparations for either a census or a revision of the electoral register. Some members of the opposition indicated they are still concerned about this issue and criticised the break with Sagem and the allocation of the contract for the register to a relatively unknown company, the South African company Waymark, and its Guinean partner, Sabari, which, they say "belongs to and is managed by associates" of the RPG.¹⁹⁹

The final point in this debate is about INEC. Its current composition is not very satisfactory: created in 2007 by President Lansana Conté, it is composed of ten members of his party, the Unity and Progress Party (Parti de l'unité et du progrès, PUP), which now represents practically nothing, and ten representatives for the entire opposition. Even more problematic was the way it operated at the last election.²⁰⁰ Despite all these weaknesses, INEC remains and is now led by its interim president, the trade unionist

two elections should take place in 2010 and use the lists established in 2010.

¹⁹⁰ It would be difficult in this case to organise the legislative elections before the second half of 2012. Crisis Group interview, senior United Nations official, New York, 16 September 2011.

¹⁹¹ Crisis Group interviews, Conakry, April and May 2011.

¹⁹² "Guinée: Enfin, la Sagem, après plusieurs mois de rétention, remet finalement le fichier électoral au MATD ce jeudi 23 juin", *guinee24.com*, 25 June 2011.

¹⁹³ Crisis Group interviews, diplomats, Conakry, April 2011.

¹⁹⁴ This concern was evident in the UNDP communiqué, quoted for example in "Le code d'accès du fichier électoral a été officiellement remis au gouvernement guinéen ...", *guineelive.com*, 24 June 2011.

¹⁹⁵ Crisis Group interviews, associates of the presidential cabinet, Conakry, May 2011.

¹⁹⁶ A South African company, in partnership with a Guinean company, will conduct the new census.

¹⁹⁷ According to the authorities, South Africa offered 2,000 census kits worth \$14 million. They also announced plans to recruit 6,000 young people for training to carry out the census. In September, INEC announced that more than 5,000 "election officials" were about to begin training. "Législatives: Alhasane Condé se prononce...", *lejourguinee.com*, 1 July 2011; "Elections législatives – Plus de 5000 agents en formation depuis ce mardi", *aminata.com*, 21 September 2011.

¹⁹⁸ "Dialogue politique: le Ministre de l'Administration du Territoire et de la Décentralisation parlera avec les partis politiques de l'opposition ce lundi", *guineelive.com*, 23 July 2011. Some observers are wondering whether President Condé called for dialogue in the knowledge that an attack was being organised against him and that he knew perfectly well that implementation of any dialogue would be blocked in the aftermath of that attempt. These reflections indicate the problematic degree of suspicion that characterises politics in Guinea. Crisis Group telephone conversations, July 2011.

¹⁹⁹ "Impasse politique en Guinée: l'opposition dénonce le silence du gouvernement", *africaguinee.com*, 6 September 2011. For the equally worrying position taken by one of the ADP leaders, see "Transition en Guinée: 'Nous sommes inquiets ...', prévient Aboubacar Sylla de l'Alliance pour la démocratie et le progrès (ADP)", *africaguinee.com*, 23 August 2011. The two companies that were contracted to produce the new register now seem to have been contracted to revise it.

²⁰⁰ See Section II.A.

Louncény Camara, considered by many to be close to the government.²⁰¹

To get out of this impasse, the NTC prepared a new organic law regulating the INEC. It had been planned to have only members of civil society in order to avoid a political deadlock. However the discussions gradually foundered in the atmosphere of mistrust.²⁰² The opposition was at first receptive to the idea of reform²⁰³ but finally declared itself against “any proposal for INEC’s structure that does not include representatives of the political parties”.²⁰⁴ Louncény Camara, interim president of INEC declared that the NTC’s project was “unconstitutional”.²⁰⁵ The Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralisation highlighted INEC’s lack of legitimacy, said it would work with the reformed commission proposed by the NTC and emphasised the legitimacy of the NTC.²⁰⁶ The situation is therefore one of total confusion.

Meanwhile, negotiations continued about the equally controversial relations between INEC and MATD. First, on 2 February 2011, the MATD replaced Yamoussa Cissé, INEC’s general secretary since the institution was created;²⁰⁷ and the decree issued on 18 March, which created a department of administrative and financial affairs in INEC, stated that its director shall be appointed by MATD. There is no doubt that INEC’s weak administration needed reform, but the opposition interpreted these ad hoc decisions as calculated to strengthen MATD’s control over the electoral process.²⁰⁸ On 16 June, Camara signed a

draft agreement with MATD establishing “cooperation” between the two institutions. The opposition and several members of INEC reminded everyone that the Constitution stated that INEC alone was responsible for the organisation of the elections and claimed the agreement was an attempt to ensure MATD’s control over the electoral process rather than to improve electoral arrangements.

Camara, supported by the government, has since taken INEC in hand. Some protesting members of INEC have been replaced and El Hadj Amadou Oury Baldé, of the Union for Progress and Renewal (Union pour le progrès et le renouveau, UPR), a pro-government party, was appointed vice president. Since August 2011, Camara has managed to obtain confirmation as president of INEC from a majority of his colleagues, while awaiting the election of two new vice presidents and the appointment of new heads of department. The opposition rejected these changes, which it judged unconstitutional.²⁰⁹ INEC therefore remains incapable of providing the necessary consensus for carrying out its mission, yet it is still responsible for organising the election. By proposing 29 December as polling day, the INEC president has in effect produced a precise timetable, including the establishment of administrative commissions for revising the electoral lists to the distribution of voting cards.²¹⁰

The intervention of the NTC in this affair is courageous. This institution has a central role to play in the balance of power and the functioning of democracy in Guinea during the transition. However, as this is all about establishing rules for competition between the parties, it seems indispensable to find an agreement acceptable to the parties, and especially to those who really count, the ones that represent Guinean citizens. Wrongly or rightly, the opposition does not feel it is properly represented on the NTC – some members of the opposition go so far as to doubt the loyalty of their own representatives.²¹¹ Although the Constitution established unambiguously that it is the NTC’s job to legislate on INEC and the electoral code, any legislation must be able to achieve a consensus among the political parties that count.

Whatever the real intentions of the parties concerned, the vacuum that persists with regard to the electoral rules is worrying. It has been easy for the opposition to say that,

²⁰¹ Remember that he had been convicted in the period between the two rounds of the presidential election after a complaint by the Cellou Dalein Diallo camp. His conviction was quashed by the Conakry Court of Appeal on 27 December 2010, shortly after President Condé was elected.

²⁰² “Division, opportunisme, menace et pression au CNT: le projet de loi sur la CENI dans les oubliettes!”, *guineenews.org*, 8 July 2011.

²⁰³ In their statement of 18 April 2011, the opposition parties called on the CNT “to expedite drafting of the organic law on CENI”. “L’opposition rejette la proposition du gouvernement de révision des listes électorales”, *guineenews.org*, 19 April 2011.

²⁰⁴ “Politique: CENI, recensement, dissolution des conseils communaux et communautaires: les griefs de Sidya Touré!”, *guineenews.org*, 3 June 2011.

²⁰⁵ “Division, opportunisme, menace et pression au CNT: le projet de loi sur la CENI dans les oubliettes!”, *guineenews.org*, 8 July 2011.

²⁰⁶ “Législatives: Alhassane Condé se prononce ...”, *lejour-guinee.com*, 1 July 2011.

²⁰⁷ The appointment of the INEC secretary general is MATD’s responsibility according to the organic law on INEC, but the sudden replacement of Yamoussa Cissé after so many years clearly provoked suspicion.

²⁰⁸ The debate had already taken place between the two rounds of the presidential election and, at that time, Alpha Condé supported a rapprochement between the ministry and INEC. This

position fuelled suspicions of collusion between himself and the then minister for territorial administration, Nawan Damey. The latter was appointed political adviser to the prime minister of Condé’s government, then governor of N’Zérékoré.

²⁰⁹ Camara received 15 votes in favour and 22 against. “Des partis politiques contestent l’élection de Louncény Camara à la tête de la Commission électorale”, *Xinhua*, 6 August 2011.

²¹⁰ “Organisation des élections législatives: la CENI propose le 29 décembre prochain”, *guineenews.org*, 15 September 2011.

²¹¹ Crisis Group interviews, Conakry, April 2011.

by calling into question the electoral arrangements that led to his victory, President Condé called into question his own legitimacy. The government's final argument, that it is trying to do the right thing, does not convince anyone. To do the right thing, in this case, would be to promote dialogue and consensus rather than anything technical, and it is precisely this that the authorities have been avoiding for as long as possible.

In March, after a long silence, the MATD finally convened an "information" meeting, which was held on 13 April 2011. The meeting was boycotted by the opposition. The MATD went on to organise a "dialogue" meeting on 23-25 June, but the opposition continued its boycott, arguing that the Constitution was sufficiently clear about the organisation of elections and that its provisions should be implemented.²¹² The recommendations made during this first "dialogue" meeting held without opposition representatives validated the government's agenda: "strengthening cooperation between INEC departments and local authorities", "the establishment of a new biometric electoral register" and "the use of local skills at all levels of the electoral process".²¹³ Although it was easy for the government to highlight that 134 of the 143 officially recognised parties took part in the meeting and supported its plans for the election,²¹⁴ the deadlock remains and the main opposition parties, which represent a considerable proportion of the electorate, remain at odds with crucial aspects of electoral arrangements as so far envisaged by the government.

On 18 July, at the same time as he announced he had abandoned the idea of a new electoral register, President Condé instructed the minister for territorial administration to begin a dialogue with the Group of Political Parties for Finalising the Transition (Collectif des partis politiques pour la finalisation de la transition, CPPFT), which groups about twenty opposition parties, including the UFDG, UFR and the New Generation for the Republic

(Nouvelle génération pour la république, NGR).²¹⁵ However, the first meeting, planned for 25 July, was postponed *sine die*. More recently, the influential coalition of civil society organisations grouped in the MSG tried, in consultation with the NTC, CNC and CES, to relaunch the process and promote a wide-ranging political dialogue.²¹⁶ However, the CPPFT has refused all suggestions to begin such a process until the government offers a direct and exclusive dialogue.²¹⁷

The increasing internal pressure nevertheless led the government to react, and on 15 August 2011, President Condé finally received Sidya Touré, an important member of the CPPFT – his first meeting with a major opposition leader since the presidential election campaign.²¹⁸ On 17 August, Minister Alhassane Condé met a CPPFT delegation, which delivered a memorandum listing its demands for a peaceful ballot.²¹⁹ On 15 September, after a silence lasting nearly one month, the authorities rejected the opposition demands. The opposition has since continued to denounce the government's unilateral actions and delaying tactics.²²⁰

There has been no dialogue since then. So when Cellou Diallo finally returned to Conakry, on 4 September, President Condé's invitation to meet him was the occasion for another skirmish. Diallo refused the invitation. The presidential cabinet then released a communiqué stating that Diallo had preferred "to leave the final decision to the Fouta Coordination and his party", which was a way of drawing attention to his Peul ethnicity. Although Diallo confirmed that he wanted to consult his party prior to any meeting, he denied discussing it with the Fouta Coordina-

²¹² "Législatives: le collectif des partis politiques d'opposition décline l'invitation du ministre du MATD, Alhassane Condé!", guineenews.org, 15 June 2011.

²¹³ "Fichier électoral: 134 partis sur 143 soutiennent le gouvernement", aujourd'hui-en-guinee.com, 27 June 2011. The last point could be interpreted as a way of preventing the return of an external guarantor at the head of INEC or that of Morpho. One could also question two other recommendations that could provide a focus for coming battles about electoral arrangements: the "publication of the decree implementing article 2 of the electoral code"; and the announced changes in constituency boundaries.

²¹⁴ The government also judged it necessary to bring forward the approval of prefects and governors, gathered in a seminar. "Administration territoriale: les gouverneurs et préfets favorables au recensement", guineenews.org, 9 July 2011.

²¹⁵ "Dialogue politique: le ministre de l'Administration du Territoire et de la Décentralisation parlera avec les partis politiques de l'opposition ce lundi", guineelive.com, 23 July 2011.

²¹⁶ "Rupture du dialogue entre le pouvoir et l'opposition: la société civile tente de jouer la médiation", guineenews.org, 28 July 2011.

²¹⁷ "Lancement d'un dialogue politique sans l'opposition", Xinhua, 11 August 2011. It was therefore in the absence of the main political parties that the MSG held two days of meetings on the legislative elections at the beginning of August 2011.

²¹⁸ "Sidya Touré chez Alpha Condé à Sékoutouréya", radio-kankan.com, 15 August 2011. The meeting between Touré and President Condé on 15 August caused rumours about a rapprochement between the two men. However, nothing has so far occurred to confirm that. Touré continues to participate at CPPFT meetings and signs the communiqués.

²¹⁹ "Guinée: le Ministre Alhassane Condé rencontre enfin l'opposition!", guineeinter.com, 17 August 2011.

²²⁰ "Elections: 'le processus électoral est en panne ...', avoue Sidya Touré de l'UFR", africaguinee.com, 27 August 2011; "Revendications de l'opposition: le gouvernement garde le silence", africaguinee.com, 31 August 2011; "Déclaration du collectif des partis politiques pour la finalisation de la transition relative à la marche pacifique", guineenews.org, 19 September 2011.

tion.²²¹ In a communiqué on 19 September, after deploring the authorities' silence and their unilateral steps in the electoral process, the CPPFT convened a series of demonstrations from 27 to 30 September.²²² The governor of Conakry, Commander Sékou Resco Camara, reminded everyone that demonstrations were banned.²²³ Although Guinea had rid itself of the military junta, was it due to repeat the events of 28 September 2009 and witness another tragedy?

Although the electoral arrangements are controversial, part of the problem is that each side scrutinises them carefully for any indication of bias towards its opponents. It is absolutely necessary to end this cycle of mistrust. The government has special responsibility in this matter. President Condé's statement that he is certain of victory because he controls the territorial administration is either a serious blunder or a grave provocation.²²⁴ In either case, this statement is regrettable. It is also to be regretted that the opposition has not been quick enough to seize on the offers of dialogue, made even though the government could certainly help things by announcing the suspension of all the changes to electoral arrangements and show it wants a genuinely open discussion.

The government seems determined to proceed to the elections at its own pace (while respecting the rules as far as possible, thanks to the existence of an INEC that is under its control, despite the challenges to its authority) and without seeking a consensus with the opposition, calculating that the opposition will probably not risk a boycott. Such an approach is very risky for the country. Whatever shape an agreement on institutions might take – a law voted by the NTC or an INEC made credible by political consensus – there is a need to recognise the exceptional nature of the situation in which the Guinean transition now finds itself. The government must begin a sincere dialogue with the opposition.

²²¹ "Alpha Condé envoie des émissaires chez Cellou Dalein Diallo", guineenews.org, 7 September 2011.

²²² The communiqué said nothing about the date proposed by INEC, which shows just how embarrassed the opposition was on this issue.

²²³ "Manifestations: le gouverneur de Conakry monte au créneau", aujourd'hui-en-guinee.com, 18 September 2011.

²²⁴ President Condé publicly declared: "They [the opposition] had all the money in Guinea, but they still could not beat us. Today, we appoint the prefects, we appoint the sub-prefects, we are the government of Guinea. If they say that they are going to come and fight me, that means they are mad". Quote from "Dixinn, Conakry: Alpha Condé s'adressant à 'ses oncles': le discours qui divise ...", guineeinter.com, 28 January 2011.

D. THE LEGISLATIVES, A RISKY THIRD ROUND FOR THE PRESIDENT ... AND FOR GUINEA

The electoral arrangements are surrounded by controversy and mistrust because, despite repeated denials by President Condé's entourage,²²⁵ the legislative elections pose a real problem for the government. Although he appears perfectly confident, Alpha Condé could find it difficult to achieve a majority in the Assembly.

The danger is aggravated by the voting system, which is different from the system used in the presidential elections. It is a mixed voting system: a third of the deputies will be elected by a simple majority in single-member constituencies and two-thirds of deputies will be elected by proportional representation from a national list.²²⁶ Parties with strong local roots will be tempted to go it alone in the elections because they will have a good chance of winning seats in single-member constituencies in their respective strongholds, and may also win a few seats by proportional representation. Moreover, as there will be only one round for both systems, President Condé will not be able to gain any advantage by forming the kind of coalition that worked in his favour in the second round of the presidential election. He will have to depend on the electoral base of his own party, the RPG. According to the provisional results from the first round of the presidential election, which provide the least inaccurate available snapshot of political loyalties in Guinea today, Alpha Condé received a little more than 20 per cent of votes, while Cellou Dalein Diallo received more than double that figure.

Moreover, the advantage always held by incumbent governments and the advantages conferred by control of the state apparatus could be of limited value because of the uncertainty about whether the new government will be able to achieve social and economic results before the election. Finally, President Condé seems to be having some problems retaining his allies. Lansana Kouyaté, whose PEDN provides genuine competition to Alpha Condé among the Malinké electorate of Haute Guinée, has expressed his disappointment with the new government.²²⁷ On 19 August 2011, he attended the official launch of a new coalition of opposition parties, the Alli-

²²⁵ Crisis Group interviews, Conakry, April and May 2011.

²²⁶ Each party or coalition of parties that participates in the election must therefore present a candidate in each constituency as well as a national list.

²²⁷ #For a summary of his speech on the Africa24 channel, see "Lansana Kouyaté: 'Alpha Condé m'a trahi... Je vais faire des révélations sur les élections présidentielles'", guinee58.com, 5 July 2011.

ance for Democracy and Progress (Alliance pour la démocratie et le progrès, ADP).²²⁸

The president seems to be having more success in Basse Côte. Despite rumours that he is dissatisfied, Kassory Fofana, leader of the GPT, rejoined the presidential fold on 16 June after four months in the United States.²²⁹ Facinet Touré and Mamadou Sylla, both believed to be influential in Basse Côte, support the president.²³⁰ However, there is lively competition between these politicians who all claim they can deliver the Basse Guinea vote to Condé.

The situation is also complicated in Guinée Forestière, where the presidential cabinet's relations with the Forester ministers, Jean-Marc Telliano and Papa Koly Kourouma seem to be strained because of budgetary control issues.²³¹ Jean-Marie Doré, leader of the Union for Progress of Guinea (Union pour le progrès de la Guinea, UPG), another influential figure in Guinea Forestière and believed to be close to Condé,²³² attended the ADP's launch, along with Lansana Kouyaté, but he took care to stress that the alliance was not "against anyone" and he was granted an audience by Alpha Condé on 7 September 2011.²³³

Cellou Dalein Diallo is counting on the support of his community. Strong in Moyenne Guinée, the UFDG could even win a few seats in the single-member constituencies in Basse Côte where there is a significant Peul population – they plan to make an electoral agreement with Sidya Touré's UFR to that end.²³⁴ It remains to be seen

what impact Alpha Condé's attempts to increase his influence in Moyenne Guinée will have. Condé's alliance with the Peul leader Ousmane Bah, whose image is tarnished among the Peul because of his association with Dadis Camara,²³⁵ hardly earned him any support in the presidential election. Moreover, a whole range of attitudes taken by the new government has fuelled the Peul community's feelings of victimisation and a desire for revenge. However, part of Diallo's electorate is weary, some are disappointed with him and others have no energy or resources left. These factors, combined with some government inroads into the community (for example, Cellou Dalein Diallo's cousin of the same name is Ambassador to Italy and was appointed adviser to the presidential cabinet),²³⁶ could all have an effect on the situation.

In addition, one should also take into account the UFDG's allies in other regions, from Sidya Touré to Abé Sylla, which have found it difficult to deliver their votes to Cellou Dalein Diallo in the second round of the presidential election. For the legislative elections, it is probable that they can count on a significant part of their traditional electorate if they run on their own, even though their political machines may have been weakened by defections stemming from their alliance with the UFDG.²³⁷ Sidya Touré has made an effort to rally his supporters in Basse Guinée by putting forward the idea that Basse Guinée should follow the example of the Peul and the Malinké, and get together to assert their political strength.²³⁸ Just as a reminder, the provisional results of the first round of the presidential election gave Diallo and Touré a combined total of more than 55 per cent of votes.

The UFDG and its allies have therefore some good reasons to hope for a creditable performance in the legislative elections while President Condé's RPG, which faces competition even in his Haute Guinée strongholds, could find himself in difficulty. Many observers believe that is why

²²⁸ #Communiqué de la nouvelle Alliance politique (ADP)", le jourguinee.com, 20 August 2011.

²²⁹ #Politique: Kassory Fofana regagne Conakry et se dit prêt à poursuivre le combat pour le changement auprès d'Alpha Condé", guineenews.org, 17 June 2011.

²³⁰ #After a long wait, Touré was finally received by the president and began his job as Ombudsman. Sylla, who cannot have appreciated being mentioned in the audits, later softened his position. He is actively involved, with Ousmane Kaba, another ally and adviser to President Condé, in the African Agricultural and Mining Development Bank (Banque africaine de développement agricole et minier), selected by the state to support the new National Micro-Credit Agency (Agence nationale de micro crédit) established by the president in April 2011. "Pr Alpha Condé-El Hadj Mamadou Sylla, ou la politique du 'je t'aime, moi aussi'", factuguinee.com, 22 April 2011.

²³¹ #President Condé's appointment of the general secretary of Kourouma's ministry may be evidence of these tensions. See "Décret portant nomination du secrétaire général du ministre Papa Koly Kourouma", guineelive.com, 8 July 2011.

²³² #Prime minister under President Konaté, Doré did not support any candidate in the presidential election.

²³³ "L'ADP se prononce pour la révision du fichier électoral", lejour.info, 27 August 2011.

²³⁴ Crisis Group interview, UFDG representative, Dakar, May 2011.

²³⁵ A few days before the 28 September 2009 massacre, an event that had an anti-Peul dimension, Ousmane Bah accompanied Dadis Camara to Labé, capital of Fouta Djallon, for a meeting. This seems to have permanently tarnished his image in the community to the extent that some question his Peul identity, saying that he is in fact "Métis".

²³⁶ Some major traders seem to have done a u-turn. The presence of El Hadj Ousmane Baldé, alias "Sans Loi", alias "Baldé Motors" at a meeting of the Association for the Promotion of Kabalaba, an NGO led by Ousmane Kaba, a presidential adviser and Mandingue leader, perhaps indicates this. See: "Société: l'APK a tenu sa cinquième Assemblée Générale Ordinaire à Conakry", radio-kankan.com, 18 June 2011.

²³⁷ Several of these parties have been hit by defections since the presidential election. Sidya Touré had to explain himself about his alliance with Diallo to the Basse Guinée Coordination.

²³⁸ Crisis Group interviews, UFR representatives, Conakry, April and May 2011.

the government is trying to delay the elections for as long as possible. Optimists think that the government only wants time to organise its coalition and to be able to deliver positive social and economic results to the electorate, which will not be easy given the budgetary problems, the weakness of the state and the slowness of donors to get funds on stream. This would explain the government's initiatives regarding the price of rice, the exchange rate, electricity and water supply and also the speedy agreement with Rio Tinto. Others believe that the government is more interested in destabilising the opposition and provoking it into making the mistake of adopting too rigid an attitude. The more pessimistic feel that the government needs more time to rig the elections and/or tamper with the electoral register and that it has absolutely no intention of organising elections if there is any chance it would lose them.

After the elections take place, the president's party may well find it difficult to control the Assembly. It will then probably form a coalition or even seek a form of cohabitation that could involve the formation of a government of national unity, which had been impossible right after the presidential election. Politicians such as Sidya Touré or Lansana Kouyaté and his partners in the ADP could play a pivotal role in such a situation. There could be an opportunity to shift the terms of the debate and defuse the dangerous ethno-regional stand-off.

Given the importance of what is at stake, the role played by ethnicity in the elections and the level of suspicion aroused by the electoral institutions, the legislative elections will probably be a moment of high tension. Before, during and after the elections, there is likely to be lively controversy over many aspects of the process. There could be clashes between party activists as they compete for the right to represent their communities. In some places, groups considered to be foreigners could see their right to vote challenged. In other places, activists could seek to punish a community perceived to be their enemy and representatives of the latter might organise reprisals elsewhere. Among the areas that present particular risks are Guinée Forestière, Fouta Djallon and Conakry.

In this context of possible escalation, Guinea fortunately has some powerful balancing mechanisms: a civil society forged during the unified mobilisation against the Conté and Dadis Camara regimes, and a long history of inter-ethnic relations and alliances. However, the perceived partisan nature of the state apparatus and the security forces' tradition of violence against civilians means there is justified concern about the state's capacity to maintain order. And precisely because society has been renegotiating the army's role for several years now, any significant escalation in the electoral process could open a window of opportunity to military malcontents.

VI. HOW TO RELAUNCH THE TRANSITION?

The transition is not over. It is important to rapidly complete institutional arrangements by electing a National Assembly and putting into place the other institutions provided for by the Constitution. Such arrangements should ease political tension and open new channels for interaction and appeal. However, this must be done by consensus. Although there is a range of local conflicts, the exacerbation of ethnic conflict is first and foremost a phenomenon promoted "from above" by political elites trying to find ways of mobilising support. These elites, in both the government and the opposition, share responsibility for completing the transition and consolidating democracy in Guinea. Taking things by stages may help them achieve this.

During these stages, the government, the opposition and civil society must be able to count on the support and vigilance of the international community. After years of difficult relations with the country, the latter played a major role under Konaté, notably through UNOWA and the International Contact Group on Guinea. The election of President Condé must not signal the end of international interest in Guinea or restrict it henceforth to involvement in the mining industry.

The European Union has maintained a supportive position and the new government has also received important encouragement from elsewhere. In February 2011, the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission agreed to the Guinean authorities request to place the country on its agenda. President Condé made an official visit to France in March and was invited to the G8 Summit in Deauville in May. He was also received by President Barack Obama in Washington in July, in the company of three other democratically elected West African presidents, and participated in the Chinese session of the Davos Forum, meeting Prime Minister Wen Jiabao in Dalian on 14 September. Rapid progress has been made with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, while a range of other financial institutions, such as the African Development Bank and the Islamic Development Bank have become heavily involved. At its summit meeting in Abuja in March 2011, ECOWAS voted a significant financial aid package for electricity supply. International involvement in Guinea must continue.

The interventions of Guinean civil society, particularly through the CNOSCG and its allies in the Guinean Social Movement (Mouvement social guinéen) and through certain international partners have already had an impact. There is no doubt that they have played a decisive role in the still timid openings conceded by the government in July and August, the abandonment of a new census, the

pardoning of the supporters of Cellou Dalein Diallo convicted after the 3 April protest march, President Condé's appeal for dialogue and the audience granted to the opposition politician, Sidya Touré, representative of the CPPFT. Even though the two sides that face each other today may lock themselves behind the legitimacy they enjoy among their respective electoral bases to adopt inflexible positions, things can still be done. The following steps should be taken:

A reconciliation that must begin in the political sphere and take place first among the key political parties.

Before even beginning to work on society as a whole, where antagonisms are perhaps not so strong as often imagined, the government can and must take a series of measures to promote a more positive political atmosphere. President Condé cannot act as though Cellou Dalein Diallo and Sidya Touré are only two leaders among 150. They represent at least 50 per cent of the electorate. A periodic and direct dialogue between the president and the leaders of parties that received a certain percentage of the votes in the first round of the presidential election (for example, 5 per cent) is required immediately and should last at least until the election of the National Assembly. The government should also promise to guarantee the freedom to demonstrate. The opposition political parties should accept government proposals for dialogue and not limit themselves to calling for the implementation of the constitutional provisions. They should also cease questioning the legitimacy of the government and the past presidential election.

A dialogue on electoral organisation. A dialogue on the forthcoming legislative elections is urgent and must cover all controversial aspects. Even more important than respect for the Constitution is the need for consensus between the main parties about the organisation of the elections. The credibility of the forthcoming election and its capacity to appease the political scene depends as much on achieving this consensus as it does on any technical criteria. This is one crucial question, which has long-term implications for the young Guinean democracy. As many of the problems that made the presidential election so tense are still present and Guineans have not succeeded in solving them by themselves, recourse to international guarantors to validate certain aspects of the process should not be excluded. The troika formed by the UN (through UNOWA), the AU and ECOWAS, which has been a driving force in the transition through the IGC-G and in discussions on security sector reform, seems to be in a particularly good position to play this role. It must get down to the job of facilitating dialogue between the president and his main political opponents.

Respect the central role of the NTC. Despite what may be considered its faults, the NTC is one of the few pluralist institutions currently functioning. Although it is not an

elected body, it has the legitimacy of being created by consensus in the heat of a profound crisis and of having played its role in difficult conditions. The government must continue to accept it as a legitimate legislative partner, as set out in the transitional Constitution. The NTC should continue to work on the organic bills that are required to complete institutional arrangements. The opposition should play a constructive and positive role in the NTC and use this forum to defend its positions.

Restraint in dealing with ethnicity. Political leaders must refrain from fuelling any escalation of ethnic tension. Alpha Condé and his entourage must avoid making ambiguous comments and stop resorting so quickly to the kind of populist rhetoric that accuses unidentified citizens of sabotaging the economy. Cellou Dalein Diallo and his supporters must stop presenting themselves as the party that protects the Peul from oppression: the new government has so far shown absolutely no genocidal tendencies and the opposition must not allow its more agitated supporters to warn about the danger of massacres without doing anything about it. The words "genocide" and "massacre" are too serious for political actors to use loosely. The INEC should ask those political parties that want to participate in the campaign for the legislative elections to sign a code of good conduct committing them to refrain from any comment that risks stirring up inter-communal tensions and ensure it is widely available to citizens. Civil society should be encouraged to watch and contribute to the code and create an independent observatory to monitor compliance with the code and, more generally, the treatment of ethnic issues in the media and political life, document abuses and publish regular reports.

Consolidate good governance. Efforts to promote good governance should be recognised and encouraged. The government must implement commitments to promote transparency (publication of mining contracts and asset declarations by the president and ministers). The government must make public past and present audits of public tenders and administrations. It is dangerous to weaken the credibility of these audits by allowing threats and rumours to interfere with their work. Although it is normal to offer all implicated actors a chance to regularise their situation, sanctions must be considered.

Promote reform of the security forces. If reform is to succeed, it should not be used to punish the military. It should give the military hope for the future and provide a career path. While waiting for a transformation of Guinea's economy, it will remain one of the few ways for young people to climb the social ladder, especially in regions such as Guinée Forestière. Although it is excessively large in relation to the country's strategic needs, the army fulfils a social function that should be taken into account. A superficial demobilisation will make no impact. The participation of Guinean units in peacekeeping forces

could be rewarding, could provide an important apprenticeship and should be encouraged. The coordination between international actors already engaged or interested in the sector must be strengthened, notably through the creation of a permanent mechanism located in Conakry and led by UNOWA and the UNDP.

Continue the fight against impunity. Judicial proceedings related to the 28 September 2009 massacre must continue. To be credible, they must proceed without consideration for the ethno-regional origin of the accused. The government and donors must support the judges' work and the International Criminal Court must continue to monitor the situation. In addition to the massacre, all members of the security forces who commit abuses of power, including during the fulfilment of their duties, must understand that they may be prosecuted. The proceedings under way in relation to routine abuses must be completed and the guilty must be convicted. The creation of an Observatory on Impunity, with a military representative, would allow monitoring of all judicial cases involving members of the defence and security forces, would produce regular and public reports and could be a highly significant measure. Alternatively, this function could be carried out by the Independent National Institution for Human Rights.

VII. CONCLUSION

Guinea has been having a turbulent time over the last ten years: the final act of the Liberian conflict, General-President Conté's long agony, Moussa Dadis Camara's erratic government and the drawn-out uncertainty of the 2010 election. The presidential election has not solved all the problems. The young democracy's institutional arrangements must be quickly completed. This is especially important in the case of the National Assembly, which will ensure an inclusive and open public debate. However, this would only be one stage in the long-term transition towards a strong democracy, which should see all Guinean political actors abandon the idea of organising on the basis of ethnic and regional identities and achieve the lasting domestication of the defence and security forces. The resolute commitment of international actors remains indispensable in this process.

In this context, the dissolution of the International Contact Group on Guinea before the election of a National Assembly was a bad signal. The region, the continent and the international community have the obligation to support the government in its major reforms and economic development and help the government, the opposition and civil society complete the transition.

Dakar/Brussels, 23 September 2011

APPENDIX A

MAP OF GUINEA



APPENDIX B

GLOSSARY

ADP	Alliance pour la démocratie et le progrès (Alliance for Democracy and Progress), opposition coalition formed in summer 2011 in preparation for the legislative elections, and composed of six parties, including the PEDN, UPG and UFC.
BCRG	Banque centrale de la république de Guinée (Guinea Central Bank).
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States.
CENI/INEC	Commission électorale nationale indépendante (Independent National Electoral Commission, INEC).
CNC	Conseil national de la communication (National Communications Council).
CNOSCG	Conseil national des organisations de la société civile guinéenne (National Council of Guinean Civil Society Organisations), main coalition of Guinean civil society organisations.
CNT/NTC	Conseil national de transition (National Transition Council, NTC).
CPPFT	Collectif des partis politiques pour la finalisation de la transition (Group of Political Parties for Finalising the Transition), coalition of about twenty opposition parties formed around the UFR and UFDG to obtain guarantees from the authorities about completing institutional arrangements.
CSM	Conseil supérieur de la magistrature (Supreme Council of the Judiciary).
FOSSEPEL	Force spéciale pour la sécurisation du processus électoral (Special Force for Electoral Security).
ICG-G	International Contact Group on Guinea.
GPT	Guinea pour tous (Guinea For All), pro-government party led by Kassory Fofana.
HAC	Haute autorité de la communication (High Communications Authority).
ICC	International Criminal Court.
MATD	Ministère de l'Administration territoriale et de la décentralisation (Ministry of Territorial Administration and Décentralisation).
MSG	Mouvement social guinéen (Guinean Social Movement), structure including CNOSCG, the two main trade union centrals and the Guinean Employers' Confederation.
NGR	Nouvelle génération pour la république (New Generation for the Republic), opposition party led by Abé Sylla and Faya Millimono, member of the CPPFT.
OGDH	Organisation guinéenne pour la défense des droits de l'Homme (Guinean Human Rights Organisation).
PEDN	Parti de l'espoir pour le développement national (Hope for National Development Party), party led by the former prime minister, Lansana Kouyaté, which supported Alpha Condé in the second round of the presidential election and participated in the formation of the opposition coalition ADP in July 2011.
PGRP	Parti guinéen pour la renaissance et le progrès (Guinean Party for Rebirth and Progress), pro-government party led by Alpha Ibrahima Sila Bah.
PUP	Parti de l'unité et du progrès (Unity and Progress Party), former president Lansana Conté's party, now led by Moussa Solano. It is a member of the opposition group CPPFT.
RDIG	Rassemblement pour le développement intégré de la Guinée (Rally for the Integrated Development of Guinea), pro-government party, led by the Minister Jean-Marc Telliano.
RPG	Rassemblement du peuple de Guinée (Rally of the Guinean People), President Alpha Condé's party.
UDG	Union démocratique de Guinée (Democratic Union of Guinea), pro-government party led by Mamadou Sylla, formerly of PUP and an associate of former president Lansana Conté.
UFDG	Union des forces démocratiques de Guinée (Union of Guinean Democratic Forces), party of Cellou Dalein Diallo, who lost to Alpha Condé in the second round of the presidential election in 2011, member of the opposition group CPPFT.
UFR	Union des forces républicaines (Union of Republican Forces), party led by Sidya Touré, which supported Cellou Dalein Diallo against Alpha Condé in the second round of the presidential election in 2011, member of the opposition group CPPFT.

UNDP	United Nations Development Programme.
UNOWA	United Nations Office for West Africa.
UPG	Union pour le progrès de la Guinée (Union for Progress of Guinea), party of Jean-Marie Doré, prime minister during the final phase of the transition, and who, thought to support Alpha Condé, participated in the formation of the opposition coalition ADP.
UPR	Union pour le progrès et le renouveau (Union for Progress and Renewal), pro-government party led by the Minister Ousmane Bah.

APPENDIX C

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

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Crisis Group's approach is grounded in field research. Teams of political analysts are located within or close by countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent conflict. Based on information and assessments from the field, it produces analytical reports containing practical recommendations targeted at key international decision-takers. Crisis Group also publishes *CrisisWatch*, a twelve-page monthly bulletin, providing a succinct regular update on the state of play in all the most significant situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world.

Crisis Group's reports and briefing papers are distributed widely by email and made available simultaneously on the website, www.crisisgroup.org. Crisis Group works closely with governments and those who influence them, including the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate support for its policy prescriptions.

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Crisis Group's international headquarters are in Brussels, with major advocacy offices in Washington DC (where it is based as a legal entity) and New York, a smaller one in London and liaison presences in Moscow and Beijing. The organisation currently operates nine regional offices (in Bishkek, Bogotá, Dakar, Islamabad, Istanbul, Jakarta, Nairobi, Pristina and Tbilisi) and has local field representation in fourteen additional locations (Baku, Bangkok, Beirut, Bujumbura, Damascus, Dili, Jerusalem, Kabul, Kathmandu, Kinshasa, Port-au-Prince, Pretoria, Sarajevo and Seoul). Crisis Group currently covers some 60 areas of actual or potential conflict across four continents. In Africa, this includes Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe; in Asia, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burma/Myanmar, Indonesia, Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka,

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